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This study attempts to explain the causes of turning points in real estate cycles and try 
to relate the housing price cycle to households’ moving decisions. The main 
contribution of the thesis is that it extends Stein (1995) hypothesis by incorporating 
real option theory and voting theory into the housing moving decision model.  
Building on the theory by Stein (1995), we surmise that a positive exogenous shock 
will swing the households to move up their housing career. The down payment 
requirements further reinforce the effects and the number of transactions increases. 
Yet the increase in both transactions and price volatility entices households to wait for 
possible increase in price in future. The waiting phenomenon further dampens the 
demand for new dwelling.  Coupled with possible new supply, we expect price to fall. 
The effects of loss aversion and equity constraints set in and the number of 
transactions and price volatility fall, until some point when it is beneficial to exercise 
the option. We further extend the above analysis by including the households’ 
improvement decisions into the picture. Further to the above, we also note that 
housing improvement decisions in the multi-family picture are collectively made. We 
further test the model postulated by Ben Shahar and Sulganik (2003) whether 
households make their votes based on minimizing disutility. In addition, we further 
test whether households do learn new strategies to abstain, or move over time, 
especially if they find the new strategy is more optimal.   
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Justification of Study 
 
Housing has consistently captured a fair amount attention from urban 
economists, geographers and social scientists (Mills, 2000). Many new scholarly 
journals, professional publications, and trade magazines have begun and expanded the 
literature during the past thirty years. In United States, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and the Federal National Mortgage Association publish at least a 
half-dozen housing periodicals. Internationally, housing research is also extensive 
throughout the OECD countries; organizations such as The World Bank and The 
Asian Development Bank have made much progress in understanding even the chaotic 
housing markets in China and Russia. In addition, research on housing, which first 
began in Europe, continues to flourish. 
 
The interest in housing market and house price dynamics is further driven by 
many motivations.  First, housing encompasses a large proportion of households’ 
consumption expenditure. In United States, housing is the largest consumer 
expenditure in United States, after medical care and food. In 1994, personal 
consumption expenditures on housing were about $2,600 per capita, or 14.9% of 
household budget (Green and Malpezzi, 2003). From the investment side, housing is 
the largest form of fixed capital investment in United States, comprising more than $9 
trillion, or half of its gross fixed private capital. In Singapore, 92% of the households 
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own the dwelling units they lived in. Furthermore, 61% of the households’ 
withdrawals of their pension savings are used to finance their housing. The total worth 
of the housing loans in Singapore is about S$5.1 billion as in 1998.  Housing is an 
important component of a household’s portfolio and house price dynamics have an 
important impact on the households’ financial situations. Furthermore, given the high 
cost of housing, most homeowners have to borrow heavily to finance their purchase. 
The cyclical nature of house price imposes credit risk on lenders, in terms of default 
and prepayment risks. 
 
Second, the sociological implications of housing market outcomes are as 
profound as the economic implications. Since housing is the largest asset held by most 
households, changes in prices in housing market affect how wealth is distributed. Stein 
(1995) postulated that housing price appreciation enabled households to move to 
better housing for constrained households. For instance, the sustained price 
appreciation of the public housing in Singapore enabled the households living in 
public housing to purchase private condominium units. Alternatively, the high price 
swings may prevent less affluent households from having access to housing. From the 
political perspective, governments need to provide affordable housing, so that less 
affluent households have an opportunity to own a flat; the governments either provide 
subsidized housing, or offer cheap financing. Fluctuations in housing price, together 
with co-ordination problems will, however, make such financing programs 
unsustainable. An understanding of the inherent causes of house price cycle and 
fluctuations is crucial for institutions to price such subsidies correctly. 




In the past decade, the number of studies on inter-temporal changes in house 
prices have further increased rapidly because of wider availability of extensive micro-
level data sets, improvements in modeling techniques and expanded business 
applications (Cho, 1996). The availability of mortgage and transaction data sets also 
allow researchers to further test the micro-foundations on the households’ decision to 
move; Genosove and Mayer (2001), Chan (2001) and Englehardt (2003) used the 
transaction data sets to further test on their hypothesis of households’ loss aversion. At 
the same time, the housing market literature also advanced several theories attempting 
to explain the relationship between prices and moving decisions. 
 
The theories can be divided into 3 categories. The first category of theories 
explains how households’ mobility decisions are triggered by a “mismatch” through 
an anticipated economic or demographic shock (Hanushek and Quigley, 1979). 
Wheaton (1990) further built upon the study by postulating that house prices were 
determined by the strength of the bargaining power between the buyers and sellers. In 
other words, the price determined depends on how many similar vacant units are in the 
market.  Hence, this group of theories implies that house price is exogenously 
determined and the house price pattern observed depends on the speed of adjustment 
by the suppliers and changes in expectations of the buyers.  These theories are 
consistent with the house price cycle literature (Lange and Mills, 1979; Poterba, 1984; 
Chinloy, 1996). 
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Nevertheless, the housing price theories postulated by Poterba (1984) and 
others do not predict the behavior of house price very well. Many authors observed 
that house price tend to remain higher than what is predicted by the past models. 
While Case and Shiller (2003) attributed the cause to fads and speculation, Stein 
(1995) provided an alternative insight and spearheaded the second group of theories. 
He explained that a positive exogenous shock in housing market would result a series 
of self-reinforcing effects; highly leveraged households were able to move up because 
of a decline in prices. Alternatively, a decline in price would result a fall in 
transactions due to equity constraints, households would try their luck by ‘fishing’.  
 
Genosove and Mayer (2001) and Englehardt (2003) put forth the third group of 
theories on the relationship between price and households mobility decisions during a 
house price downturn. Borrowing concepts from behavioral economics, they 
postulated that sellers experiencing nominal losses tend to set higher list price and 
keep properties on the market longer as compared to those experiencing gains.  In 
other words, why households do not move during downturns is attributable not only to 
the equity constraints faced by them, but also to the fear of nominal loss.  Their results 
further showed that equity constraints might not be critical in influencing households’ 
decision to move during bad times.  
 
Interestingly, Stein’s hypothesis and the loss aversion hypothesis are driven by 
different wants and needs of households. Stein’s hypothesis is formulated from the 
maximization of utility from consumption of housing and income, subject to a budget 
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constraint; homeowners are driven by consumption decisions. The loss aversion 
hypothesis, however, centers more on the homeowner’s investment motivations. 
Hence, the test on both hypothesis implicitly uncover whether the price behavior is 
influenced by investment objectives or consumption objectives.  
 
It is further observed from past literature that the explanation of the turning 
point of house prices is unclear. The theories that attributed house price movements to 
supply lags largely postulated that prices started to fall when the households formed 
expectations that there had been excess supply, or that prices would fall due to some 
exogenous factors. Yet, if there is excess supply, what then causes the over-
exuberance in the housing market to end? In addition, the loss aversion theory and 
equity constraints theory implies that households will probably not move when price 
falls. Thus, what causes the households to break from an immobility trap during a 
downturn? Is it another exogenous shock, or simply a sudden awareness of excess 
demand?  
 
I attempt to explain the turning point using the real option framework. I 
hypothesize that households have the option to relocate or stay in their existing home. 
The homeowner’s freedom to move or modify his dwelling is akin to the manager’s 
flexibility to expand, contract, defer the operations of the firm. Like the manager who 
is financially constrained to invest, the homeowner is constrained by the availability of 
financing to purchase his desired houses. Given that a large proportion of the 
homeowners’ wealth is spent on their dwellings, the capital gains/equity from the sale 
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of their dwelling will help the homeowners to purchase the desired homes. This is 
especially so, if the price of the current dwelling has grown sufficiently or the 
homeowners have build up sufficient equity over the years through the amortization of 
the mortgage.  There are two implications arising from the option to relocate; 
households will tend to stay when the house price volatility is high or if the price 
differential between the households’ current and desired dwellings widens. The option 
to move will not be in-the-money if the down payment payable exceeds the capital 
obtained from the sale proceeds. 
 
How do we incorporate the option theory into the household decision model? 
As suggested in most models, when there is a positive exogenous shock, housing 
demand increases and housing supply slowly adjusts to meet the demand. The slow 
adjustment in supply exerts an upward pressure on price. In addition, given the 
shortage in supply, sellers have greater bargaining power and can demand higher 
prices. The effect of leverage further fuels price increase, as equity constrained 
homeowners trade their current dwellings for better ones. As prices and transaction 
volume increase, house price also becomes more volatile. The option premium to wait, 
which depends on the difference between the purchase and expected selling prices of 
current dwelling and the volatility of prices, subsequently outweighs the present value 
appreciation and households will start to delay their housing investment.  The decrease 
in demand makes the increase in supply unsustainable and price starts to fall, changing 
the expectations of households. In addition, the equity constraint and loss aversion 
effects start to set in. As the price declines lead to lower transaction volume, the 
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option premium will be lower. When the price differential between the desired 
dwelling and current dwelling is lowered and the volatility of housing price becomes 
lower, households start to trade off or exercise their options. I further attempt to 
empirically test whether my hypothesis is plausible, using Singapore housing market.  
The clear segmentation of the housing sector – public and private housing sectors- 
provide us the unique opportunity to test our theory empirically.  The segmentations of 
housing markets in other countries are less clearly defined. Hence, it is harder for us to 
model the households’ upward or downward movements along their housing career.   
 
Our theory is, however, incomplete if we do not consider the households’ 
decision to improve their current dwellings. In 1995, expenditures on maintenance, 
repair, improvements, and alterations of the housing stock in United States totaled 
$111.7 billion; expenditures on private construction of new residential buildings 
totaled $162.4 billion1. According to estimates from the Joint Center for Housing 
Studies at Harvard University based on the 1995 and 1997 American Housing 
Surveys, home owners’ spending on housing improvements during 1994 to 1997 
averaged in excess of $100 billion. Including the spending by rental property owners, 
total expenditure on residential improvements and repairs averaged $165 billion per 
year between 1994 and 1997, just slightly less than the $184 billion average annual 
spending on construction of new private housing units over this period according to 
U.S. Commerce Department (Baker and Kaul, 2002). However, inclusion of the 
improvements variable will make our initial hypothesis more complicated. First, 
improvements will affect the supply function. Increasing housing improvements 
                                                 
1 Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Series C-50 and Series C-30 respectively. 
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indirectly increases the supply of housing.  Second, improvements affect the 
households’ demand of housing services. On the one hand, such improvements may 
serve as a substitute to moving.  On the other hand, sellers may improve the housing 
to fetch a higher price. Third, the housing improvements can also be treated as real 
options (Downing and Wallace, 2000). By incorporating the improvement decisions 
into the mobility option model, we attempt to extend the theoretical basis and test the 
implications of the model. The availability of Main Upgrading Programme (MUP) and 
the Interim Upgrading Programme (IUP) in Singapore, which are major improvement 
works on the households’ current dwellings initiated by Government, allow us to 
observe and model the households’ decision to invest in their housing.  
 
However, the Main Upgrading Programme also complicates matters because 
the Main Upgrading Programme can only be carried out if 75% of the households 
living in the affected precinct vote for it. Thus we need a voting game in place to 
model the choice. In the voting game, we assume that there are two groups of 
households, one for MUP and the other against MUP. The households can agree, 
disagree or abstain. In this case, the households can abstain by moving.  Ben-Shahur 
and Sulganik (2003) first studied how the voting rules favored by opposing parties are 
determined under different scenarios in a gated community. We first test their 
assumption on minimization of disutility, which is similar to the   minimax regret 
model (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974). In addition, we attempt to extend our 
understanding in the voting game within the gated community. We hypothesize that 
the households may learn other strategies in their course of playing the voting game, 
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1.2 Objectives of Research 
I. The first objective of this study is to model the households’ option to 
move or relocate. 
II. The second objective is to verify the households’ forward-looking 
response to house price appreciation. 
III. The third objective is to empirically test the option to move or relocate 
using household microdata. 
IV. The fourth objective is to model how improvement decisions interact 
with household decisions. We further to test whether our hypothesis on 
the interaction holds true or not.  
V. The fifth objective is to test the assumption of Ben-Shahur and 
Sulganik’s model and to expand our understanding of the voting 
strategies of co-owners. 
 
1.3 Organization of Report 
  
I will cover the related literature in the following chapter. In Chapter 3, we 
provide a brief overview of the housing market and the housing policies in 
Singapore. In Chapter 4, a conceptual model of the option model and the 
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voting model will be presented. In Chapter 5, I present the results of the 
preliminary tests for the real option theory. I further compute the option and 
further test the hypotheses using data from Singapore housing market in 
Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, I test the voting model postulated in Chapter 4 and 
analyze the empirical results. Using the results in the earlier chapters, I 
conclude by discussing the limitations of the study and the direction of 
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2.1 Households’ Mobility Decisions and Price Dynamics 
  
 Why do people move? Rossi (1955), a sociologist, first suggested that mobility 
is “the process by which families adjust their housing to their housing needs that are 
generated by shifts in family composition that accompany life-cycle change” in 1955. 
Following his study, many geographers, and economists further explore the 
underlying motivations that influenced the owners’ decisions. The early studies 
generally postulate that owners move because they cannot fulfill their housing needs 
in their current dwellings, or their current dwellings more than satisfy their housing 
wants. Yet the relationship between house price and mobility decisions is not 
discussed in these studies. In fact, house price is rarely featured in the modeling of 
households’ decision to move (Coupe and Morgan, 1981; Goodman, 1976; Pickles 
and Davis, 1985).  
 
 The relationship between price and moving decisions is first put forth by 
Hanushek and Quigley (1979). They explain mobility decisions as precipitated by a 
“mismatch” through an unanticipated economic or demographic shock. They assert 
that such adjustments are not smooth or necessarily symmetric over price increases 
and decreases, but they do not attribute the friction to any particular characteristic of 
the market. Wheaton (1990) and DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) further formalize the 
households’ decisions in a bargaining model. They assert that household income, life 
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cycle and demographic factors influence the preferences of total household 
consumption. When an exogenous event initiate a series of changes in the housing 
demand changes, the household will conduct a search and contemplate the net gains or 
losses of moving as opposed to staying in the current dwelling. The relative bargaining 
powers of buyers and sellers, which can be proxied by the vacancy rate of housing 
market, further push up house price. If the vacancy rate is high, buyers can easily 
match their wants. If not, they have to pay more for less desirable housing.   
 
 Using the above framework, Dispaquale and Wheaton (1996) further describe 
the market dynamics of housing in different setups where households form their 
expectations differently. They further attribute the fall in house price from the peak of 
cycle to excess vacant units caused by overbuilding. They reason that suppliers 
overbuild because of supply lags and information asymmetry between suppliers and 
buyers.  Dispaquale and Wheaton’s framework has many similar aspects with  
Poterba’s asset market approach (1984) and Topel and Rosen’s investment approach 
(1988) in modeling of the housing market. The only exception is that Dispaquale and 
Wheaton incorporates the stock flow methodology to account for land as an input 
whereas Poterba and Topel and Rosen do not do so.  
 
 Poterba (1984) examines the impact of a shock to the steady state, mapping out 
the adjustment process to a new steady state. A shock such as an increase in income 
initially results an increase in real housing price since the housing stock is fixed. The 
market thus adjusts with growth in the housing stock and decline in property price to a 
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new steady state. On the supply side, he assumes that the home-building industry 
composes of competitive firms and that the industry’s aggregate supply depends on its 
output price, the real price of housing structure. Assuming there are limits to supply of 
any factor of production, increases in demand for construction will boost the 
equilibrium price of dwellings. Topel and Rosen (1988) examine the extent to which 
housing investment decisions are determined, by comparing current asset prices with 
current marginal costs of productions. They posit that current asset prices are 
sufficient statistics for housing investment if short-term and long-term supplies of 
housing are the same. They further assert that the divergence between short-term and 
long-term elasticities indicates that current asset prices are not sufficient to make 
investment decisions, and suggests that builders must form expectations about future 
prices in order to project the expected earnings. 
 
 Numerous studies have lent support to the “mismatch” theories, and have 
confirmed a positive correlation between housing prices and trading volume. 
Berkovec and Goodman (1996) further formalize Wheaton’s search model (1990) and 
conduct an empirical test on the correlation between the changes in turnover rates and 
demand. Their findings lend support to the search theories. Ortalo-Magne and Rady 
(1998), Andrew and Meen (2003), and Leung et al (2002) also present empirical 
evidence in  support of the Wheaton model for US, UK and Hong Kong respectively.  
Yet, such empirical evidence, which is based on aggregate data, can only at most 
establish some causality between the correlated series of housing prices and trading 
volume. Without controlling for the demographic and socio-economic factors, these 
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aggregate results suffer from significant omitted variable bias (Seslen, 2003) because 
past literature shows that these factors affect households’ decision to move.   In 
addition, the “efficient market” approach to house price determination has also 
encountered empirical difficulties. Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) present evidence that 
changes in house prices can be forecasted, based on both past price changes and on 
some fundamental-based measures such as rent-to-price and construction-cost-to price 
ratios. Many observers also reach similar conclusions that house prices are in part 
driven by non-fundamental speculative phenomena such as fads or bubbles (Chinloy, 
1996; Abraham and Hendershott, 1996).  
 
 Stein (1995) offers a theory to explain both large price swings as well as the 
correlation between prices and trading activity in the context of equity constraints. 
Stein (1995) proposes that such a phenomenon is a result of self-reinforcing effects 
from down payment to house prices. He further explains his proposal by modeling the 
would-be home buyers’ behavior.  Stein’s model is one of repeat buyers-families who 
already own a home but have reasons for wanting to move (e.g. new job, better 
schools, etc). These families are assumed not forced to sell their homes under adverse 
conditions, but would choose to move only if the gains from moving are large enough. 
In particular, at any level of house prices, families can be divided into three groups: 
“unconstrained movers,” “constrained movers,” and “constrained non-movers”.   
 
 The “unconstrained movers” consists of families whose debts are so low that 
the down payment requirement does not affect their behavior. Hence, the housing 
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demand for this group of movers is a decreasing function of price and they perform a 
stabilizing role.  Unlike the previous group, the “constrained” movers have an 
intermediate level of debt and they face binding financial constraints. In equilibrium, 
each of the “constrained” movers chooses to sell their old house and buys a new one. 
Nevertheless, the new dwelling is smaller than what they would like because they do 
not have enough money for a larger down payment. However, this group of 
constrained movers would be able to realize more from their sale of house upon an 
increase in price and would use the extra money to make the down payment for a 
better dwelling. Hence, the housing demand for this group of “constrained” movers is 
an increasing function of price and this group of movers performs the crucial 
destabilizing role in Stein’s model. Finally, families in the group of “constrained non-
movers” are so financially constrained that they would be better off sitting tight than 
moving, despite the potential gains from moving. Thus they would not react to 
increase in house prices. Yet, when house prices fall, these households may rationally 
choose to stay where they are than move to a much smaller house. Or, the constrained 
non-movers may list their current house (fishing) at an above market price in the hope 
of getting lucky and raising enough money to make a reasonable down payment. 
Hence, he surmises that this could be one of the reasons the transaction volume is 
lower when prices are falling than that if prices are rising.  
 
 Lamont and Stein (1999) find empirical evidence to support Stein’s 
hypothesis.  Studying the borrowing patterns at the city level from the American 
Housing Survey for 44 metropolitan areas between 1984 and 1994, they find that 
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house prices react more sensitively to city specific shocks in cities where a greater 
fraction of homebuyers are highly leveraged. In addition, Chan (2001) tests the Stein’s 
hypothesis by analyzing the mobility of homeowners, using a sample of 5,094 
residential single family 30-year mortgages originated in New York, New Jersey and 
Connecticut. Chan (2001) find that there are severe constraints to mobility as a result 
of negative housing market shocks. Her test supports Stein’s theory on why lower 
transaction volume coincides with the fall in prices. Stein’s model, however, also 
implicitly assumes that households’ decision to move is dominated by price 
movements. This basis, which the model depends on, may not be true, since other 
socioeconomic factors can trigger off household decisions to move. In addition, 
households also need not move in order to increase their housing consumption; they 
may choose to renovate their house or increase their floor area of current house.  
 
 Unlike the mismatch theory postulated earlier, Stein implicitly assumes that 
price changes are caused by changes in demand, rather than supply lags. He asserts 
that the interaction between demand and price depends on the change in demand due 
to unconstrained movers-the change in demand that arises from families that switch 
from being non-movers to constrained movers and the change in demand of 
constrained movers. Of all the demand functions of the three categories of movers, 
only the change in demand of constrained movers is positively influenced by the price 
change. Hence, if most constrained movers have acted upon a change in price and 
become constrained non-movers, the self-reinforcing effects will dwindle, and 
subsequent changes in demand of housing of unconstrained movers and constrained 
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non-movers are likely to offset the effect of constrained movers. The price will, thus, 
fall. 
 
 One of the criticisms leveled on Stein’s model is the static nature of the model. 
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998, 1999, 2001) further extend his model by incorporating 
the life-cycle model into Stein’s existing framework. In their model, agents face credit 
constraints and their housing consumption is restricted to a discrete set of possibilities.  
There are two sets of agents; one group consists of agents who are younger, credit 
constrained and going for starter housing, and the other group consists of agents who 
are older and not credit constrained. These agents can choose to rent, stay with 
parents, or move to a starter housing or a more expensive housing. Generally, the 
prospective buyer prefers to own its dwelling than to rent. In addition, they would like 
to live in more expensive housing rather than the starter housing, which they could 
first afford.  
 
 Assuming four periods, Ortalo-Magne and Rady further set several parameters 
determining the distribution income levels of the households. At each period, the 
prospective buyer decides which type of accommodation to occupy in the following 
period, execute the corresponding transactions on the housing and credit markets, and 
last, consume the numeraire good. By specifying the age of the households, they 
further identify the equilibrium price and demand, given a positive income shock. 
Ortalo-Magne and Rady find that the income of credit-constrained households has a 
great influence on the credit-constrained households’ housing demand, and the 
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fluctuation of prices. In addition, they find that the property prices of the better 
dwellings are supported by the price of starter housing, which is further determined by 
the income of the credit constrained households.  In addition, the relative difference in 
user costs of both types of housing to the utility premium of the better housing also 
determines the price, since households in the later stages of the life cycle tend to 
substitute the better dwellings for the starter flats.  
 
 Using the theoretical construct of Ortalo-Magne and Rady,  Bardhan et. al. 
(2003) further examine the determinants of new private residential units sold in 
Singapore during the 1990s. Their findings show that there is a statistically significant 
“wealth effect” driving the sales of new private residential properties. Second, the real 
local interest rates have a statistically significantly negative impact on these sales. 
Thirdly, they further discover that an increase in the rate of change of public resale 
prices has an important and significant effect on the sales of private residential units. 
 
 Grossman and Laroque (1990) present a model that spans both theories 
reviewed above. They assert that the transaction costs play a critical role in 
households’ decision to move. In their model, housing consumption is determined by 
an ideal ratio of housing to total wealth, which is based on household preferences with 
regard to consumption value, risk aversion and other factors. With no transaction 
costs, any deviation from the ideal level of usage of housing services should induce 
the household to readjust their housing consumption. As transaction costs grow, a 
band of inactivity develops around the ideal, and the disequilibrium between the actual 
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and ideal ratios must increase in order to induce a move. Hence, duration dependence 
is very strong especially among older individuals, occurring as a result of an 
increasing psychological and economic attachment to the home over time (Venti and 
Wise, 1990; Seslen, 2002). Ferreira (2003), who analyzes how moving costs generated 
by property laws affect household mobility, further support Grossman and Laroque’s 
model with his empirical results. 
 
 Genosove and Mayer (2001) and Englehardt (2003) offer an alternative 
explanation for the low transaction volume during the down turn in house price, as 
opposed to Stein (1995). Borrowing concepts from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on 
behavioral economics, they explain that households do not move during down markets 
because of loss aversion, as opposed to equity constraints. Genosove and Mayer 
(2001) explain that households, in fear of nominal loss, will put up their property for 
sale at higher prices than their initial price in a down market. The time in market will 
be longer and total transaction volume will be lower. Genosove and Mayer (2001) 
assert that the loss composes of two components; loss due to change in market indices 
and loss due to overpayment or underpayment of current attributes. However, the 
latter component is not easily observable and this results a measurement problem. 
Genosove and Mayer come up with two models to measure the loss. In the first model, 
loss is estimated as the truncated difference between the purchase and predicted price 
of a hedonic equation. Their second model adds the previous selling price from the 
price regression as a noisy proxy for unobserved quality. Using individual property 
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listings in the Boston Condominium market at weekly intervals between 1990 and 
1997, their empirical results support the prospect theory. 
 
 Englehardt (2003) further uses interactions between initial period loan-to-value 
ratio and nominal gains and losses in housing value to clarify the role of loss aversion. 
Using detailed data from 1985-1996 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79), which were matched with house price data from 149 metropolitan areas to 
estimate instrumental variables linear probabilities, he discovers that loss itself, not the 
tightening of equity constraints due to declining prices, lowers mobility. Englehardt 
argues that the households that have low loan-to-value ratio debt level are not equity 
constrained. Hence, if nominal losses are significant in positively influencing theses 
households’ decision to stay, we can draw conclusions that prospect theory and loss 
aversion hypothesis are supported. His results should, however, be interpreted with 
care, given that the study focuses only on the young, and does not account for 
individual heterogeneity in mobility behaviour. Wong (2003) also tests the loss 
aversion theory, using SARS epidemic as a natural experiment and her results support 
the loss aversion model. 
 
 Although Stein (1995), Englehardt (2003) and Genosove and Mayer (2001) 
offer robust explanations on the low transaction volume during a price downturn, what 
causes demand of housing to recover remains unanswered. If the equity constraint and 
loss aversion effects remain influential in affecting households’ decision to stay, we 
are likely to observe a persistent fall in housing price until it reaches the floor price, 
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which is likely to be determined by the cost of construction. Hence, the question is 
whether the market can recover endogenously by its dynamics or require an 
exogenous shock remains to be explored. 
 
 Seslen (2003) further studies the above models and tries to link to the 
consumption decisions of household. Her analyses show that households respond 
strongly to housing price dynamics in the trading decision, but the demographics play 
a far stronger role in the decision to trade down. She finds that a Grossman and 
Laroque model coupled with the existence of loss aversion come closest in explaining 
the positive effects of rising markets and negative response to price declines. Using a 
structural estimation technique on a sample of movers, she finds that households show 
a significant evidence of a forward-looking response to price appreciation.  
 
 As mentioned earlier, I attempt to use real options concept to further explain 
the turning points of price cycle.  Implicitly, all the above studies recognize that the 
homeowners have some flexibility to adjust their housing consumption. Such 
flexibility means that a homeowner has an option to move, subject to his or her 
affordability of the desired house. Given that the sale of the current dwelling provides 
capital gains to the owner, the owner can utilize the realized equity to move. The 
homeowners’ decision to move is similar to the investment decision of developers. 
Capozza and Sick (1991), Williams (1993) and Capozza and Li (1994) model the 
investment decisions as real options. Similarly, we can follow their example by 
modeling the homeowners’ decision to move using real options. 




 One critical assumption based on real options approach is that the households 
must be forward looking and they make rational expectations. The household’s 
decision to move is analogous to an economic decision because he or she has to 
circumspect all future benefits or decisions that depend on his or her decision to move. 
The concept of expectations is well established in macroeconomics and is instrumental 
in explaining the efficiency of markets and the impact of exogenous changes 
introduced into the market.   
 
 The adaptive expectations or backward looking expectation model assumes 
market participants form expectations based on some pattern or past behaviour in the 
market. The adaptive expectations model is widely employed in modelling of 
agricultural markets (see Nerlove, 1958) because models embodying this assumption 
are readily able to generate stable cyclical fluctuations. Although such adaptive 
expectation models are frequently criticised as being ad hoc, there is evidence from 
consumer surveys that consumers frequently operate in this manner (Case and Shiller, 
1988). A characteristic of the adaptive expectations model is that the price cycle will 
be unable to converge to its steady state, and the cycle will exist by itself without any 
cyclical movements in the market exogenous variables (Dispaquale and Wheaton, 
1996). 
 
 The rational expectations hypothesis is first put forth by Muth (1961).  The 
rational expectations hypothesis assumes that people’s subjective probability 
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distributions about the future outcomes are the same as the actual probability 
distributions, conditional on the information available to them. In other words, the 
consumers are perfectly informed about the operation of the market. The tests of the 
rational expectation hypothesis are made possible, through the form of tests of the 
‘efficient market hypothesis’ pioneered by Fama (1970, 1976). Essentially, under 
rational expectations, prices follow a random work. Prices are efficient and 
unpredictable because lagged values of no variable have an influence on price 
movements. In other words, a market shock does not set off a cyclical pattern; there is 
only a single price overshoot (Dispaquale and Wheaton, 1996).  
 
Alternatively, under the exogenous expectations hypothesis, agents formed 
expectations independently of the local market behaviour. Such attitudes exist if 
households believe that future prices will rise with general economic inflation or some 
long-run growth rate that is largely unaffected by short run movements in price. The 
exogenous expectations model relies on the assumption that the market participants’ 
beliefs are constant over time and are not affected by recent price behaviour in the 
market (Dispaquale and Wheaton, 1996). Although the assumptions are restrictive, the 
exogenous expectations model offers a useful intellectual exercise. 
  
 The concept of expectations was tested indirectly in the real estate literature 
through examinations of the efficiency of the housing markets. Life Cycle models 
under rational expectations imply that house prices follow a random walk and exhibit 
seemingly cyclical behaviour only if the exogenous variables that affect the market 
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have cyclical movements (Meen, 2003). All evidence, however, suggests that housing 
markets are neither efficient nor can be characterised as a random walk (Englund and 
Ioannides, 1997; Gatzlaff and Tirtiroglu, 1995; Cho, 1996; Dispaquale and Wheaton, 
1994; Mankiw and Weil, 1989). The factors that account for the market inefficiency 
appear to be the presence of transaction costs and credit market constraints (Quigley, 
2003).  
 
 Since housing prices are reflective of the actions of would-be movers, the 
above implies that the expected returns from housing and other form of housing will 
influence the decisions of would-be movers. In addition, the inefficient market also 
implies that households expect the market to rise if past prices are rising. Case and 
Shiller (1988) find evidence that this is true- house buyers’ attitudes about likely 
future price appreciation are highly correlated with recent price behaviour.   
 
2.2 Households’ decisions and Housing Investments  
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, households can consume more housing good, not 
only by moving to a better house, but also by improving the facilities and 
characteristics of its current dwelling. Much of the work done to date focuses on the 
demand for home improvement because homeowners are both suppliers and 
consumers of housing (Dispaquale, 1999). Bogdan (1992) provides a detailed review 
of the literature on renovation and repair decisions. She asserts that the basic modeling 
approach in this literature is to assume that the property owner maximizes the value of 
net benefits from the housing unit. For owner-occupants, the benefits include housing 
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consumption and the return on the housing investment in the form of capital gains 
when the house is sold. Expenditures on renovation, repair and maintenance increase 
with the marginal value the household places on housing services, the additional flow 
of services produced by the expenditures, and the expected price the property is sold.  
 
 Potepan (1989) first analyzes the decision between home improvements and 
moving. He surmises that higher interest rates increase the attractiveness of home 
improvements assuming that homes are purchased with a fixed rate mortgage. If 
moving results in taking a mortgage at a higher interest rate than that of the current 
mortgage, the household finds home improvement more attractive to moving. He 
further argues that increases in income make home improvement less attractive 
because there are technical limits to the increase in housing services that can be 
achieved by making improvements on an existing structure. Using the 1979 Panel 
Study of Income dynamics, which provides micro-level data on households, he test his 
hypothesis by estimating a logit model where the choice is defined as making 
improvements or moving.  He finds that higher interest rate increase the chances of 
households improving their current dwelling, while increases in income decreases the 
probability of choosing to improve. 
 
 Montgomery (1992), however, contends that Potepan’s results are difficult to 
interpret because he does not consider households who choose neither improvement 
nor moving. She constructs a model where households choose the optimal level of 
housing and the means to achieve the level given their current housing. She estimates 
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her ordered probit model using 1985 American Housing Survey, which provides 
detailed information on the households and their housing characteristics and 
expenditures for renovation and repair. Her results suggest that high income 
households are more likely to improve their existing unit. The probability of 
improving and the size of expenditures on improvements are lower for mature and 
minority households, as well as for those who stayed in their dwellings for an 
extensive period. In rapidly growing markets, households are more likely to improve 
and spend on those improvements, probably reflecting expectations about house price 
growth. Occupants of older houses are also found to be more likely to improve and 
spend more on those improvements.  
 
 On the one hand, the above models by Montgomery (1992) and Potepan 
(1989) assume moving and improving to be competing means for households in 
disequilibium to achieve equilibrium in housing consumption. If the outcomes in 
terms of housing consumption are broadly the same, move or improve decisions 
become cost minimizing problems (Montgomery, 1992; Shear, 1983; Amundsen, 
1985; Galster, 1987). On the other hand, Littlewood and Munro (1997), extending 
from Edin  and Englund’s (1991) argument that recent movers are no more nearer to 
equilibrium consumption than the non-movers, assert that moving and improving can 
be complementary strategies utilized by households to reach their equilibrium 
housing. Using the 1991 Scottish House Condition Survey (SHCS), Littlewood and 
Munro (1997) construct a model to test three hypotheses. First, they want to know 
whether improvement activity is an ‘inferior’ mode of housing adjustment to moving, 
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where ‘inferiority’ is established by experiencing relative socio-economic 
disadvantage. Second, they attempt to find out the extent to which movers are in their 
equilibrium state. Third, they attempt to explore the factors associated with a move-
and-improve decision. They find no evidence that improvement is an ‘inferior’ mode 
of housing adjustment and not all recent movers are in equilibrium. Baker and Kaul 
(2002) further explore the home improvement decisions further, by incorporating 
dynamic factors, namely changes in the composition of the household and previous 
spending on home improvements. Their results show that adding a child or an adult 
increases the odds of expansion by 27% and 32 % respectively and income positively 
influenced households’ decision to move. Their study, however, fails to account for 
households’ decision to move. 
 
 Downing and Wallace (2000) offer a different approach to model homeowner 
improvement decisions. In their model, the value of a house is equal to the expected 
net present value of a perpetual stream of service flows, which are a function of a set 
of attributes describing the structure. This set of attributes is further allowed to evolve 
over time. Given the fluctuating stream of service flows, Downing and Wallace model 
the homeowner’s decision to invest in house attributes as real options. The 
homeowner compares the value of an additional unit of attribute, net of the value of 
the opportunity to invest in the future, to the cost of the investment whether or not to 
invest. Using panel data from the American Housing Survey,  Downing and Wallace 
construct the mixed-logit model and conduct an empirical test of whether observed 
homeowner investment behavior is consistent with the real option theory of 
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investment or not. Consistent with real option theory, they discover that homeowners 
are more likely to invest when the spread between the return on housing and user cost 
of capital is wide. In addition, they find that the value of waiting to invest increases, 
when the net return on the investment is more volatile. Although their approach is 
novel, they do not consider households’ decision to move as covered by the past 
literature. Furthermore, given that most of the residential developments in Singapore 
are gated communities or multi-family residential properties, improvement works on 
common property cannot be initiated by any individual and require consensus among 
the other residents.  
 
2.2 Households’ Improvement Decisions, Mobility Decisions and voting strategies 
 Households living in multi-family residential properties may not obtain the 
expected returns spent on housing investments. First, the increase in asset value in the 
absence of cooperative effort is marginal since part of the expenditure generates 
external benefits to owners of proximate properties (Fischel, 1985). Second, financial 
institutions are reluctant to lend residents in blighted neighborhoods and owners of old 
buildings and the costs of borrowing would be high. Besides the higher costs involved, 
owners of multi-family properties co-own the common areas and any improvement 
decision requires a general consensus under the lease contract. 
 
One of the ways for co-owners to arrive a consensus is by voting- “a method 
by which to achieve simultaneously joint ownership and decision making.” De Geest 
(1992) finds various voting rules for different decision types by examining practices in 
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apartment buildings in five European countries. For instance, he finds that decisions 
which result in value redistribution often required a unanimous agreement, while 
decisions about maintenance of existing public goods in apartment buildings are 
generally reached by simple majority voting. Ben-Shahur and Sulganik (2003) also 
explore the optimal voting rule for co-owners whose future debates are resolved by 
voting. By adopting the optimality criterion and the general methodology by Rae 
(1969) and then developed by Badger (1972), they further examine the arguments of 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Barzel and Sass (1990)- heterogeniety in interests 
among voters optimally leads to a larger majority voting rule. They define a voting 
rule as optimal if it minimizes the expected disutility for each voter from failing to 
vote according to the adopted decision.  
 
Ben-Shahur and Sulganik (2003) found that their results were consistent with 
those of Barzel and Sass (1990). They showed that a relatively small (large) majority 
rule would persist for the types of proposals around which the voting group was 
expected to be homogenous (heterogeneous). However, they show that individuals 
who exhibit distinct preferences and/or different prior beliefs on the own and other 
stances in future potential votes might still opt for the same voting rule. They also 
proved that raising disutility generated by rejection (acceptance) of a proposal, which 
the individual supports (opposes), generally decreases (increases) the level of the 
optimal voting rule. They concluded that one could not make deductions about the 
characteristics of the co-owners by making deductions about the characteristics of the 
co-owners. Although the results of Ben-Shahur and Sulganik’s (2003) study offered 
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new insights, they assumed that co-owners strategize their vote to minimize their 
disutility, rather than maximize their expected utility. In other words, their model calls 
for extremely conservative behavior on the part of voters 
 
From the above, we can further imply that co-owners can judge whether their 
position is optimal or not if the voting rule is provided. Yet, whether they vote or 
abstain remain unanswered after they have judged their position based on the voting 
rule. If the position is non-optimal, the co-owners may move so that their utility 
positions remain unchanged. Hence, if the co-owners, who feel they belong to the 
minority, abstain by moving, the distribution of voters will change and the majority 
becomes stronger.  
 
Borrowing concepts from the economic theories on voter turnout, we attempt 
to model how co-owners vote or abstain after the voting rule is established. Dhillon 
and Peralta (2002) provided a good review of the voter turnout literature. In order to 
adapt to our context, we propose the bounded-rationality models to study how the 
voters behave, as proposed by Sieg and Schulz (1995). Sieg and Schulz (1995) 
replaced the full rationality of a voter assumed in a game theoretic model, by a model 
of adaptive learning. In their model, no voter knows the optimal strategies but learns 
voting strategies that are of high economic fitness. The objective of the voter is to 
raise her voting status, which is denoted as the ratio of the voter’s payoff to the 
average payoff of other voters. Learning is through trial and error: a voter changes his 
strategy by accident. One trial shows whether the status quo or the new strategy is 
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better. A voter is able to learn a new strategy if this increases his social position. An 
evolutionary voting equilibrium is reached whenever no other strategy can increase 
the relative payoff and thus no other strategy can be learned. . In our context, the 
upward movement from public housing to private housing is viewed as improvement 
of household social status (Koh and Ooi, 1996) and is deemed as one of the deviant 
strategies.  




Chapter 3  Singapore Housing Market and Housing Policies 
 
3.1 Housing Market in Singapore 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Singapore housing market offers us a unique 
opportunity to test our hypothesis. First, the clear demarcation of the housing market 
allows us to test the households’ option to move. Second, the unique Main Upgrading 
Programme allows us to test the various hypotheses posited by the housing 
improvement literature. In addition, the voting procedures required by the guidelines 
for Main Upgrading Programme allow us to understand how homeowners make their 
voting and mobility decisions concurrently. 
 
 Singapore’s housing market is segmented into two sectors; the public housing 
sector and the private housing sector.  In 2002, 85% of the population lived in public 
flats (See Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 1995). Of the 866,071 units of public 
housing, 83% were owner-occupied housing while the remaining 17% of the public 
housing stock comprised of rental units.  The high proportion of owner-occupied 
housing is an anomaly, since most countries have a relatively strong rental sector. The 
high rate is attributed to the Government policies to retain talent in Singapore. When 
Singapore gained its independence on 1965, there was great political instability and 
there is a growing exodus of talent to other countries. In order to cultivate the sense of 
belongingness to Singapore, the government came up with measures to allow 
Singaporeans to afford good quality housing.  In addition, during the 1960s, Singapore 
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was facing a shortage of housing supply and living conditions were bad. The 
Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) then was incapable of providing sufficient 
housing to the residents. On 1 February 1960, the Housing and Development Board 
(HDB) was established under the Housing and Development Act (Cap. 129, 1985 Ed.) 
to take over the role of constructing affordable housing units. The successful provision 
of shelter and together with good management of the economy, gave the ruling party, 
People’s Action Party, the required legitimacy to rule Singapore.   
 
 One of the reasons of the astounding success of Singapore’s homeownership 
policy is the unique finance arrangement offered to Singaporeans purchasing public 
housing. All Singaporeans keep a permanent savings account known as the Central 
Provident Fund (CPF), and they can use the savings in (CPF) to finance their housing 
purchase. The fund is essentially a fully funded, pay as you go social security scheme 
which requires mandatory contributions by both employers and employees of a certain 
percentage of the employees’ monthly contractual wage to his/her account in the fund.  
The percentage, determined by the government, varies over the years. The percentage 
contributed by the employers is usually reduced during economic downturns. These 
fairly substantial forced savings may be withdrawn at age 55 or earlier for various 
approved purposes. Between 1968 and 1981, they could be withdrawn for the 
purposes of down payment, stamp duties, mortgage and interest payments incurred for 
the purchase of private housing.  This policy of allowing households to use their CPF 
savings to finance their purchase of homes enables the homeownership policy to be 
successful (see Asher, 1994, 1995).  




During the past decade, rules governing the use of CPF savings have been 
gradually liberalized to allow for withdrawals for medical and education expenses, 
insurance and investments in various financial assets. In addition, the HDB also 
provide mortgage financing to its flat-buyers. The loan quantum is either 80% or 90% 
depending on the government policy at the point in time, and the maximum repayment 
period ranges from 25 to 30 years. The HDB mortgage rate is pegged at 0.1 per cent 
above the CPF interest rate, which is below the housing mortgage interest rates of 
commercial banks. This represents another subsidy for the purchaser of an HDB flat.  
Nevertheless, this subsidy may not be accessed by all HDB owners; the resale flat 
buyers who do not meet the eligibility requirements for the HDB loan has to take up a 
private loan.  
 
 Within the public housing sector, we can further subdivide into three sectors: 
the public new housing sector, the public resale housing market and the public 
executive condominium market. In the public new housing sector, HDB sell newly 
built dwellings at subsidized price, and offer the owners subsidized mortgage rates. 
But accessibility to this sector is strictly regulated.  In addition, the allocation schemes 
of the public housing changes over time, the latest scheme is a build-to-order 
allocation system where the supply is determined by the demand generated by the 
buyers. The public resale housing market is first introduced in 1971 and is subject to 
the regulations laid down by the HDB. The minimum occupancy period is 30 months 
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if the flat had been purchased in the resale market. A resale unit differs from a new 
unit in that buyers do not have to be on a waiting list for new units to be completed.  
 
 In contrast to the prices for new flats, prices in the resale market are 
determined not only by market forces, but also by changes in prices for new HDB flats 
and HDB credit and valuation policies for resale flats. In addition, the subsidies are 
offered less freely to buyers of resale flats. More importantly, there are no income 
ceilings for those who want to purchase public housing.  Exhibit 3.1 shows the 
changes in price over the years. The resale property price rose from 1990 till 1996, 
and declined thereafter. There was a slight recovery at 1999, but price fell again to 
1998 level from 2000 onwards.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 3.1] 
 
 The increase in resale price from 1990 to 1996 is likely to be caused by the 
housing policies implemented then. In 1991, the authorities allowed singles above 35 
years old to purchase 3 room or smaller resale flats outside the central area. This 
effectively increased the demand for 3-room resale flats. In addition, financing was 
made easier with the relaxation of the use of the owners’ savings in Central Provident 
Fund (CPF), and the provision of grants to first time buyers. For instance, with effect 
from 1993, CPF members can make additional withdrawal to service interest 
payments even if the total sum exceeds the purchase price of the private property. 
Also, with effect from June 1995, all first timers who purchase resale flats are eligible 
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for grants, even if they do not live near their parents. Alternatively, the reasons for the 
in fall in price in 1997 are likely to be the Asian Currency Crisis and the Anti-
Speculation Curbs implemented by the Government on 1996. 
 
 The public executive condominium sector was first established in Aug 1995, 
and was aimed at satisfying the growing demand for private housing and to replace the 
executive apartment programme. The building of executive condominiums is carried 
out by developers appointed in the Gazette by the Minister for National Development 
under sec. 4 of the Executive Condominium Housing Scheme Act.  The executive 
condominium resembles private property in its form, except that they have restrictions 
because of the implicit subsidy in its final price. They are strata-titled, have facilities 
and finishing similar to private condominiums, and sell at prices 20%-30% below the 
prevailing market prices of comparative properties.  They are, however, smaller in size 
than the executive apartments that they are designed to replace. Also, buyers can only 
sell or transfer their units to citizens and permanent residents after five years and to 
anyone after another five years.  Unlike the housing offered by the former sub-sectors, 
HDB will not offer any mortgage financing to buyers of executive condominiums. The 
20% down payment required for private housing loans also applies to executive 
condominiums.  
 
 Like the executive condominium market, the housing prices in the private 
housing sector are directly determined by market forces. Government does influence 
the housing prices by stipulating the minimum amount of down payment required and 
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the employers’ CPF contribution.  Other than financial rules to be followed, there are 
no regulatory barriers to entry and exit of the private housing market.  Given the better 
design and the greater exclusivity, private housing is much preferred to public 
housing. 
 
 Exhibit 3.2 further shows the private house price cycle based on the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority Index. There are four peaks in 1973, 1983, 1996 and 2000 
corresponding to a period of 10, 13 and 4 years respectively. The short cycle from 
1996 to 2000 is due to the regional economic crisis. Lee-Khor and Tay (2001) provide 
a brief discourse on possible causes of the cycle. From the late 1960s, foreigners 
helped to boost housing demand and house prices peaked in 1973. However, excess 
supply, curbs on foreign demand, global slump and the 1973 OPEC oil hike halted the 
boom. This was followed by a period of consolidation until about 1980 as the excess 
supply began to disappear with the onset of economic recovery from the 1974-5 
recession. The sharp rise in house prices was also due to another OPEC price hike in 
1979. The large increase in wages between 1979 and 1981 further boosted the prices.   
 
 
[Insert Exhibit 3.2] 
 
 In Singapore, a unique upward movement from public housing to private 
housing is observed, and there is a linkage between the two sectors.  Phang and Wong 
(1997) regress the private property price index with the relevant macroeconomic 
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factors and let the years to proxy the policy change and find that the liberalization of 
rules on public housing ownership criterion and housing finance had a significant 
impact on private housing prices.  Ong and Sing (2002) also find that both markets are 
integrated and the causality from private to public housing markets is stronger than the 
other way round.  
  
3.2 Main Upgrading Programme 
 The Housing Development Board announced the Upgrading Programme in 
1989 and launched it in 1992 to give older HDB housing estates a new lease of life. 
The main objective of the policy was to stanch the gradual outflow of residents from 
older estates to new towns that arises from the residents’ desire to have better quality 
housing and amenities (HDB Annual Report 1989). Alternatively, some studies view 
the upgrading as a tool used by the ruling party to establish its legitimacy to rule 
Singapore (Chua, 2001) The 15 billion upgrading initiative, targeted at the majority of 
the households living in public flats, is to be implemented over a period of 15 years. 
The upgrading of six demonstration precincts, Lorong Lew Lian, Marine Parade, Ang 
Mo Kio, Telok Blangah, Clementi and Kim Keat, were completed in 1995. The 
Upgrading Programme aims to transform old estates into quality precincts comparable 
in quality and environment to new HDB towns. Numerous selection criteria have been 
established to prioritise the blocks for upgrading; age of blocks, presence of a large 
number of 3-room flats, environmental conditions of the blocks. 
  
Chapter 3 Singapore Housing Market and Housing Policies 
 
 39
The Upgrading Programme comprises the Main and Interim Upgrading 
Programmes.  The Main Upgrading Programme (MUP) is designed for HDB precincts 
which are 18 years and older. Under the MUP, improvements are implemented at 
three levels- in the precinct, in the block and within the flat. The improvements may 
consist of an additional utility room or balcony, improved lift lobbies, new facades, 
more landscaped areas and provision of a multi-storey car park. Generally, the 
Government bears between 93% to 58% of the cost of improvement works depending 
on the type of upgrading package chosen and the size of flats. The MUP is carried out 
in batches; fifteen precincts are scheduled for upgrading under this programme every 
year. It is estimated that the MUP will involve more than 370,000 flats (Lee-Khor and 
Tay, 1995-2001). Nevertheless, flats have to be 15 to 20 years old to qualify for MUP, 
which implies that residents of relatively new flats have to wait a long time for their 
turn.  The upgrading will only proceed if at least 75% of the flat owners in that 
precinct indicate their support for the exercise. 
 
 The Interim Upgrading Programme (IUP) was launched in 1993 to help 
owners of relatively new flats to overcome the long wait for MUP. About 20 precincts 
or 20,000 flats per year will be scheduled for IUP. This is to ensure that some 210,000 
units, which are between 10 to 17 years old, can enjoy some for of upgrading within 
the next eight to nine years. The budget for IUP is only about 10% of the MUP budget 
and is meant only to satisfice certain critical needs of the precincts, which includes 
upgrading of lift lobbies, provision of new letter boxes, new garden pavilions and/or 
barbeque pits, but does not include works within the flat. The costs of IUP are entirely 
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borne by the government, while the costs of upgrading work under the MUP are 
shared between the government and the flat owners. 
  
 As part of the government’s plan to renew and optimize land use in older 
estates, another alternative scheme, Selective En-bloc Redevelopment Scheme 
(SERS), was introduced at the 1995 National Day rally. Under this scheme, residents 
of obsolete blocks in selected matured estates, which are old, low rise, underutilized 
and have adjoining vacant land, will be offered new 99 year leasehold flats built on 
nearby vacant sites. Their existing flats will be acquired under the Land Acquisition 
Act. The compensation package to be offered entails a land acquisition award and an 
ex-gratia payment, priority in booking flats in redeveloped blocks and a 20% discount 
on the price of the new replacement flat, subject to a maximum amount of $30,000. 
Affected singles, whose current entitlement is a 3 room flat, will be offered 4-room 
flats nearby. The singles will, however, cannot enjoy the discount on the new flats. 
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Chapter 4  The Model 
 
4.1  Housing mobility Option 
 
 We further extend Stein’s model (1995), incorporating the households’ option 
to improve and move, and attempt to use his framework as the foundation to explain 
the cyclical movements of house price. Adopting the assumptions and structure laid by 
Stein, I let the model span through three time periods, 0, 1 and 2, and consist of a 
continuum of families indexed by i.  At time 0, each family is endowed with one unit 
of housing stock, as well as some outstanding mortgage debt outstanding. The 
mortgage loan owed to the bank, Ki, is further distributed on an interval [KL, KH] 
according to the cumulative distribution function of G(K). The debt is denominated in 
units of the numeraire good, “food”. Ki can be negative, i.e. it is possible that KL <0. 
This is interpreted as some families having liquid assets at time 0 above and beyond 
their houses.  
 
 At time 1, families can trade houses with each other. The housing stock is 
assumed to be divisible, so it is possible for any family to own more or less than one 
unit after moving.  It is also assumed that the housing stock is fixed at time 0 level; 
there are no new houses built at time 1. The per unit price of housing at time 1 is P, so 
that the cost of buying a house of size H is PH. According to Stein, three crucial 
assumptions are made about the trading process. First, when a family sells their old 
house, it must repay the outstanding debt immediately, leaving the family with net 
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liquid assets of P-Ki. Second, a minimum down payment is required to buy a new 
house. Specifically, if the new house costs PH, the down payment must be at least 
γ PH, with 0< γ <1. Once this minimum down payment requirement is met, a buyer 
is able to borrow the rest of the purchase price at the riskless rate of interest, r. Third, 
there is no rental market: the only way a family can occupy a house is by owning it. 
An implicit assumption made by Stein is that buyers are able to afford the monthly 
payments. 
 
 Given the above structure, I let the families have the option to wait till period 2 
to trade their old house. The families may find it more worthwhile to wait because of 
the uncertainty of the price movements. By pricing the option, households may find it 
more optimal to wait for next period to purchase their new housing. Nevertheless, 
waiting also incurs a cost; the buyers’ desired house may be sold to another party, and 
the buyers have to incur interest payable and user costs for another period.   
 
 At time 1, the family has the option to sell and purchase a new dwelling. Yet 





+−≤ .      (1) 
After exercising the option to move at time 1, the families will receive their labor 
income to repay all their outstanding debts, and enjoy utility from their consumption 
of both food and housing services at time 2. Family i's labor income iL  is hence equal 
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2,1 iK+  units of food, where 2,iK  is the sum of the amount of debt undertaken at time 
1 and the interest payable. 2,iK  can be further denoted as follows, 
[ ] )1()1()1( 1,1,2, rKrHPK iii +++−= .    (2) 
 Stein (1995) also let each family’s total net income, including the initial time 0 
endowments and the time 2 labor, be the same. In other words, 1H  is assumed to be 1 
and d be zero. In our context, we relax the assumptions so that we can observe the 
payoff if the family decides to move at time 2.  
 
 Alternatively, the family can delay its purchase till time 2. If the price of its 
current dwelling rises, the family can purchase and consume more housing good than 
it could at time 1. In addition, if price falls, the present dwelling serves as a safety net; 
the family can still consume the present amount of housing good.  Following real 
option theory, we surmise the family’s flexibility to terminate its tenure of current 
dwelling by moving is valuable, especially if price volatility is high. Hence, at time 2, 








+−+≤ ,       (3) 
if the household decides to exercise its option at a later time. The debt undertaken at 
time 2 by the household will be  
[ ]1,21,2, )1()1()1(' iii KrHPK ++−+= η  ,    (4) 
 which is payable in the future, say time 3.  
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 As before, family i receives an income of 2,1 iK+  at time 2. Family i further 
uses part of the income to pay the down payment. It also borrows the maximum debt 
determined by the down payment constraint, even though it may have the means to 
finance the purchase by equity, when 2,iK ′  is less than 2,iK . Hence, 2,iK units of food 
are saved and used to repay the loan at the time 3. Any shortfall will be covered by 
additional income earned at time 3. Assuming the savings rate is s, and the discount 






+−+ ii KsKr ,     (5) 
 
which can be positive or negative. Whether the family will exercise the option to 
move depends on how much more housing good the family can expect to consume at 
time 2 and the relative costs associated in delaying the option to move. In other words, 
the decision to exercise the option to move at time 1 depends on the expected amount 
























































B . (6) 
 
 The first term represents the amount of housing units consumed and extra food 
units gained by the household had the family not moved in the next two periods. The 
extra units of food arise because of the lower debt that is used to finance the purchase 
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of the original dwelling.  The second term refers to the amount of housing units 
consumed by the family if they move at time 1 and the third term is the amount of 
food gained or lost had it moved at time 2. The first component of the third term refers 
to the housing units consumed at time 1, the second component refers to the housing 
units consumed at time 2 and the third component refers to the amount of benefits 
received as a result of the difference in level of debts undertaken to finance the 
purchase of the housing for both strategies.  
 
 Extending Stein’s model, we postulate that a family’s utility is a function of 
four things: the amount of food they consume, the size of the house they live in, the 
ability to move to a new house, and the option premium to move at a latter period.  By 
adopting the Cobbs-Douglas function to represent the preferences of the family, the 
utility is given by  
ectedtiiectedii BMFBHU exp,exp |ln)1(|ln θαα +−+= ,    (7) 
where iF  is i's food consumption and tiM ,  is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value one if family i moves at time t, and zero other wise.  The amount of housing 
good consumed, iH  and the trading gains from moving, tiM ,  are further dictated by the 
expected payoffs of each strategy. As suggested by Stein (1995), tiM ,  is included to 
capture the gains from trading in housing market at time 1.  
 
The price of dwelling is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion, and 
is provided by the following 






PP σα += ,     (8) 
where pα is the expected change in house price, pσ is the volatility of house process 
and dz is a Wiener process. It is noted that at this juncture that the volatility is an 
exogenous variable to make our analysis more tractable; our objective is to show that 
growing volatility will reduce the excess demand and result the change in the peak.  
There are several reasons why we assume housing price to follow such a process.  
First, the assumption makes our analysis more tractable because it enable us to have a 
close-form solution. Second, the Wiener process a Markov process, where the 
probability distribution for all future values of the process depends on its current 
value, and is unaffected by past values of the process.  In other words, the households 
are assumed to hold rational expectations of the future prices.  As we will see in 
Chapter 5, this assumption is reasonable for our test. 
 
 From (6), (3) and (1), we observe that the difference between the sale price and 
debt owed positively influences the amount of housing a family can consume, after 
accounting for the higher cost of debt that comes with higher consumption. Applying 
the multi-period binomial approach by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), we further 
can compute the option premium of waiting as shown in Exhibit 4.1. 
{Insert Exhibit 4.1} 
 
The total option premium of delaying to move is hence  
 ( ) ( )idduu KrPeVpVpOption )1( +−−+= −λ .    (9) 
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Following Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), P follows a symmetrical binomial inter 
temporal price process defined by an up (u) and a down (d) path, 
 
 dtveu σ= ;   dtved σ−= .     (10) 
where dt is the discrete time interval. The probability that P will move up can be 





−=       (11) 
 
where tr jfea δ=  and 
1f
r  is the risk free rate at period 1. The probability that P will 
move down is up−1 . 
 
 
Thus if Option is greater than zero, it implies that  
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4.1.1  Equity Constraints, loss aversion and Option to move 
 
 Like Stein (1995), we first work through the “perfect capital markets” case 
where there is no down-payment requirement. In this case, the constraints in equations 
(1) and (3) are never binding. It follows that everybody will trade in the housing 
market at time1 or 2 for their desired housing, since this increases utility by θ  and 
delaying their decision will not increase the families’ ability to consume more housing 
goods.  
 
 Since the liquidity constraint is never binding, each family’s demand for 
housing is independent of their initial debt Ki, and depends only on their total lifetime 
wealth and consumption patterns. At time 1, their total wealth has value of 1+P units 
of food. Given the utility function as shown in (7), families will spend α  of their 
wealth on housing. Hence, the price of housing a family will pay is  
)1(1, PPH i += α ,      (13) 





+= α .      (14) 
Were the family to delay its purchase, their wealth would have changed to 






+= α   at time 2.    (15)  
Hence, whether the family will delay its purchase depends on the size of the present 
value of 2,iH  compared to 1,iH .  If 1,iH  is higher, the family will move at time 1. The 
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per capita supply of housing will be 1 unit. Equating demand and supply, the price at 
time1 has the same formulation as Stein (1995), 
α
α
−= 11P .      (16) 
  
 If the price volatility is high and the present value of 2,iH  is higher than iH  , 
the family will move at time 2, and the supply of housing will be 0, and the family 
continue to consume 1 unit of housing at time 1. At time 2, the supply of housing will 





−= , given that 1≠upuα .    (17) 
 
If the probability of price raise is very low or the raise in price is small such that, 
1up α u ≠ ,  then the expected price is higher than that at time 2.  Such circumstances 
usually occur when volatility is high. Alternatively, if the volatility of price returns is 
low and the probability of price rise is high, upu >1, the price may decrease. Thus, 
when the volatility is high, the excess demand is reduced to zero at time 1, as the 
option premium is valuable. The question is then how the generation of excess 
demand by equity constrained households, as proposed by Stein, is affected with the 
presence of the option to delay purchase.  
 
 In the case of ‘unconstrained movers’-families whose debt is sufficiently low 
that the down payment requirement does not affect their behavior- as defined by Stein, 
the highest amount of debt, *K , a family can hold to qualify in this group is obtained 
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by equating the unconstrained demand to the constrained demand. When it is viable to 






α *)1()1( +−=+      (18) 





+−= γα       (18’) 
as suggested by Stein.  
 
 Alternatively, if the volatility is sufficiently high to induce the household to 
wait, K* must also satisfy the constrained demand at time 2. In other words, the debt 

















+−+−−+= γα  ,   (19’) 
rearranging and substituting  )1( −upu  forη . 
Hence the maximum debt undertaken is the minimum of *wK  and 
*
0K . If the house 
price volatility is sufficiently high, we will expect the numerator to be smaller because 
the effects of up  and u are squared. Nevertheless, the effect of high volatility is muted 
by the interest payments charged for the next period.  
 
 At time 1, if the benefits of delaying their option are more viable, the 
unconstrained movers will not unload any units of housing and will only demand 1 
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unit of housing good and excess demand is zero. If the volatility is not high enough or 
the cost of waiting outweighs the premium to delay the decision to move, the total 









.    (20) 
Thus, the higher the volatility of price will cause excess demand to be 0 at time 1.  
 
Yet, if the family only exercises its option to move at time 2, the demand at time 2 will 
be   
 
)()(' *02 KGPD time = 1)1( −+P
uPpuα .    (21) 
In other words, the excess demand will be higher than that at time 1.  
 
 Stein’s explanation of the large price swings lies with the behavior of the 
“constrained” movers- families who are constrained by debt levels, but still able to 
capture the gains from trade when it moves. Stein suggests that the constrained movers 
debt level, iK , is within the interval [
*K , **K ], where *K is derived earlier in (18’) 
and (19’) and **K is determined  by equating the utility from moving to that of not 
moving. With the option to move, we have to determine whether families are not 
moving or simply delaying their decisions to move.  
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 If the constrained mover moves at time 1, then the size of the new house 
bought by a family i will be smaller than 1 and is denoted by  
P
KrPH ici γ
))1(( +−= .      (22) 
The cost of this dwelling will be ciPH , leaving family i with an endowment of 
c
iPHP −+1 at time 1 that can be spent on food. Thus the utility of this family, ciU , 
will be  
θαα +−+−+= )1ln()1()ln( cicici PHPHU  ,    (23) 
if it moves.  Letting equation (23) equals 0, we further derive **K by substituting ciH . 
 
 Yet alternatively, the household can delay its decision till time 2. If that occurs, 
the utility enjoyed by the family will be the present value of the expected amount of 














U ,    (24) 
where 2,2, )1(')1( ii KsKr +−+  is the difference in the cost of debt when the family 
repays the debt on time 2 after purchasing their new dwelling at time 1, and the cost 
incurred if the actions are made one period earlier, taking account the larger amount of 
housing good to be consumed at time 2. It is noted that ciH 2,  can be more than its 
original endowment 1+P. Thus if the volatility is sufficiently high to prevent 
households from moving at time 1, the net excess demand will be 0. If not, the excess 
demand from the constrained movers will be  














−=  ,    (25) 
as suggested by Stein (1995).  
 
 Unlike the former cases above, some families uses so much debt to finance 
their initial purchase that they find it optimal to remain in their old house rather than 
moving to smaller dwellings. They have a debt level in the interval [ **K ,KH], and they 
will contribute nothing to net excess demand.  
 
 According to Stein, the necessary condition for equilibrium is that the price be 
such that the total economy-wide excess demand for houses,  
nedunconstraidconstraine PDPDPD )()()( += , equals zero and that it is possible that there are 
more than one equilibrium when D(P) is not monotonically decreasing.  
Differentiating with respect to P, we obtain 






















,   (26) 
where the first the term represents the change in demand due to the unconstrained 
mover group, the second term represents the change in demand due to the switch of 
non-movers to constrained movers and the last term represents the change from the 
constrained movers. If the equation only consists of the first term, the demand 
function represents a monotonically decreasing function. There will be a single 
equilibrium because of the satisfaction of the derivative condition of the benchmark 
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case, where no down payments are required. The second term is negative, since the 
non movers will sell their current dwellings for 
c
iH  units of housing, which are less 
than 1. The last term is positive, because as price increases, the down payment 
restrictions are relaxed and demand of the constrained movers increase.  
 
 If we consider the households’ likelihood to delay its decision, then  






















,    (27) 
depending on the expected benefits the families will receive as derived in (12). The 
higher the price volatility, the more likely that the excess demand is zero, regardless of 
the value of the above derivative function. 
 
 Up till this point, we assume volatility is exogenously determined to show how 
the premium of waiting actually deterred the family decision to move. Yet, the 
purported volatility of house price is endogenously determined. In other words, the 
volatility has to be simultaneously determined by the following, 
1)( −= tp dP
dDfσ  .    (28) 
 Looking from a multi-period perspective, if the level of price volatility before 
time 1 is low, most households will exercise the option to move. Coupled with a 
majority of coupled households, multiple equilibra will prevail and hence, multipliers 
will be generated. Yet, as the excess demand gain momentum, the growing volatility 
increases the option premium to wait in time 2. Fewer households will exercise at time 
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2, since it is more worthwhile to move at time 3. The excess demand will fall to 0 
when all households anticipate for capital gains fall until zero. If the new supply of 
housing is provided by exogenous suppliers, the price level will fall. The fall in price 
also means that the households can only sell their dwellings at lower prices. For the 
families who exercise earlier, equity constraints and loss aversion (Englehardt, 2003; 
Genosove and Mayer, 2001) force them to ‘fish’- list their properties at prices where 
they can earn a nominal profit. What follows is the decline in the number of 
transactions and volatility until such point that the family finds it worthwhile to 
exercise the option to move again. 
 
 4.2 To Move or to Improve 
 One possible criticism of the model exposited above is my exclusion of the 
family’s possible investment to improve the existing stock of housing.  Given the 
great expenditure on improvement as shown in Chapter 1, our understanding of 
housing investment is incomplete without an understanding of investment in the 
existing housing stock. We further incorporate the frameworks posited by Littlewood 
and Munro (1997) and Downing and Wallace (2000) to extend our model above.  
 
 Littlewood and Munro (1996, 1997) find recent movers are more likely to 
invest than longer-term residents, suggesting that a decision to move does not preclude 
a positive improvement strategy. Hence, unlike Montgomery (1991) and Potepan 
(1989), they argue that improving and moving are complementary choices rather than 
competing choices with the objective to improve their housing consumption towards 
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the desired state. In their framework, they posit that households try to adjust the 
housing consumption level by moving and improvement. They model the desired 
housing consumption level of the family across the life cycle as shown in Exhibit 4.2; 
housing demand typically increases during child-rearing stage of the life cycle towards 
a ‘peak’ of housing consumption, before diminishing towards a lower life cycle. In 
order to match more closely to the continuously adjusting demand equilibrium, 
households adopt the strategy of moving and improving as shown in Exhibit 4.3. Their 
study offers an interesting insight; they find owners may deliberately buy a property 
embodying fewer housing services than they would want, with the intention of 
improving it over the lifetime.  
[Insert Exhibit 4.2 here] 
 
[Insert Exhibit 4.3 here] 
 
Extending from our earlier analysis, we further denote *H , which is more than 1, as 
the desired amount of housing good the buyer wishes to consume at the end of the two 
periods; *H  is assumed fixed in our model. As above, the amount of housing family i 




+−=  and *1, HH i ≤ .  If the amount of 
housing that family i can afford is less than *H , family i can adopt a strategy from a 
number of options to overcome the problem.  Firstly, family i can delay its housing 
decision to time 2, so that the possible appreciation in the future can relax their 
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financial constraints. The amount of housing good to be consumed at time 2 will, 








 units of housing. 
 
 The other option for the family is to invest in its current dwelling. The family 
can act like a developer; it can improve the current dwelling, sell it at a premium at 
time 1 and use the proceeds to pay the initial down payment for a better unit. In this 
instance, the family will enjoy 1,iH ′′  units of housing, where 
P
IHKrHPH invesmentiinvestmenti γ
−+−+=′′ )1()1(1, .     (29) 
 
Besides the above strategies, the owner can sell its current dwelling, and use the 
proceeds to purchase a moderate dwelling that offers services less than 1,iH .  Denoting 
the housing services offered by the moderate dwelling be −1,iH , the savings from the 
purchase of the moderate dwelling, ( )−− 1,1, ii HHPγ , is further used to finance the 
improvements investmentH ' , , as motivated by Littlewood and Munro (1997). Hence, the 
total amount of housing the family can enjoy is investmenti HH '1, +− .  
 
 Assuming the family can only invest on its dwelling at time 1, the investment 
is financed by equity and all user costs except  interest payments is zero, then  the 
choice depends on the amount of housing good each option offers, i.e. 









































.   (30) 
 
By considering housing investment in (30), we observe that a much higher volatility 
than what may be predicted earlier is required to induce households to delay the option 
to move, especially if the market valuation of the improvements is much higher than 
the cost of improvement.  Whether this is empirically supported has to be further 
determined. 
 
 What we have established at this juncture hinges on our assumption that the 
families will invest their current dwelling at time 1. Yet, as in Littlewood and Munro’s 
study, the families may delay their improvement till a later date. On the one hand, the 
delay may be the households’ strategy to time the expected increase in demand in the 
future. For instance, some households may only add a room when the size of family 
increases.  On the other hand, homeowner may postpone their decision to improve for 
investment intentions. Adopting the model by Downing and Wallace (2000), we can 
model the homeowner’s decision to invest in house attributes as real options, as in the 
case of our earlier option to move. Downing and Wallace (2000) assume each attribute 
of a house generates a flow of services over time, so that the value of an additional 
unit of an attribute is the expected net present value of the stream of services that it 
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provides. The homeowner compares the value of an additional unit of an attribute, net 
of the value of opportunity to invest in the future, to the cost of the investment when 
deciding whether or not to invest. Generalizing from the real option model, Downing 
and Wallace further contemplate that the spread between the return of housing and the 
user costs of capital may influence the households’ decision to invest. Additionally, 
they find the value to wait increases when volatility of the spread is high.  Their 
empirical results from the American Housing Survey strongly support the real option 
model.   
 
 Extending the study by Downing and Wallace, we can treat the option to 
improve and the option to move in a competing framework. Yet the findings from the 
study by Littlewood and Munro (1997) imply that we cannot do so. The families may 
adopt the strategies of moving after improving or improving after moving. The ambit 
of competing choices should consist of all strategies that the families can utilize to 
maximize the total benefits they can enjoy.  
 
 Consider the strategy of improving and moving. Assuming that the investment 
is financed by equity alone and is fixed at I, per unit of housing. Family i can either 
improve their current dwelling at time1 or time 2. I further let the user costs, excluding 
interest payments, incurred by family i for consuming the housing good, to be 
capitalized within the investment costs.  
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 At time 1, the family can improve their current dwelling and sell it to purchase 
a better dwelling. The amount of housing it will consume is derived in equation (29).  
Alternatively, it can improve the dwelling first, and delay to move till time 2. Whether 
the family moves depends on the possible price appreciation and additional cost of 
debt at time 2. The cost of debt may increase because of higher consumption of 
housing, and higher interest costs at time 2. Exhibit 4.4 further depicts the simple 
binomial tree for the computation of the option, and the other parameters are as 
defined earlier.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 4.4 here] 
 
 Thus, if the family has made the investment at time 1, it should delay its 
decision to move till time 2 if the option premium, 
 ( ) ( )[ ]iinvestmentdinduinu KrHPeVpVp )1()1(,, +−+−+ −λ , (31) 
is positive. An important insight from (33) and Exhibit 4 is that households’ decision 
to move at time 2 is not affected by the improvements, from this aspect. The amount 
of housing to be consumed is thus γ
inV  at time 1. 
 
 Besides selling the dwelling after improving it, the household can move to a 
moderate dwelling that offers less housing services than 1,iH  but more than 1. The 
household then uses the savings to improve the moderate dwelling. If the household 
moves to the moderate dwelling at time 1, it will have to further decide whether to 
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improve now or later. The household may delay its improvement decision because of 
the fluctuation costs of improvement over the two periods; it is likely that the 
improvement costs are cheaper at time 2. Alternatively, the family may wish to take 
advantage of the fluctuation of savings rate by delaying the decision to improve. We 
first have a generic model, which includes both the factors.  
 
 At time 1, family i has the choice to move to consume −1,iH units of housing. If 
the family decides to move at time 1, it has to further decide whether to improve the 
housing the family bought at time 1 or to delay the improvement works till time 2. The 
payoffs and the choices are further provided in Exhibit 4.5.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 4.5 here] 
In this context, we assume 
I
sJ )1( +=  to follow a geometric Brownian motion, where  
jJJ JdzJdtdJ σα += ,    (32) 
where Jα is the expected change in J, Jσ is the volatility of J and jdz  follows a 
Wiener process, independent of dz. 
 
 Following Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) again, J follows a symmetrical 
binomial intertemporal price process defined by an up (u) and a down (d) path, 
 
 dtJeu σ= ;   dtJed σ−= .     (33) 
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where dt is the discrete time interval. The probability that P will move up can be 





−=       (34) 
 
where tr jfea δ=  and 
1f
r  is the risk free rate at period 1. The probability that P will 
move down is up−1 . 
 












.   (35) 
It is viable to move and delay improvement if the option is positive.  
 
 Besides improving after moving at time 1, the family can also move at time 2 
and make the necessary renovation works subsequently around the same time. Unlike 
the former case, the determining factors that influence the households’ decision to 
move and improve lie with the volatility of price and investment costs. Hence, the 
premium to move at time two can be further derived by Exhibit 4.6.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 4.6 here] 
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In this case, we let ),( IPfQ = , and assume it follows a Geometric Brownian Process, 
where  
QQQ QdzQdtdQ σα += ,    (36) 
where Qα is the expected change in Q, Qσ is the volatility of Q and Qdz  follows a 
Wiener process, independent of dz and jdz . 
Q, hence, follows a symmetrical binomial intertemporal price process defined by an 
up (u) and a down (d) path, 
 
 dtQeu σ= ;   dtQed σ−= .     (37) 
where dt is the discrete time interval. The  probability that Q will move up can be 





−=       (38) 
 
where tr jfea δ=  and 
1f
r  is the risk free rate at period 1. The probability that Q will 
move down is up−1 . The option premium to move and improve at time 2 is  further 






− γλ .  (39) 
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 Comparing all the strategies that are available to the family and letting Hsg be 
the optimal amount of housing services consumed by a household, the choice depends 


































































given that *HHsg ≤ , and HsgH −*  is minimized. 
 
 It is noted that we have excluded the households’ decision to improve only and 
their option to delay the improvement works as alternative strategies. The reason lies 
in the substitutability of the households’ current dwelling and new dwelling. Given 
our context, the household can only borrow or use its labor income to finance any 
renovation on their current dwelling. If the family decides to improve their current 
dwelling, the savings from not moving -lower debt costs- can be utilized to improve 




−−+= ))1((1 1,γ ,     (41) 
where 1,iH is the amount of housing that the household would consume, if it had 
moved.  
 
 Whether the household would move or improve depends on the cost of 
improvements, and how much the improvements are valued in the market. If the 
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improvements are not much valued by the market, households are unlikely to improve, 
and would rather study the strategies that involve movement. The only exception is 
when the housing households are consuming is close to *H , and they do not want to 
over consume housing services. If such circumstances arise, these households will 
only consider improvement of the dwelling and the decision to do so largely depends 
on the spread between the rental income and user costs as postulated by Downing and 
Wallace (2000). Nevertheless, the omission of this group of households is unlikely to 
affect our result, since the excessive demand and the effect of real options are largely 
caused by households who only want to move. 
 
 Studying the payoffs of the different strategies stated above, the strategy of 
moving at time 2 after improving the current dwelling at time 1 may supercede the 
strategy of waiting to move at time 2, given that price volatility is high. If this 
happens, the ability to improve at time 1 only serves to amplify the effect of the 
waiting option. However, the effect of the option to move is likely to be eroded if the 
household adopts the strategy of moving to a moderate housing at time 1 and 
improving at time 2. They will occur for 2 likely reasons. 
 
 First, if the volatility of saving rates and improvement costs are much higher 
than that of price, and the quality of the moderate dwelling, which is less than 1,iH but 
more than 1, is not very far off from IH*, it is likely that the families adopt the 
strategy of moving to the moderate housing at time 1. Second, if the market valuation 
of the improvement exceeds the costs, i.e. the cost of improvements is subsidized; it is 
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also likely that the families adopt such a strategy. In the context of Singapore market, 
as stated in chapter 3, the Main Upgrading Sites were completed by 1995, and 
residents can sell the completed flats then.  The second reason may explain the 
sustenance of the excess demand and speculation in private and public housing market 
in 1995.  
 
 The last strategy of delaying the move to a moderate dwelling and improving it 
subsequently is unlikely to be dominant. When price volatility is high and the 
investment costs are sufficiently high, the household may choose to purchase the new 
housing that maximizes his utility instead of delaying his move to a moderate dwelling 
and subsequently improving it. This is because the improved housing is unlikely to be 
better than the new dwelling. Alternatively, if the investment costs are heavily 
subsidized, the household will move first to utilize the savings rate.  
 
4.3 Collective Improvement: Voting to Improve- Abstaining by moving 
 
4.3.1 Minimization of disutility 
 
 A large proportion of the home improvement literature treats the families’ 
decision to improve as an individual decision, rather than a collective decision. In 
Singapore and many Asian cities, most people live in multi-family units and major 
renovation works require the consensus of all the residents living in the same block. 
Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) provide the first study in understanding the residents’ 
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collective decision to improve. They model the households’ choice of voting rules, 
given the households’ specific voting rules. As mentioned in the literature review, they 
implicitly assumed that these households will choose to minimize their disutility. 
  
 In their model, they consider a group of N individuals that will make a decision 
by voting on a future proposal that affects the members of the group. Each voter’s 
decision is driven by individual preferences and that the decision upon the proposal is 
obtained by a vote of all N members of the group. Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) 
further denote the number of voters who will vote supporting (S) by the discrete 
random variable l~ . In addition, the existing voting rule is denoted l *X≥ , where l is 
the realization of l~ and *X  ( NX ≤≤ *0 ) is some fixed integer representing a 
threshold level agreed upon  ex ante by the members of the group. If the voting rule is 
satisfied, then the proposal is accepted. By specifying the amount of disutility the 
voter would receive given an unfavorable outcome , and the voter’s ex ante subjective 
assessment of the probabilities other voters’ choice, Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) 
further derive *X  by minimizing the disutility of those who support or oppose the 
proposal. They further vary the weights assigned by each voter to the outcome in 
which he does not want, and the ex ante probabilities, which also serves to identify the 
homogeneity of voters, to analyze how the optimal decision rule changes.  
 
 The above study offers several interesting insights, which can be linked to our 
study. Our previous section explains how the possibility of improving the current 
dwelling affects the families’ option to move.  Yet in a multi-family housing 
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development, such improvement decisions are collective decisions. We need to 
compute the probability of non-performance of the improvement proposal, so that we 
can accurately capture the effect of the improvement decision on the mobility 
decision. Nevertheless, the probability cannot be deduced from the voting rule as 
shown by Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) and have to be determined by other means.  
Additionally, Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) assumes that the voter’s choice relies 
on their need to minimize disutility, whereas our earlier analysis on households’ 
decisions centers on the maximization of utility.  In other words, the voters will 
behave more conservatively than the families we discussed earlier. 
 
4.3.2 Bounded Rationality Model and Abstaining from the decision to improve by 
moving 
 
 While Ben-Shahar and Sulganik (2003) offer an insight on the families’ choice 
of voting rule, they assume no abstention on the families’ part. Additionally, these 
families are rational. Extending their model and incorporating the bounded rational 
model proposed by Sieg and Schulz (1995), we relax the above assumptions to study 
the decision making process of households.  
 
 In Sieg and Schulz’s model, the voter is a learning individual- he does not 
solve decision problems, but learns how to operate. The voters learn which strategies 
are good by observing what has worked well for them in the past and what has worked 
well for other people. The objective of the voter is to improve his or her social 
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position, which is proxied by the ratio of the payoff of the voter with that for other 
voters. Let i { }NM +∈ ,...,1 be an element of the index set of players who can vote 
among alternative outcomes, 1A , for 2A , or  moving. The additive utility function of 
voter i is iU , and if )()( 21 AUAU ii > , the strategy vote for 1A  dominates the strategy 
of vote 2A . We further let { }MT ,...,11 = be the index set of voters with 
)()( 21 AUAU ii > , and { }NMMT ++= ,...,12  be the index set of voters with 
)()( 12 AUAU ii > .  The M+N voters have M+N strategy sets which consists of pure 







Strategy of voter 21 TTi ∪∈  
iπ  ( )NMi qq +,...,1π :  expected payoff for a voter 21 TTi ∪∈ with strategy 
iq  
Aπ  :),...,( 1 NMA qq +π : average expected payoff for a non deviant voter. 
Ei  ( )NMjjii qqpqqEpE ++−= ,...,,,,...,)( 111 : expected revenue for a voter 
in 1T with strategy p 
ππ iAi ),(  Average expected payoff for a voter in 1T  
)( Diπ  ( )NMjjDiDi qqpqqp ++−= ,...,,,,...,)( 111ππ : expected payoff for a 
iq
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deviant j iT∈  with strategy { }1,0∈p . 
 
 A deviant player is one that learns and applies a strategy that is a relative 
response, rather than one that applies a strategy that leads to a Nash equilibrium. He 
will have the added incentive to learn a new strategy and apply it in the future if he 
can increase his relative success by changing his strategy. Hence, a voter is able to 
learn a new strategy if this strategy increases his social position.  It is noted that that 
only the change in relative success is important. A voter with strategy { }1,0∈iq  is 




AD ssqssqsspssp ii ++−++− −≥− ππππ . (42) 
In intuitive terms, Equation (42) states that relative voter payoff for choosing strategy 
p is higher than the relative payoff for choosing strategy q.An evolutionary voting 
equilibrium is reached ‘whenever no other strategy can increase the relative payoff 
and thus no other strategy can be learned.  
 
 In our context, a voter i will have to decide whether he supports the scheme to 
upgrade the current dwelling or not. As in the case of Singapore’s Main Upgrading 
Programme, the voter can only vote for or against the scheme, which is consistent with 
the assumption made Ben-Shahar and Sulganik  (2003). The dominance of the strategy 
to support over a strategy of not supporting depends on the likely payoffs, which is a 
function of the household’s intentions in the earlier section.  Yet the voter can actually 
abstain by moving to another property, since the resident can give up the right to vote 
by surrendering his ownership rights to his buyer.  Unlike the example of voter turnout 
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as described by Sieg and Schulz (1995), the voter, however, replaces himself with a 
buyer that supports the scheme which the voter opposed2.  
 
 In Singapore context, residents living flats that are at least 18 years old are 
likely to receive an offer to improve their dwellings via the Main Upgrading 
Programme. Although the residents do know the decision rules for the voting decision 
in our context, their knowledge of voting costs and potential quantity of the preference 
groups is not obtainable; their decisions may not appear rational. Hence, instead of 
assuming the rational voter, we assume that the voters are learning individuals as 
explained above.   
 
  They have to learn, either from past experience, or from the experiences of 
others3 who have undergone upgrading. Whether they learn depends on the 
satisfaction of Equation (32), the costs of voting, which includes the cost of 
improvements, and the respective payoffs from the deviant strategy, and other 
strategies. For instance, some households may find moving less affordable than 
upgrading, despite their opposition to upgrading. Hence, they have no incentive to 
learn the deviant strategy of abstaining by moving. 
  
                                                 
2 We assume that the buyer knows about the vote for improvement works and the expected results, else 
he will not buy the dwelling. In other words, possible regulatory constraints against new owners and 
asymmetry information are not considered. 
3 They could learn the experiences of households who have undergone the upgrading program via word 
of mouth, mass media and the government authorities. Here we do not consider the bias of the source of 
information. 
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 The question is then how to capture such learning phenomenon.  The 
uniqueness of Singapore’s main upgrading programme allows us to do so. As 
mentioned earlier, when their flats become 18 years old or older, the owners will be 
offered a chance to upgrade, depending on the authorities’ list of priority and the 
timing of the implementation of the policy. Thus, some flats will be upgraded when 
they are over 20 years old, while others get to upgrade when their flats are newer.  
Assuming there are M+N residents, who are entitled to vote, in the affected precinct. 
The M residents who support the upgrading belong to 1T and the other N residents who 
are against the upgrading belong to 2T . We try to identify the households in both 1T  
and 2T  by the difference between the housing services that can be consumed after 
MUP is completed, MUPH , and   *H ,  the desired amount of housing family i wants to 
consume. In other words, 
|)||,min(| MUP)support ( ** cMUP HHCHHP −+−= ,  (43) 
where cH  is the amount of housing services the resident is currently enjoying, *H is 
determined by the life-cycle stage the household is in,  and C is the cost of upgrading. 
It is noted that MUPH  can be higher than *H because the upgrading works may create 
more space than the resident desires. The excess space may create disutility to the 
households who are in the latter stages of life-cycle, where their household size is 
small or expected to decline in the future.  
 
Yet, as seen from the results of our survey and the findings by Littlewood and 
Munro(1997), the owners may improve the current dwelling, so that they can obtain a 
higher capital gain in the resale market and afford the down payments for their desired 
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housing. In addition, owners may improve their current dwelling and down grade to a 
cheaper unit, so that they can enjoy the increase in wealth. Hence, equation (43) can 
be further expanded  
|)|,)(|,min(| MUP)support ( *** cntransactio
NewMUP HHdowngradeWCHHCHHP −×−+−+−=
,(44) 
where ntransactioC is the transaction costs incurred purchasing the new flat,  
NewH  represents the amount of new consumption services received from the new flat 
purchased, 
and W represents the gain in wealth from the transaction if the owner downgrades.   
 
It is noted that the second term, unlike the third and fourth terms, can be 
negative because of the wealth component. We also assume that households that wish 
to move up their housing career will use every cent from the sale proceeds to purchase 
the new dwelling. Hence, the wealth component only applies to households who 
intend to downgrade to cheaper dwellings. 
 
Additionally, those households who wish to move up their housing career will 




1××−−= ,   (45) 
 
where P is the price per unit of housing, Loan  is the outstanding loan payable, MUP 
is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if MUP is completed and γ is the proportion 
of property price required for down payment. Alternatively, we modify the function by 
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including a wealth component if the households wish to downgrade, as shown in 




1××−−=×+ .  (46) 
 
As mentioned earlier, residents living in public housing face a window period 
from eligibility to polling because of the institutional setup.  This window can be 
viewed as an immediacy or urgency factor that acts as a catalyst for the household to 
decide whether moving strategy is better than the strategy of staying and voting for 
their desired outcome. Following Sieg and Schulz (1995), we replicate equation (42) 
except p refers to the household’s strategy of moving during the window and q refers 
to the households’ strategy of staying and voting for its desired outcome. Unlike Sieg 
and Schulz, we do not specifically include a deviant voter where other voters can learn 
the deviant strategy of abstaining. Rather, we assume the voters learn the payoffs of 
moving from studying the price trends and the probability of the favorable outcome 
being voted.  
 
 From equation (44), we observe that households support the upgrading for 
several reasons. First, some households support the upgrading because they want to 
increase their housing consumption and they are financially constrained to move. As 
time passed, we postulate that households learn the price trends and the possible 
payoffs of moving before the polling takes place. Rather than waiting for the polling 
and the completion of the upgrading works, these households may find the relative 
payoffs are higher than those that remain in the precinct. Thus we expect the 
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affordability measure to be significant for these households during the window period. 
Second, some households who support MUP to increase their consumption of housing 
services face prohibitive social costs to move. Since households who live in the area 
longer tend to have higher social costs, we utilize the Weibull model in our duration 
tests in Chapter 7 to isolate the effects. The Weibull model allows the hazard rate to 
follow a concave distribution.  Third, some households support MUP so that they can 
use the sale proceeds of the upgraded dwelling to purchase a better one. Yet, over the 
course of time during the window, the households may learn about increase in price, 
which encourages them to upgrade. In addition, the household may now find that the 
returns from sale exceed what is required for the purchase of the new dwelling. Hence, 
household may be encouraged by the excess returns to move. Fourth, some households 
may want to downgrade to cheaper dwellings, but they support MUP because of the 
higher wealth that can be obtained from the sale proceeds of the upgraded dwelling, as 
shown in Equation (46).  Like previous examples, the learning of price trends may 
induce the households to downgrade first, especially if the returns are attractive. 
 
On the other hand, households may oppose to upgrading because of 
affordability problems and small household size.  When the window opens, these 
households are subject to an urgency to decide whether the moving strategy is better 
than the opposing strategy. Such a strategy depends on the likelihood of having 
majority support for upgrading, and changes in price. Increase in price may induce 
households to down grade to cheaper dwelling before the upgrading takes place. 
Hence, we expect the households to react to changes in price and their level of 
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affordability if households learn the strategy during the window, regardless of 
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Chapter 5  Preliminary Tests and Results 
 
 In this chapter, we attempt to analyze housing price movements in Singapore 
housing market and seek some preliminary evidence to support the real option model. 
In addition, we also conduct some tests on the assumptions that we employ in our 
model, using the macroeconomic data that is publicly available in the government 
publications. The results from the preliminary tests provide some empirical support to 
our hypotheses on the real option model. 
 
  One of the key implications from our earlier analysis is the relationship 
between price change and volatility. When price increases, the reinforcing effects of 
the down payment further fan demand for new dwellings. The price volatility increase 
until it reaches a point, where the households will put their option to move on hold. 
According to the real options theory, we expect the households to find the option to 
wait more attractive, especially if the price volatility is high.  The collective behavior 
of home owners delaying their option will be in the slow down in demand, and any 
new supply initiated by the developers will further result a fall in price. 
 
 Using the price indices of the Housing Development Board (HDB) flats 
derived from the transactions in the resale market, we compute the volatility of returns 
of HDB resale flats and plot it against the price indices as shown in Exhibit 5.1. The 
volatility is computed over a four-year window period. Exhibit 5.2 also depicts a 
similar relationship between the price index of private housing (condominium) and the 
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volatility of the returns of private housing. Volatility of housing price returns is 











 where r  is the mean return over the sixteen quarters, and ir  is the return for each year 
considered. 
 
[Insert Exhibit 5.1] 
[Insert Exhibit 5.2] 
 
The graphical depictions of the volatility of returns against resale flat and 
private property price indices offer some interesting insights. The volatility of the 
returns of both type of housing tends to bottom out when the market is at the bottom 
of the cycle and peak after the price cycle reaches its apex. In addition, the volatility of 
the returns tends to jump sharply, when a recovery starts to set in and falls steeply 
when the demand no longer supports the supply. The visual relationship between the 
movements of price and its volatility supports the implication of the real option 
hypothesis we set earlier. 
 
The real options model expressed in the earlier chapter also implies that the 
volume of transactions is closely related to housing return volatility. Exhibit 5.3 shows 
the graphical depiction of the number of resale applications and the volatility of 
returns of HDB flat.  
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[Insert Exhibit 5.3] 
The number of resale applications moves in tandem with the volatility of returns, and 
the number of application peaks right after the volatility of HDB price returns hit the 
highest point. We further run a simple ordinary least squares regression, with the 
number of applications as the dependent variable and the volatility of returns of HDB 
apartments and its square as the independent variables. The results, as seen in Exhibit 
5.4, show that the square of the volatility of returns of HDB flats is negatively related 
to the number of applications for resale units. 4  
[Insert Exhibit 5.4]. 
 
Although the above preliminary analyses provides some support of the model 
we postulated, several key assumptions must be satisfied for the theory to work - 
whether households are forward looking, and whether the theory of loss aversion and 
equity constraints work in the subject housing market we are testing. As mentioned 
earlier, the Singapore housing market is chosen because of the clear demarcation of 
the housing market into public and private sectors. The segmentation of the market, 
coupled with the availability of a resale market for public housing, allows us to make 
our test more tractable.   
 
We further conduct more preliminary tests on the assumptions made in the 
model.  The rationale and the results of the tests are provided in the table below: 
                                                 
4 It is acknowledged that a time-series model will be more appropriate. However, given the limited data, 
we are unable to run time-series analysis. 
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Tests Rationale Results 
Whether Households 
are forward looking? 
We assume the households to 
form rational expectations 
because the option component 
in our model assumes that 
price follows a Geometric 
Brownian Motion. 
The test shows that 
households hold rational 
expectation of future 





Our model adopted many 
similar specifications from 
Stein’s model.  In other words, 
we assume debt to generate 
self-reinforcing effects on 
changes in price.  
The test shows that an 
increase in affordability 
will trigger households’ 
decision to move. This 
implies that debt will 
generate the required 
self-reinforcing effects 
due to changes in prices. 
Does loss aversion 
effects affect price? 
Although we did not explicitly 
incorporate this effect in the 
model, loss aversion effects 
may dominate the equity 
constraint effect when price 
falls.  
 
Given that our model relies 
heavily on the Stein’s model, it 
is important that his model is 
still valid after incorporating 
loss aversion effects. 
The test shows that 
households do exhibit 
loss aversion, but equity 
constraints still play an 
important role in their 





In our subsequent preliminary tests of the assumptions, we use a sample of 
households obtained from a Housing Development Board branch office. The data 
pertains to only one constituency. This chosen constituency is one of the earliest HDB 
estates built in Singapore, and many improvement works and rebuilding activities 
have been undergoing since 1996. The majority of the flats in the chosen estate are 
more than ten years old and the resale market for these flats is very active, given its 
Chapter 5 Preliminary Tests and Results 
 81
central location. From a total stock of 37,000 units in the estate, a sample of 594 resale 
mortgages spanning a period from 1982 to 2000 is collected. For each loan, we were 
further given the borrower characteristics, property characteristics and loan amount, 
and the date of purchase and sale of property. The descriptive statistics of the sample 
and the respective denotations are further provided in Exhibit 5.6. It is noted that we 
do not include a dummy variable to capture the effect of Interim Upgrading Program, 
which is discussed in Chapter 3. This is because the authorities have no intentions to 
start interim upgrading program in the constituency.  Exhibit 5.6a further provides the 
definitions of the variables considered. 
[Insert Exhibits 5.5 and 5.6] 
 One of the problems I faced when I was using this sample is that the selection 
of the subject constituency may generate bias in our results. Nevertheless, the HDB 
apartments are similar in design and the amenities in each neighborhood are similar. I 
try to ensure consistency by comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
sample with those of the population.  We found that the data reflects the resale market 
well; the proportion of transactions made for each type of public housing reflects that 
in the market shown in Exhibit 5.5. About 54% of the households surveyed lived in 
the 3-room flat, 34% of those surveyed lived in 4-room flats and the rest of the 
households lived in 5-room apartments.   In addition, the racial composition of the 
sample is consistent with that of the population.   
 As observed in Exhibit 5.6 , the average income level of households surveyed 
is below the national average income level.  This is reasonable because the housing 
provided by HDB is of poorer quality and is lower in price. Hence, most of the 
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households who lived in HDB apartments belong to the lower income group.  
Nevertheless, given that the resale market does not restrict rich households from 
entering the market, we also observe that some of our sampled households have higher 
than average income.  In addition, the difference in quality between 5-room HDB 
apartments and private apartments is small, and the households staying in these 5-
room HDB flats have higher household income.  Hence, this attributed to the high 
standard deviation in income. 
 
 The purchase price of housing ranges from $20,000 to $800,000. The lower 
bound of the purchase price can be attributed to the transactions completed in the early 
1980s.  Alternatively, the upper bound of the purchase price can be attributed to the 
speculation and continuous rise in price from 1990 to 1995.  Because some sampled 
households have returned the flats to HDB due to foreclosure, we observe that the 
lower bound of the selling price is 0. What is interesting to note from the descriptive 
statistics is that the premium for housing is extremely high.  On average, each buyer 
pays a price 51.3% higher than the valuation of the apartment.  This phenomenon is 
resulted from the speculation during the 1990s.  
 
 A summary of the results, rationale and the objective of our tests are further 
provided in Exhibit 5.6b. 
 
[Insert Exhibit 5.6b] 
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5.2  Forward-looking households 
 
The appropriateness of our hypothesis of the market relies on our assumption 
of households’ behavior; they are forward looking, rational individuals. We compute 
the option premium backwards, considering that the prospective buyers are able to 
foresee the future. In other words, we have to test whether the expectations formed by 




Following past studies, we utilize survival duration models-parametric and non 
parametric- to test the above assumption. The hazard rate used in this study is the 
mobility rate of households living in Housing Development Board (HDB) flats. In 
other words, the hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of a move, conditional upon the 
property having survived move up till that time. The duration of time between the 
purchase of property and sale for ith property is denoted as iT .  
 
The probability distribution of duration can be specified by the distribution function 
  
)Pr()( tTtF <= ,     (47) 
 
which specifies the probability that the random variable T is less than some value t. 
The corresponding density function is  
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dt
tdFtf )()( = .      (48) 
 
In studying duration data, it is also useful to study the survivor function where 
                      






            (49)              
which is the probability that the random variable T will equal or exceed the value t. 




tft =λ .      (50) 
 
In this study, we employ two approaches to study the effect of postulated covariates 
on the  mobility rate- the non-parametric and the parametric duration models. 
 
5.2.1.1 Non-parametric duration model 
 
The sample survivor function for a sample of n observations with no censoring 
is      
S(t) =n-1 (No. of sample points ≥ t),       (51) 
 
where the empirical cumulative distribution is turned around. Censoring occurs when 
the observation could not be made as the start point or the ending point is out of the 
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study period. The life table approach of Cutler and Ederer (1958) will be used for the 
non-parametric analysis, allowing for censored observations (Kiefer, 1988). 
Observations that are censored are borrowers who have not moved as at end of June 
2000. 
 
Suppose the completed durations in the sample are ordered from the smallest 
to largest, t1 < t2 < t3 < …< tk. The number of completed durations of K is less than n 
because of censoring and because of ties. Ties occur when two or more observations 
have the same duration. Let hj be the total number of moves at duration tj, for j = 1 ,…, 
K. In the absence of ties, the hj are equal to one. Let mj be the number of observations 
with durations greater than tj, the longest complete duration. The hazard rate at 
duration tj for j = 1 to K, is the probability of a prepayment at duration tj, conditional 














iij hmn )( ,     (53) 
 
nj being the number of mortgages that were neither prepaid nor censored before 
duration tj.  The corresponding estimator for the survivor function is 

















)( λ ,    (54) 
 
which is the Kaplan-Mier or product limit estimator for j= 1 to K. 
 
The time line is split up into fixed intervals in the tabulation of the life table. A 
survival rate is then calculated for each interval. Let λi be the probability of prepay at 
the ith interval. The acturial estimator adjusts for censoring by subtracting one-half of 
the number of observations censored during the ith interval from the number entering 
the interval in calculating the fraction of completed spells. 
 
5.2.1.2 Parametric duration model 
 
The Weibull distribution is selected with the hazard function h(t) to be 
    
1)()( −= ptpth λλ      (55) 
 
and the Survivor function S(t) to be 
 
   pttS )exp()( λ−= .      (56) 
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The Weibull distribution is proposed for the study, since it allows for duration 
dependence captured by the parameter p. Duration dependence means that the hazard 
rate can be increasing or decreasing. If the duration dependence factor p =1, the 
duration follows an exponential distribution where the likelihood to move is constant 
with time. 
 
The hazard rate is defined as an exponential function of covariates 
        
).'exp()( ixt βλ −=      (57) 
 
The hazard function can be further transformed such that,  
        
βσ +== iii wTy ln ,     (58) 
where 
   σβ /)(ln −= Tw ,     (59)  
βλ −= e and 
p
1=σ . Allowing for censoring due to incomplete spells observed at the 
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where iδ is the censoring indicator (1 if complete and 0 if censored). The expected 
duration is simply the reciprocal of the hazard rate, 






tE βλ == .   (61) 
5.2.2 Variables 
 
We model the motivation to move against four categories of independent 
variables, borrower, property, loan and the macroeconomic explanatory variables. 
Most of the variables included in the model are motivated by previous studies on 
household mobility, which will be elaborated at a later section. We further include the 
different returns computed under the above theories in the model.  
 
The expected returns of private and public housing are generated at the time of 
sale or censored date, using the adaptive, rational and exogenous expectations 
methodology. The returns of private housing are included because findings in the 
research of Tu et al (2002) and Ong and Sing (1999) imply the households’ upward 
mobility from public housing to private housing. Under the adaptive expectation 
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MYOPUB , (63) 
 
where tMYOPTE 5_  is the expected return of the private housing in quarter t 
and tMYOPUB 5_  is the expected return of public housing at quarter t.  The choice of  
using the average expected returns over 6 quarters is motivated by Tu and Wong 
(2001), who found that there are no significant differences between the different user 
cost measurements differentiated by the different quarters (from 2 quarters to 6 
quarters) considered to form the price expectation5. On the other hand, the expected 
return from both public and private housing is the inflation rate at the time of sale or 
prepay or the censored dated, represented by EXO_1. The rational price expectation of 








)( 1 −= +     (64) 
and 
                                                 
5 The results remained unchanged when average expected returns over 5 and 4 quarters are used. 
 






HDBPRHDBPRRATPUB )( 1 −= + .   (65) 
5.2.3 Results 
 
From the above non-parametric methodology, we derive the graphs for the 
hazard rates and survival rates. Exhibit 5.7 shows the Cutler and Ederer life table 
estimation of the duration (DUR). The table shows that the most moves occur between 
23 and 47 months (1.91 years6 to 3.91 years). This is due to the resale restriction 
policy for two and half years by HDB. The hazard rate reaches a maximum at 0.99% 
between 94 months to 118 months (7.83 years to 9.83 years). Exhibit 5.8 and Exhibit 
5.9 show the graphical depiction of the estimated survival function and the Kaplan-
Meier Hazard function. The graph shows that the majority of the prepayment occurs at 
the 150 months, which is approximately 12.5 years, and the hazard rate is expected to 
peak at the end.  
 
Going one step further, we conduct four parametric tests separately to analyse 
the impact of the expected prices formed by the each methodology. The actual realised 
return is included in the model in the first test, Test 1, so that we can compare its 
results with those of other tests that utilise the respective expected return variables. 
For the completed sales data, the actual return realised from sale of property is  
                                                 
6 Although there is a stipulation that households can only relocate after two and a half years, there are 
households who are forced to move due to persistent default of loan commitments and carrying out of 
unlawful activities in their HDB dwellings.  Such instances are, however, rare because of the purpose of 
the provision of public housing. 
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PricePurchase
)Price SalePrice Purchase( −=ACTGAIN .    (66) 
For households who have not sold their dwellings within the test period, we use the 
change in HDB price index to proxy the realized gains accrue to them at the censored 
date.  
 
 In Test 2, the average expected returns over the past 6 quarters are computed 
using the adaptive methodology, as motivated by Tu (2001). In Test 3, the expected 
returns are computed over a quarter, using the rational methodology. In the final test, 
Test 4, the expected returns of housing are assumed to be formed independent of the 
housing market past performances; the inflation rate is used to proxy the expected 
returns of housing.    
 
The results are presented in Exhibit 5.10. Using the Likelihood ratio test, we 
found that at least one variable in all the four tests are significant and improved the 
performance of the model. It is also observed that the average hazard rate is about 
0.9% for all tests except test four and is significantly different from zero. In other 
words, there is a 0.9% probability that prepayment will occur in a particular month. 
All the parametric tests show that the data exhibits a significant positive dependence 
(p>1), showing that the Weibull model is appropriate.  The estimated survival function 
plotted in Exhibit 5.11 also resembles that in Exhibit 5.8. The Kaplan Mier hazard 
function in Exhibit 5.9 appears to be an increasing function, which is similar to the 
estimated hazard rate function depicted in Exhibit 5.12. 
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After running Tests 2, 3 and 4, the results show that the adaptive and the 
rational expected return for public and private housing have the same signs in the 
tests. Under the adaptive expectations assumptions, the returns from the mortgagors’ 
dwelling are positively related to their length of stay. Alternatively, the expected 
returns from the private housing market are negatively related to borrowers’ length of 
stay. The results are interesting because they imply that the supply of resale flats will 
fall when the returns from the resale flats are relatively high in the past quarter, 
assuming all other variables remained unchanged.  In addition, the significant 
relationship between expected returns from the private sector and the length of stay 
also implies that both public and private housing markets are related, which is 
consistent with previous studies on the co-integration between private and public 
markets (Ong and Sing, 2002). 
 
The results under the rational expectation assumptions are mixed. On the one 
hand, the rational expected returns from public housing sector are significant at 5% 
level of significance. This is an interesting finding, given that the expected returns 
based upon the assumption of adaptive expectation are also significant. In addition, the 
expected returns under both rational and adaptive assumptions have a relatively low 
correlation of 0.238.  A possible explanation for the finding is that expectations 
formed using past prices affect the households’ decision to move and the households’ 
decision to move is further reflected in the price.  
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On the other hand, the rational expected returns from private housing sector 
are insignificant. It is not surprising that the expected private returns, using the 
rational expectation assumptions, are insignificant because real estate market is 
inefficient. However, the results offer an interesting contrast to the relationship 
between public market returns and the households’ length of stay. The results imply 
that both private and public housing market mechanisms are different and both 
markets are in different levels of efficiencies.  Nevertheless, the results of the above 
study lend support to our assumptions for our model as a whole. 
 
5.3 Equity Constraints  
 
In our model postulated earlier, we borrow Stein’s concept on large price 
swings, and the findings by Chan (2001), Stein and Lamont (1999) support Stein’s 
model. In order to test Stein’s hypothesis whether households consume more housing 
given increased affordability, we need to identify the mobility patterns to capture the 
increase in consumption, and discover a measure for affordability. The Singapore 
housing market is a good choice because we can easily identify the upward movement 
from public housing to private housing and use it as a starting point for our test. 
Exhibit 5.13(i) shows the cross tabulation between the capital gains households 
received when they moved prior to June 2000 and the loan-to-value ratios they 
undertaken when they purchase their original flats. It is observed that most households 
experience gains when they move. Alternatively, Exhibit 5.13(ii) shows that about 
36% of the households who undertook a mortgage of more than 60% loan-to-value 
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ratio did not move by June 2000. This proportion is much higher than that of 
households who borrowed less. Although we observe that the majority of households 
who borrowed less than 60% loan-to-value ratio experience gains as computed from 
change in HDB price index, the proportion is less than that for households who moved 
prior to June 2000. On the whole, 104 households out of the 594 households 




 The more applicable measures for our study are the measure of accessibility of 
homebuyers defined by ANHS (1991) and the affordability index defined by Keare 
and Jimenez (1983). The homebuyers’ accessibility to new housing (ANHS, 1991) is 
determined by the households’ ability to afford the down payment. Given that the 
average homebuyers’ wealth is made up by the value of their current housing, the 
homebuyers’ affordability of the house greatly depends on the capital gains obtained 
from the sale of their current housing. On the other hand, the affordability index 
proposed by Keare and Jimenz (1983) captures the buyers’ affordability in terms of 
mortgage payments. 
 
 Although the affordability measures above provide a good basis to analyse the 
homebuyers’ upgrading behaviour (Tu et al, 2002), the measures cannot adequately 
explain the upgrading process. This is because the interactions between the two 
measures cannot be observed and monitored. There are many households who may 
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pass one of the affordability measure but not the other measure. In addition, we cannot 
determine which factor is dominant if we utilise both measures jointly.  
 
 Linneman and Wachter (1989) also used similar measures as above to estimate 
the extent by which the desired purchase price exceed the maximum allowed under 
industry borrowing standards. They came up with size constraint measures: three each 
for income and wealth. Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1997) further extends the 
study by allowing households to select the  loan-to-value ratio and mortgage product 
that minimize the impact of the constraint. Haurin, Hendershott and Wachter (1997) 
further improve the measures by having a fuller consideration of the endogeniety of 
wealth and income.  
 
 For our study, we will adopt the Threshold Upgradability Index, or TUI, (Ong 
and Sing, 1999), which follows the spirit of Haurin, Hendershott and Wachter (1997). 
The TUI incorporates both effects and is a suitable measure of would-be movers’ 
ability to upgrade. Ong (2000) further empirically tested the model to evaluate the 
theoretical underpinning as well as the ability of the model to predict private property 
price and found the model to be robust and a good predictor of private property price.  
 
 The index is derived from the concept of the “threshold upgrader”. The threshold 
upgrader is the owner of a HDB flat who is just able to upgrade to a private property 
prior to a decline in values (Ong and Sing, 1999). The threshold upgrader relies 
entirely or partially on cash proceeds from the sale of HDB flat to pay the required 
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down payment of the private property. The threshold upgrader, moreover, can just 
barely afford the servicing of the mortgage.  
 
 
 The TUI is obtained by deriving the minimum of two prices; each 
constrained by different conditions and is derived at the point of sale. The TUI at the 
point of sale is chosen because we are trying to find out the level of TUI that will 
induce the sale. The first price is constrained by the price of HDB, proxied using the 
HDB resale index. At t=1, HDB resale prices move to Hi. In order for the threshold 
upgrader to upgrade, the private property price must be 41








P R +−=  .     (67) 
 The 0.245 denominator is due to the minimum cash requirements of the 
purchase of the unit7. The other price is constrained by the change in mortgage rate 
and income. If the threshold buyer’s income is to increase to Yi when the mortgage 
rate changes to ii, and assuming that the loan-value ratio and the payment-income ratio 
remain constant after the changes and all other factors unchanged, the new private 
property price AP1  that can be afforded by the threshold buyer is  









niiA =  .    (68) 
Hence, the threshold private property price that will allow households to upgrade is 
                                                 
7 Before May 1996, the minimum down payment required for the purchase of private housing is 10% of 
sale price. The minimum down payment required is, however, raised to 20% of sale price on May 1996 
as a measure to curb speculation. In this case, the TUI is adjusted accordingly to reflect the change in 
policies. As at Sep 2002, buyers can use their Central Provident Fund to pay 10% of the sale price as 
down payment in the latest changes. 
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[ ]AtRtt PPTPP ,min 4=  ,    (69) 
since the threshold buyer is subject to both constraints. The TUI is computed as a ratio  
of the threshold private property price over the actual property price at time t. The year 







TUI 100= .     (70) 
The higher the TUI implies the greater the affordability to upgrade. The TUI over the 
years is shown in Exhibit 5.13.  
 
 
The variables included in our test are the same as before, except for the 
Threshold Upgradability Index. Following the literature, borrower specific 
characteristics such as race, household size and age of buyer are included in the 
model. The gross household income (GHHINC) is also included, since it determines 
the ability of the borrower to move (Pickles and Davis, 1991). In our study, we use the 
household income level, instead of the gross household income, so that we can 
account for inflation and the relative changes in income over the study period. 
Household income level (INCLEV) is the ratio of the annual gross household income 
adjusted for inflation to the average household income of the country at the point of 




GHHINCINCLEV =     (71) 
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where GHHINCn is the real annual household income at year n and AVEHHINCn is the 
average household income in year n, derived from the annual GDP at the point of 
purchase.  
 
 The property specific data cover the description of the property including 
the type of flat, the floor-level and the age of flat. In addition, the market premium 
(PREMIUM) paid by the buyer is also included in the model and is defined as the 
difference between price and valuation of property divided by the valuation. The 
higher the premium paid implies the greater the demand for the unit since any 
premium must be paid in cash. 
 
 Loan specific information includes the loan-value ratio (LV), loan 
outstanding at prepayment date (OUTLOAN) and initial payment-to-income ratio 
(PAYINC). LV is computed by dividing the loan amount by the appraised value or 
purchase price whichever is lower. It is assumed the valuation is equal to the price 
transacted when no valuation is available.8 The maximum loan-to-value ratio is 80% 
and the purchaser can at most take a loan up to 80% of the purchase price or valuation 
whichever is the lower. The date of origination (PDATE) is added too and coded in 
terms of the year. Another variable that is incorporated is the spread between the 
public interest rate and the private housing loan rate for 15 years (INTDIFF). It is 
defined as the difference between the 2 rates at the point of prepayment or at the 
censored date. 
                                                 
8 This is especially in the earlier years when valuation is not required. The assumption is valid as flats 
of same classification are resold at similar prices and the market is very stable during the earlier period. 
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 Next, we specify the set of macroeconomic variables to capture the 
changes in the environment. These include the return on public residential market 
(CHDBPR) obtained from the HDB Resale Price Index, the public mortgage rate at the 
point of prepayment (SHDBINT) and the change in GDP per household (CGDP). The 
change of HDB Resale Price Index is used to proxy capital gains over the holding 
period, which is from the date that the owner first purchased the dwelling to the date 
that he sells the house, or June 2000, the censored date, whichever is later. The change 
in GDP per household enables us proxy the change in income over the holding period.  
From the literature reviewed earlier, these three variables are not only important in our 
tests for mobility decisions (Ioannides,1987; Ioannides & Kan,1996), but also critical 
in shaping Stein’s model (1995).    
 
 The change in SES index (CSES) is incorporated in the model because it 
helps us to capture borrowers’ expectations of the housing market, since property 
market tends to lag stock market. Furthermore, this variable allows us to capture how 
changes in the return of other assets affect the households’ mobility decision and their 
prepayment decision (Zorn and Lea, 1989).  
 
 Additionally, we include the volatility of private mortgage rate 
(SMORTVOL) in the model. Although the volatility of the mortgage rate is not tested 
in the empirical analysis of mobility decisions, we expect that greater volatility of 
mortgage rates will discourage buyers because the buyers are taking adjustable rate 
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mortgages and will be subject to greater interest rate risk. The volatility is measured 




We employ the time-varying parametric duration and probit models to analyze 
the relationship between the TUI and the length of stay of households. The time-
varying parametric duration model is like the parametric duration model in the earlier 
test, except that some variables are allowed to vary over time. More about the time-
varying parametric duration test is further discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
Besides the type of dwelling the subject household is staying, the race of the subject 
household, its household size, income level, floor level, we let all other independent 
variables vary over time.  The results are tabulated in Table 5.15a. In this test, we omit 
some variables that are tested in the subsequent probit tests, like the date of purchase, 
and payment-to-income ratio. This is because the date of purchase is reflected in the 
dependent variable and the payment income ratio over time is partially derived from 
the change in GDP index over time and is related to the time varying loan-to-value. 
Both the loan-to-value ratios and the change in GDP index are included in the model, 
and we would face multi-collinearity problems if payment- to-income ratio were 
included. The results show that the threshold upgradeability index is negatively and 
significantly related to the households’ length of stay.  
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We further conduct probit test to verify our earlier results.  The households’ 
decision to move and prepay is tested using the probit test in the following: Model A, 
Model B and Model C. In this case, we use the probit model instead. In Model A, the 
TUI variable is included to test the households’ likelihood to prepay. However, as 
seen in Exhibit 5.15b, we have chosen to omit several variables in Model A in our test. 
Macroeconomic variables such as changes in HDB prices and private prices, volatility 
of returns of HDB and private dwellings and difference between the public and private 
rates are not considered because these variables are used jointly to derive TUI and 
may lead to erroneous results. Nevertheless, although variables such as the change in 
income and volatility of market mortgage are derived using the same variables- 
mortgage rate and GDP- in deriving TUI, these variables are included because the 
treatment of the inputs in deriving the mortgage volatility and change in income is 
different.  Furthermore, as shown in (68), the movements of GDP and mortgage rate 
may offset each other in the derivation of the overall TUI.  In addition, several 
property specific variables such as floor level are omitted because they are highly 
insignificant. 
  
In Models B and C, we replace TUI with the variables omitted earlier. In 
addition, we include another variable, the relative price difference between private 
housing and public housing (RELPI), in the probit model to analyse whether HDB 
mortgagor is more likely to prepay when the price differential has decreased. The 
relative price differential is obtained by dividing the private property price index by 
the residential price index, with the base year for both indices fixed at 1990. Hence, 
Chapter 5 Preliminary Tests and Results 
 102
the larger the value of RELPI is, the greater the price differential between HDB and 
private residential properties. The difference between Model B and C is that the 
households’ mobility decisions are tested against the public HDB rate in Model B 
whereas their decisions are tested against the difference between the public and market 
rates in Model C. All the results are summarised in Exhibit 5.15b.   Using the 
Likelihood ratio test, we found that at least one variable in all the three tests are 
significant and improved the performance of the model.  
 
The TUI is found to be positively related to the probability that the household 
will move and prepay. In other words, households are induced to move when their 
level of affordability improves. Hence, Stein’s implicit assumption that the households 
will move to consume more of the housing good when they able to do so is 
empirically supported.  
 
In order to ensure the robustness of the earlier test, two further tests on the 
households’ decision to move and prepay are carried out by excluding TUI and 
including other variables that are omitted earlier. Models B and C provide a good fit 
with Log likelihood of – 39.78 and -41.46 respectively. Most of the variables tested 
exhibit similar relationship, except payment-to-income ratio, which becomes 
insignificant. A likely reason is due to the inclusion of the public mortgage rate as a 
test variable. Conversely, the property specific variables, which were omitted 
previously, exhibit similar relationship as that in the preliminary test we did earlier in 
Model A.  
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5.4 Loss Aversion 
The prospect theory, which were introduced by Englehardt (2003) and Mayer 
and Genosove (2001) to real estate literature, hypothesizes that households tend to 
hold out by listing higher prices during market downturn, because of their aversion to 
nominal losses. Both Englehardt (2003) and Mayer and Genosove (2001) hypothesize 
that the effect of Stein’s equity constraints model during a downturn may be over 
stated, if the effect of loss aversion was not captured. Englehardt (2003), and Mayer 
and Genosove (2001) themselves, and Seslen (2003) further tested the prospect theory, 
and find that the loss aversion effect is more influential than that of equity constraint 
variables. We further extend the test of loss aversion in Singapore’s market; the effect 
maybe different. The households may view housing differently and the regulations 
that are in place may prevent the way the prospect theory postulates to be.  
5.4.1 Methodology and Results 
 
Further to our earlier tests, we further include variables to capture the loss 
aversion effect, following Englehardt’s equation. From Equation 61, we extend the 
right hand side to the following, 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ××+×+ ××+×++= GainDLTVGAIND LossDLTVLossDLTVXtE GainGain lossLossit ξδ υτφα'exp)( .  (72) 
The first term, X , includes all our previous explanatory variables, except the expected 
returns of HDB housing. The second term includes the loan-to-value ratio. The third 
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term makes up of two components: LossD , a dummy variable that is one if the 
household has experienced a nominal loss in house price in current period t relative to 
the initial purchase period, and Loss, which measures the nominal loss in percentage 
terms. Loss is expressed as a positive number. The fourth term is an interaction term 
of the Loss variable with the HLTV variable.  The HLTV variable takes the value one if 
the loan is more than 0.6 of the value9. Loss and Gain for each household are derived 
from the HDB residential price index. The value of Loss for each household is the 
same as that of CHDBPR, if  CHDBPR is negative, else zero. The value of Gain is 
computed similarly, except that the value of Gain takes that of CHDBPR only if 
CHDBPR is positive.    
 
The initial loan-to-value ratio is included because it is likely to have an effect 
on mobility independent of equity constraints. The υ parameter represents the 
differential effect of having a high initial loan-to-value on mobility and experienced a 
nominal loss in housing. In other words, the parameter υ  measures the impact of 
equity constraints. By filtering the effects of equity constraints, τ  measures the impact 
of loss aversion. Consequently,  the GainD  is a dummy variable if the household has 
experienced a nominal gain in house price in excess of moving costs in current period 
t relative to initial period 0, Gain measures the nominal gain in percentage. Therefore, 
ξ  measures the differential effect of having a high LTV and experienced a nominal 
gain. δ , on the other hand, measures the pure effect of nominal gains on mobility for 
                                                 
9 This is lower than that used in Englehardt’s study because of the minimum loan limit stipulated in the 
banking regulations in Singapore. 
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households not expect to be equity constrained. We further test the variables using the 
parametric duration tests, The results are further provided in Exhibit 5.16.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 5.16] 
 
Exhibit 5.16 shows that the parameters of initial loan, loss aversion and equity 
constraints are positively related to the length of stay. The loss aversion effect is, 
however, less pronounced than that of equity constraints. Nominal gains also 
encourage both constrained and non-constrained households to move. The results 
support both the loss aversion and equity constraints hypothesis. But unlike the 
findings of Englehardt and Mayer and Genosove, the effect of equity constraints is 
much stronger that that of loss aversion.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical Test on Real Option Hypothesis  
 
6.1 Computing the Real Option 
 
 In order to test the real option hypothesis, we need to identify a market where 
we can observe the households’ upward movement of their housing career. The clear 
segmentation of Singapore housing market into private and pubic housing sectors 
enables us to do so. Yet, the adjustable rate mortgages are the dominant form of 
mortgages in Singapore. There are two implications: (1) the quarterly adjustment of 
mortgage rates, coupled with the subsidized rates, causes the reduction of borrowers’ 
motivation to prepay when market rates fall, and (2) the periodic changes in mortgage 
rate have to be accounted as dividends in our real option model. Applying the real 
options model, we attempt to find the option premium that the owner is enjoying at 
each period. We further try to operationalize the model we proposed in Chapter 4. 
 
The proposed model is only for repeat would-be movers. This model assumes 
that the household can afford the mortgage payments. The household’s maximum 
length of stay is defined as n, and the owner will not move after n because the cost of 
moving will outweigh any benefits of moving. In addition, we further assume that n is 
less than or equal to the mortgage term N. If n is greater than N, the owner, who 
accumulates sufficient capital through the amortization of the housing loan will 
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exercise his option at N, unless the sale price of the current housing depreciates below 
the down payment required.10  
 
Assuming the would-be movers will not incur transaction and moving costs if 















X refers to the current dwelling of the household, 
Y refers to desired dwelling of the household, 
jXP )(  is the price of the household’s current dwelling at period j, 
1,1 +−− kNikMC  is mortgage constant for the computation of mortgage payments in period 
k-1, 
kNik
PVAF −− ,1  is the present value factor for the computation of mortgage balance 
outstanding at period k, where j>k,  
ji   is the mortgage rates at j. 
                                                 
10 If this assumption does not hold, the value of the option is zero because the homeowner cannot afford 
to move. Nevertheless, the homeowner has the option to default. See Appendices on the option to 
default. 
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jYP )(  is the price of the household’s desired dwelling at period j and L/V is the loan 
to value ratio for the loan to be taken to purchase the household’s desired dwelling. 
 
The second term at the left hand side of the equation is the household’s 











)(/ ,    (74) 
 
where D = jj YPVLXP )()/1()( −− . 
 
At each time step, the homeowner will have to repay the loan payment for its 
current dwelling, if he or she does not exercise his or her option. Moreover, given that 
housing is a consumption asset, the household will enjoy services from its current 
dwelling. Hence, the households will receive benefits from their current dwelling if 
they do not exercise their option to move.  However, the dwellings desired by the 
households also provide housing services, which are equivalent to the convenience 
yield enjoyed by manager if he exercises the option. Yet, the households will have to 
repay its mortgage payments to finance his purchase of their desired dwelling and 
current dwellings. Thus the benefits accrued to the household if it exercises its option 
can be written as follow, 
 
[ ]jjjjj XPMTXRYPMTYRCF )()()()( −−−= .   (75) 




jCF  is the benefits  accrued to homeowner at period j if he or she exercises the option, 
jYR )(  is the services accrued to household if he or she purchases house Y at period j,  
jYPMT )(  is the mortgage payments that the household will pay if the homeowner 
purchased his or her desired house at period j , which can be written as  
Nijj j
MCYPYPMT ,)()( = .      (76) 
 
jXR )(  can be defined as the services accrued to household if he or she stays 
in house X at period j, and jXPMT )(  defines the mortgage payments that the 
household will pay if the homeowner continues to stay at his or her current dwelling at 










)()( .   (77) 
 
 jR  can be assumed as a percentage of the property price and is 
synonymous to the rental yield of residential properties. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the receipt of CF is between two consecutive time steps. In other words, the 
benefits are deducted off the spot value V at each time step. 
 
 From the above, the strike price is the outstanding mortgage balance at the 
end of the period, which can be written as follows, 











)( .     (78) 
 
The mortgage balance is subject to movements in the mortgage rates. Following Ong 
and Tan (2000) and Tse (1998), we use the Vasicek model to represent the stochastic 
process. The usual stochastic model used to represent the interest rate movements is 
generally in the form of a mean reverting process: 
 
dWrdtrdr r
γσαβ +−= )( ,      (79) 
 
where W is the standard Brownian Motion, r is the risk-free rate, α  is the equilibrium 
risk-free rate to which rates will tend to return (the long-term interest rate), β  is a 
non-negative reversion parameter that describes the intensity at which risk-free rates 
will return to the equilibrium rate. rσ  is the volatility of risk-free rates and γ  is the 
parameter that determines the sensitivity of the volatility with respect to interest rate 
level. γ  take the value 0 in the Vasicek model. Although the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(CIR) model is the most appropriate form to describe interest rates, the Vasicek model 
is less complex.  The parameter estimates obtained by Tse (1998) over period 1975 to 
1993 for the Vasicek model will be used, where  
β =0.0069, 
α =5.1682%, and  
rσ =0.3208. 
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 These values, however, were computed on a weekly basis. Given that this 
study discretised time into annual basis, so  
 
11 )(' ++ +−=− tttt rrr εαβ , 
 
where 1+tε  follows );,0( rN σ  β =0.3312, and rσ =2.2225%. 
The risk free rate, r, is assumed to lie within the range 1% to 9%, since historic data 
shows that the 3-month inter-bank rate lies within the range of 1% to 9%. The 
mortgage rate is also assumed to change by a magnitude of 0.25% in each adjustment 
because mortgage rates adjustments tend to be 0.25%. The margin between the 
mortgage rate and the risk free rate is taken to be between 2.5% and 5.5%. Although 
Board rates are usually pegged to the interbank rates by a margin of 3.5% to 5.5%, the 
lower boundary appears to be breached on numerous occasions. In addition, it is 
assumed that there are no transaction costs and there are no restrictions to prepayment 
in the mortgage arrangements. 
 
 The market prices of the households’ current dwelling and their desired 
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where xµ  is the drift of P(X), 
 
xµ  is the drift of P(Y), 
xσ  is the variance of P(X), 
yσ  is the variance of P(Y), 
ε  is the random drawing from a standardized normal distribution, N(0,1), for P(X) 
and P(Y). 
 
Given that D= jj YPVLXP )()/1()( −− , the variance for V can be written as  
 
yxyxxV VLVL y σσρσσσ ,2222 )/1(2)/1( −−−+= ,   (82) 
 
where xyρ  is the correlation between P(X) and P(Y). The stochastic process 





Dyyyx εσµµ +−−= ))/1(( .    (83) 
 
Following Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979), V follows a symmetrical binomial 
intertemporal price process defined by an up (u) and a down (d) path, 
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 dtveu σ= ;   dtved σ−= .     (84) 
where dt is the discrete time interval. For an option matures in n, the option life can be 
divided into h number of dt intervals, i.e.h =n/dt and that probability that V will move 





−=       (85) 
 
where tr jfea δ=  and 
jf
r  is the risk free rate at period j. 
 
 















kNikNittt CEPVAFMCXPCFDC kk .  (86) 
The option to move is similar to a compound option (Geske, 1979; Carr, 1988), where 
the premiums of the options in the later period are contingent upon the premiums of 
the earlier periods. Implicitly, we assumed that the mortgage rate is independent of the 
housing prices. The assumption is reasonable because the correlation between 3-
months interbank rate and property return derived from the private property price 
index is -0.29 for the period from 1988 to 1998. 
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 The base case is shown in the following Exhibit 6.1. In the base case, we 
assume that the buyers will take up maximum loan available, which is 80% of the 
property price.  The maximum period of stay is assumed to be 5 years. Nevertheless, 
we expect that that the changes in maximum length of stay will not affect our analysis 
and result.  The mortgage rate is assumed to be 3% above the risk free rate, which is 
assumed to follow the above stochastic process.  We also assume that the mortgage 
rate is the same, regardless of the type of housing purchased by the owner.  
 
 The housing return volatility for current dwelling is obtained from the 
Housing Development Board (HDB)11 price index from 1990 to 2000 and the return 
volatility is obtained from the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) private price 
index12 from the same time period. The correlation between the desired dwelling and 
current dwelling of households in the base case is also derived from HDB and URA. 
The housing prices for the desired dwelling and the current dwelling are assumed to 
follow the stochastic process in (79) and (80). The current rental yield for desired and 
current dwelling is set at 6% and 3% in the base case. The benefits or jCF  were 
deducted at every time step. 
[Insert Exhibit 6.1] 
                                                 
11 The HDB Price Index is based on the quarterly average resale price of HDB flats by date of 
registration.  
 
12 The URA Price Index is based the price of private properties, obtained from caveats lodged with 
"Option exercised" as grounds of claim. The price of properties excludes stamp duties, legal & agency 
fees and other professional fees. It is the agreed purchase price of the property between the purchaser 
and the vendor as entered in the caveat form. En bloc sales are not included because the prices of en 
bloc sales are usually higher than normal. 
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 Using the @Risk package, which let the user perform Monte Carlo 
simulations, we simulate the movements of the risk-free rate and the prices for current 
and desired dwellings together to determine the option value. A simulation of 1,000 
iterations was conducted and the option value is shown in Exhibit 6.2. The value of 
the options is positively skewed as shown in Exhibit 6.2. The mean option value is 
about $55,436, which is about one sixth of the value of the household’s current 
dwelling.  The mode option value is much lower, at $39,445. 
 
[Insert Exhibit 6.2] 
 
 It was also found that higher volatility of mortgage rates will result higher 
average option values. In addition, the option value also has a positive relationship 
with the volatilities of the prices of the households’ current dwellings and their desired 
homes. An interesting finding is that a lower correlation in the prices of current 
dwellings and the desired dwellings will result a higher option value. In addition, it is 
found that the greater the difference between the prices of the current and desired 
dwellings, the greater the value of the option to move. 
 
 Alternatively, by dividing equation (74) by the price of the current dwelling 
at period j, P(X)  , equation (74) can be rewritten as follows: 
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VLZ −−= .  In other words, the value of the option can also be 
written as  
 






























Implicitly, equations (87) and (88) imply that the greater the capital gain, the higher 
the value of the option, and, hence, the less likely the homeowner will move. In 
addition, the smaller the difference between the price of the household current 
dwelling and desired dwelling, the higher the option price and the less likely 
homeowners will move. 
 
6.2 Volatility and Spread Test 
 
Using the same sample, we further carried a parametric duration test (non-time 
varying) on the volatility of returns of HDB and private apartments. The parameter 
estimates are provided in Exhibit 6.3. The results show that the household’s duration 
of stay will be longer if higher price volatility for HDB flats and private properties 
exists and this relationship is significant at 5% level of significance. In addition, most 
of the variables are consistent in both tests except SHDBINT, which may be due to 
collinearity errors. The presence of the mortgage volatility variable may distort the 
significance of SHDBINT. Since the real options model suggests that higher price 
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volatility increases option premium to wait, the empirical results suggests that the real 
options model can explain the households’ mobility decisions. The private mortgage 
volatility is also positively and significantly related to the households’ duration of 
stay. This result is similar to the sensitivity analysis of the option value with respect to 
the mortgage volatility.  
[Insert Exhibit 6.3] 




By substituting the relevant values in equation (86) and let n be 10 years, we 
further formulate a 10 year binomial tree to compute the option premium. There are 
several reasons why we use 10 years as our benchmark. First, by the tenth year, the 
household is qualified to purchase a new HDB flat at the subsidized rate, with 
subsidized mortgage rates. Hence, those living in the smaller flats could upgrade to 
bigger public flats, without a levy. Second, since given that the average amortizing 
period is 18 years, the borrower is likely to build up sufficient capital by paying the 
loan over the 10 years period, and become less constrained by the down payment 
requirement at the end of the 10th year.  
 
In addition, instead of computing the option premium for those upgrading from 
a HDB flat to a private apartment, we also compute the option premium to delay 
moving from a small HDB flat to a bigger one. We obtain the average valuation of 
Chapter 6 Empirical Test on Real Option Hypothesis 
 118
each type of flat from the HDB annual reports and use them for our start values. In 
addition, we assume the different types of HDB flats have the same volatility as that 
reflected in the HDB price index. Using a separate sample of 14,436 HDB flat resale 
transactions spanning from 1997 to 2000, we further compute a hedonic regression 
and obtain the price indices for the 3 room, 4 room, and 5 room flats.13 We further 
compute the correlation of returns between the different types of dwellings. One 
possible problem is that the variance of returns of the different types of housing may 
be different. In the appendices, we show that the price movement is similar for all 
types of HDB housing from 1997 and 2000.  
 
Another key variable that is required for our computation of option premium is 
rent for HDB housing. The rental transactions for HDB housing are not recorded and 
are arranged in an ad-hoc manner. The only published rents for public housing are 
rents for one and two room flats. I interviewed several agencies and managed to obtain 
the current rent for HDB flats in the targeted constituency. From the interviews made, 
the rent is estimated about $800 for a 3 to 4 room flat and $1000 for 5-room flats. 
With the given current rents, I further work backwards the rents using the private 
rental index, assuming that public and private rents move in tandem. Private rents, on 
the other hand, are obtained via REALIS database. The mortgage rates used are based 
on the housing loan rates of financing companies, which can be obtained from the 
TRENDS database. Alternatively, the public rates are obtained from Housing 
Development Board. After obtaining the data, we compute the option premium to 
delay, Option, using equation (86) for each year, each stage of payment and each type 
                                                 
13 The computation of the hedonic regression is provided in the appendix. 
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of housing to which the household will upgrade to. In our context, we assume that 
households will upgrade from three-room flat to four-room flat, from four-room flat to 
five-room flat, from five-room flat to private apartments.  
 
Nevertheless, we found that the above duration analysis largely assumes that 
the covariates are constant, which may not be reasonable. We further attempt to adopt 
the time-varying covariates duration model.  We let the interval 0 to it be divided into 
k exhaustive, nonoverlapping intervals, kk ttttt <<<< − )1(320 .. , where 0t =0 and 
kt = it . The covariates are assumed to stay constant within each of the k intervals, but 
may change from one interval to the next. Let 
kkxt tth k   to fromfunction  hazard 1)( −× = , 
since within that interval, the covariates are constant.  
 
The hazard function and survival rate can be written as the following, 
dt
tSdht
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1|Pr)|( .   (91) 
Finally, the density at kt  is 
 )(ln)|()|( kkkkk tSxthxtf += .   (92) 
Chapter 6 Empirical Test on Real Option Hypothesis 
 120
The log-likelihood function for one observation is  
)(ln)|(lnln kkkii tSxthL += δ .  (93) 
Thus, each observation contributes the survivor function to the log-likelihood 
function. For noncensored observations, we add the density, evaluated at the terminal 













)|()|(lnln δ .   (94) 
In other words, the hazard function is modeled as a step function, with different values 
of the covariates through several intervals between t=0 and t=T, the terminal value in 
the observation, at which either censoring or exit takes place. 
 
Besides the usual variables and the option premium, Option, we include 
several variables. We include the two dummy variables, AMUP and MUP. The former 
takes the value one when the households’ current dwelling qualifies for Main 
Upgrading Program, while the latter takes the value of one when the households’ 
current dwelling has been confirmed to undergo the upgrading program. In addition, 
not all variables are time-varying. R3, R4, MAL, JOINT, HHOLD and PDATE are 
time-invariant variables. Intuitively, the type of housing the households live in, the 
race of households and the year they purchase the house will not change over time. 
Nevertheless, the household size and the type of ownership may change over time. 
We, however, do not have access to the changes in these two variables and can only 
test these variables at the origination date with respect to the households’ length of 
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stay. The time varying variables are MUP, AMUP, Option, BLDGAGE, INCLEV, 
BUYERAGE, CGDP and CSES. 
 
6.3.2 Results  
 
We first conduct three tests. In the first test, we include all observations 
spanning from 1982 to 2000. In the second test, we omit observations where purchases 
are made before 1990. This is because the market conditions for the resale housing 
market are very stable and volatility is zero before 1990. Under such circumstances, 
the premium to wait has no value. As shown in Exhibit 6.4, the option premium is 
positively related to the duration of stay, whether the pre 1990 observations are 
included or not. Nevertheless, the effect of option premium is weakly significant when 
the pre 1990 observations are included, as compared to when it is not. The results 
generally support our hypothesis of real option model. The log likelihood also shows 
that the test is robust; at least one variable in the model is significant at 5% level of 
significance. The relationship between the rest of the variables and length of stay 
remains consistent with our earlier analysis. 
 
We also observe that both MUP and AMUP are significant. The positive 
coefficients of MUP and AMUP show that the advent of the upgrading program will 
entice the household to lengthen its stay in its current dwelling. The presence of MUP 
and AMUP also help ensure that the effect of OPTION is isolated.   We further include 
an interaction variable between AMUP and OPTION, in the third test. The inclusion of 
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the interaction variable is to determine whether households’ decision to delay moving 
is affected by the advent of upgrading. If the interaction variable is insignificant, it 
implies that one’s decision to delay moving is affected by his improvement decisions. 
The results show that the interaction is negatively related to households’ length of 
stay, but insignificant.  According to our model, we show that such insignificance 
arises when the household decides to cash in the difference between the market 
valuation and the actual cost of improvements.  
 
Yet, interestingly, we observe that such relationship is inconsistent when we 
test the relationship between the value of option to delay moving after MUP and the 
household length of stay. We introduced another variable MUPOP by multiplying the 
variables MUP and OPTION together. This variable captures the changes in the option 
premium after the upgrading is completed. Conducting the same test again except 
omitting MUP, we find that the regression coefficient of this variable is positive. The 
result offers some empirical support that the voting and uncertainty influence dilutes 
the real option effect.  I suspect that the unique institution setup of the upgrading 
programme may cause the inconsistency. It is likely that the uncertainty surrounding 
the date of carrying out upgrading and the support of the improvements further dilutes 
the households’ option to move.  
 
 
[Insert Exhibit 6.4] 
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One of our hypotheses surmises that the effects of loss aversion and equity 
constraint lose its influence on the prospective buyer’s decision to purchase their 
desired dwelling when house price volatility declines. Following the loss aversion and 
equity constraints theories, the transaction volume of housing will fall when a negative 
shock causes the housing price to decline. The continued fall in transaction volume 
after the negative shock reduces the price volatility, which also reduces the household 
option premium to wait.  
 
To test our hypothesis, we have to test whether the influence of loss aversion 
and equity constraints is significant when it is favorable to exercise the option to 
move. We introduce two dummy variables to equation (71): POPT, which takes the 
value 1 if the option premium to wait is positive, and ZOPT, which takes the value of 
1 if the option premium to wait is zero. We further multiply the above dummy 
variables on the equity constraint and loss aversion terms in equation (71), and analyze 
whether the parameters remain significant. Yet, by including the two dummy variables 
in equation (71), we realize that too many zeros are created, and this led to 
multicollinearity among the different variables. 
 
In order to resolve the problems stated above, we let these two variables 
interact with the relative change in Threshold Upgradability Index, TUI, and housing 
returns over the households’ length of stay instead. The independent variables include 
the following: 
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where LOSS is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if CHDBPR is less than 0, 
           GAIN  is a dummy variable and takes  the value 1 if CHDBPR is more than 1, 
          POPT  is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if the option premium to wait 
is   more than zero, 
 ZOPT  is a dummy variable and takes the value  1 if the option premium to wait 
is zero, 
    NTUI is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if the relative TUI over the 
length of stay drops, 
 PTUI is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if the relative TUI over the 
length of stay rises, 
 CTUI is the relative change in TUI over the length of stay. 
 
The first term on the right hand side of the equation captures the households’ 
loss aversion effect when the option premium to wait is positive and the fifth term 
captures the same effect when the option premium to wait is zero.  We expect the 
parameter of the first term to be significant and positive, since the presence of the 
option premium to wait will reinforce the effect of loss aversion. Alternatively, if the 
parameter of the fifth term is significant, we cannot conclude that whether the real 
option is indeed present. Yet, if this parameter is insignificant, the hypothesis that the 
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real option effect overcoming the loss aversion at the trough is supported. This is 
because that offers evidence of the counteracting effects of the two forces.  
 
The third term on the right hand side of the equation accounts for the effect of 
capital gains on the length of stay when the option premium to wait is positive, and the 
seventh term captures the same effect except that the option premium has no value. 
Unlike the first and fifth term, we expect the parameter of the seventh term to be 
significant and negative, and that of the third term to be insignificant. With higher 
gains for household to receive from sale and no incentive for the household to wait, 
we expect the household to exercise his option. Nevertheless, the effect of capital 
gains is less clear when the option premium is positive, and we cannot draw 
conclusions on our hypothesis unless the parameter of the third variable is 
insignificant. 
 
The remaining variables measure the influence of equity constraints when the 
option premium is positive and zero. The inclusion of these variables helps us to 
isolate the equity constraints and the loss aversion effects. We do not include any 
interactive variables in this case because the derivation of the threshold upgradeability 
index incorporates the change in housing price.  The second and the sixth term 
measure the effects of reduced equity constraints on the households’ length of stay 
when the option to delay is favorable and unfavorable respectively. Following our 
hypothesis, we expect the parameter of the second term to be insignificant, and the 
parameter of the six term to be negative and significant.  The remaining fourth and 
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eighth terms measure the impact of increased equity constraints on households’ 
mobility decisions, when it is more favorable or unfavorable to delay the decision to a 
later date. The theory suggests that the parameter of the eighth term to be insignificant 
because of counteracting effects of equity and real option effects. However, we expect 
the parameter of the fourth term to be significant and positive.  
 
The results are further tabulated in Exhibit 6.4a. The findings show that the loss 
aversion effects are not significant when the option premium to delay is nil; the 
variable ZOPT*LOSS*CHDBPR is insignificant. Similarly, the effect of equity 
constraint is also shown to be insignificant when the option premium to wait is not 
valuable. The results also reveal that the relationship between capital gains and 
households’ length of stay is insignificant. Alternatively, we found that positive 
capital gains, together with low option premium, will encourage households to move. 
Thus the results lend support to our earlier hypothesis on the turning point. 
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Chapter 7 Collective decisions and voting for upgrading program 
 
7.1 Methodology and Test 
 
Although the advent of Main Upgrading Program may influence the 
households’ decision to move, the decision to carry out the upgrading works is made 
collectively, not individually. Even though the household may want to improve its 
dwelling, the final decision may go against its favor. In the earlier chapter, we also 
observe that the effect of real option is diluted when the dwelling enters the window 
eligible for upgrading.   A possible way to incorporate the voting for the upward 
movement our earlier test is to make use of the voting rule. Yet Ben-Shahur and 
Sulganik (2003) notes the voting rule alone cannot answer how the voters vote. 
Assuming that voters are rational, and they seek to minimize disutility, Ben-Shahur 
and Sulganik (2003) predict that voters belonging to different camps may choose the 
same voting rule. However, in our mobility and improvement model, we assume that 
households maximize the utility. Since adopting either criterion may draw different 
conclusions, we attempt to test whether the households seek disutility. In addition, we 
also test whether households actually ‘learn’ the deviant strategy of abstaining by 
moving. This is especially so if the households realize that the general consensus will 
be unfavorable. 
 
We surveyed 872 households and their votes for or against the Main 
Upgrading Program (MUP). These 872 households are from two constituencies; 378 
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households are from Clementi Avenue 4 and the rest from Pandan Gardens, West 
Coast. Both constituencies are in close proximity to each other, and the polling for 
MUP was held in the same year, 2003. Hence, there should be little differences in 
*H and information sets for the two constituencies. During the sampling process, I 
initially targeted respondents from other sites that have undergone MUP in the past to 
obtain a panel data set.  Yet, I found that some of the actual voters have moved after 
MUP is carried out and the responses are likely to be biased. Hence, select the two 
constituencies to investigate the voting model from the cross-sectional perspective.  
 
The main reason for the choice of both constituencies is largely because of the 
different outcomes of the polls in both areas. The majority of the residents in Pandan 
Gardens have polled against MUP, and those in Clementi Ave 4 have voted for it. This 
offers us the opportunity to test and measure whether disutility plays a part in 
household decision making process. We try to capture the households’ disutility by 
asking those households who obtained an outcome that they were against, and how 
much they were willing to pay to overrule the decision. At the same time, we also try 
to observe how voter demographic and economic characteristics influence their 
choices. 
[Insert Exhibit 7.1] 
 
Exhibit 7.1 lists the reasons that households vote against the Main Upgrading 
Program. The most commonly cited reasons are the inconvenience cause by the 
upgrading works and the high costs involved. In addition, about 26% of the 
Chapter 7 Collective decisions and voting for upgrading program 
 
 129
households who vote against MUP find that the additions do not increase the value of 
their properties substantially. Alternatively, most households that support the 
upgrading program cite neighborhood requiring major facelift as the reason, as shown 
in Exhibit 7.2.  Interestingly, 22% of those who support the upgrading works believe 
that the improved amenities will increase the value of their dwellings substantially and 
26 % find MUP is value for money, which contrasts with the perceptions of those 
oppose. Exhibit 7.2 also reveals that 30% of respondents who support the upgrading 
works vote for MUP because they are attached to the neighborhood and would like to 
improve the neighborhood. 
 
[Insert Exhibits 7.2 and 7.3] 
 
We further adopt a probit model to test our hypothesis on the households’ voting 
decisions. We examine the probability to vote for the upgrading by assigning the 
dependent variable, iy  to be either 0 (against) or 1 (for). The vote is then modelled on 
a set of independent variables denoted as ix .  Generally, the probability to vote for the 
program can be specified as 
  )()1Pr( ii xFy β== ,     (96) 
where F is an appropriate distribution function.   
 
Many empirical analyses have either utilized the logit or the probit model to 
understand discrete choices of respondents. Given that the choice of either model does 
not affect the results, we use the probit model. The probit model is chosen instead of 
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the normal linear model because using the normal linear model will lead to 
specification bias. The cumulative distribution curve of the probit model is a S shape, 
bounded in the interval (0,1) and such that 0)( →iYE when −∞→iX and 1)( →iYE  
when Xi → ∞. 











π     (97) 
As both functions are non-linear, we cannot use the familiar Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) procedure to estimate our parameters. Hence it is accepted that the probit model 
can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function, where 










−=∏ ββ     (98) 
The variables are further described in Exhibit 7.3 and the descriptive statistics are 





The results are tabulated in Exhibit 7.5. We conduct 6 tests. We exclude the 
households’ income and the job status of owner in the first test, the education level of 
owner and households’ income in the second test and the job status and education 
level of owner in the third test. For Test 4, we substitute household size with marriage 
status. In tests 5 and 6, we further incorporate the disutility factors. The log likelihood 
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tests are significant for all three tests. Generally, household income and job status of 
owner have insignificant effects on the households’ decision to vote for MUP. 
Alternatively, it is found that the voters with tertiary education-having at least a 
university degree- tend not to vote for MUP, as compared to those with primary 
education. Since the employment status of owner and its income are insignificant, we 
believe that highly educated voters vote against MUP not because of affordability 
reasons. It is likely that these highly educated voters have better knowledge of the 
costs of MUP than those with poorer education. Or they could have higher specific 
costs associated with MUP.  
 
The results also show that AREA, which takes the value of 1 if the household 
interviewed is located in Pandan Gardens, is negatively related to the households’ 
likelihood to support MUP. In other words, households living at Pandan Gardens are 
more likely to vote against MUP than those in Clementi precinct. The HDB precinct in 
Pandan Gardens, compared to that in Clementi Avenue 4, has poorer access to the 
Mass Rapid Transit and other forms of public transport. In addition, there are fewer 
amenities in Pandan Garden than in Clementi Avenue 4.  As stated earlier, many 
residents that oppose the upgrading claimed that the upgrading do not increase their 
property values, and it is likely that this is especially so in Pandan Gardens where the 
location is poorer than that in Clementi.  
 
Three other variables that are significant in influencing households decision to 
vote; the age of owner, the type of flat and the size of household. The older the owner 
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is, the more likely he is to vote against MUP. From the interviews conducted, most of 
the older owners are adamant on the need for MUP. They felt the money can be 
safeguarded for other purposes.  Incidentally, we also found that the heads of 
households at Pandan Gardens, where MUP is rejected, are predominantly more than 
50 years old. On the other hand, we find larger households are more pro-MUP than 
smaller households. This is because they need more room to accommodate the family 
and MUP usually offers the addition of one room or an increase in floor area. 
Interestingly, we observe that the residents living in 5-room flats are more likely to 
vote against MUP than those living in 3 room flats. The residents living in the 5-room 
flats interviewed told us that there was no need to, as the space they had was 
sufficient.  
 
We further incorporate the variables that capture the amount of money the 
households are willing to pay to get what they want in our test. These variables are 
used as proxies for the disutility if the households face an unfavorable outcome. We 
further splintered the amount of money payable into four categories, with the category 
of minimal disutility as our basic variable. Test 5 of Exhibit 7.5 shows that the 
likelihood to support the upgrading program is positively and significantly related to 
the variable 11_20. This means that households receiving a disutility of 11-20% of the 
total upgrading costs are more likely to support the upgrading program as compared to 
those who receive disutility of less than 10% of the upgrading costs. Yet, households 
receiving a disutility of more than 30% of the upgrading costs have a greater 
likelihood to oppose the upgrading works as compared to those who receive lower 
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utility costs. This implies that households with low disutility tend to vote for MUP and 
those with highest disutility tend to vote against MUP. In other words, those 
households that vote against MUP tend to have higher disutility than those who 
support MUP. Nevertheless, the costs are hypothetical and are not enforceable. 
Additionally, the costs are not relative to family wealth or income. We try to 
circumvent the problem by multiplying the variables with the disutility factors, 
whereby  








   ,(99) 
where ix represents all the independent variables and β  represents the parameters of 
ix ; 
 iZ  represents the property and buyer independent variables that  affect 
households’ decision to move and φ is the related parameters, 
HI takes the value one if the household is higher than the average household 
income computed from GDP per capita and national average household size, 
LOW takes the value one if the household is lower than the average 
household income computed from GDP per capita and national average 
household size, and “11_20”, “21_30”, “>30” represent the percentage of 
upgrading costs the owner is willing to pay to overturn the decision. 
 
 The results for low income reflect those of Test 5, but high income owners 
who receive disutility of 21-30% of upgrading costs are more likely to support 
upgrading as compared to those receiving disutility of less than 10% of upgrading 
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costs. The results of Test 6 imply that high income owners are willing to pay more to 
support MUP. 
 
A possible criticism to the above result is that households when surveyed may 
provide extreme views. For instance, a household who does not want MUP will desire 
maximum compensation, while a household who wants MUP will go for minimum 
compensation. We try to overcome the problem by spacing out the questions during 
the interview. For instance, we asked the respondent who rejected MUP whether they 
would vote for MUP if they were to receive a discount of 5% of the total costs. After 
asking this question, we would follow up with other questions before asking them the 
same question, but quoting a higher discount. We did a trial survey and found that this 
method prevented the respondents from giving extreme values. 
 
One interesting result from the above test is the insignificance of RETURN, on 
the probability to vote for MUP. Coupled with the significance of the disutility 
variables, it appears that the households disregard the possible monetary return that 
they are likely to make, when deciding to vote for or against upgrading. Yet, the use of 
the cross-sectional data may prevent us from making the above conclusions. It is 
likely, as postulated in the learning model, that the households who are against the 
MUP move before they vote against it. 
 
In order to test whether the households learn the deviant strategies, we 
introduce a third set of variables to the sample, which we used to test the real option 
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hypothesis. As mentioned previously, the returns of housing may form the impetus of 
households’ decision to support MUP. Hence, the household will only learn of the 
deviant strategy to move before voting if the returns excess of what are required to 
move to a better housing is significant. In this subsequent test, we adopt the time-
varying parametric duration test, because households’ income, house prices, and 
buyers’ age change over time. In addition, we let AMUP and MUP to be time-varying 
variables. AMUP took the value of 1 if the observed property is eligible for upgrading 
at the subject point of time, else 0. Similarly, MUP takes the value of 1 if the 
authorities announced polling for upgrading of the observed property at each point in 
time, else zero.  
 
We conduct 5 tests. In the first test, we use the parameters obtained in our 
earlier probit test 3 of Exhibit 7.5 and substitute the relevant values of the observations 
in our second sample to obtain each household’s probability of voting for upgrading. 
The use of test 3 results is due to the lack of information on the educational level of 
the residents. Given that the precincts the households in the earlier sample are located 
in are similar to that in Clementi, we let AREA took the value of 0. We also introduce 
two more variables; AMUPPROB and MUPPROB. AMUPPROB captures the 
probability that the owner will vote for upgrading when his dwelling is eligible for 
improvement, and is a time varying variable in our model. MUPPROB, which is also a 
time varying variable, captures the probability that the owner will vote for upgrading 
when the authorities announced the polling for Main Upgrading.  In other words, 
MUPPROBAMUPPROBZx ii ηγφβ ++= ,   (100) 
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where ix represents all the independent variables and β  represents the parameters of 
ix ; 
 iZ  represents the property and buyer independent variables that  affect 
households’ decision to move and φ is the related parameters 
γ  represents the parameter for AMUPPROB and η  represents the parameter 
for MUPPROB. 
 
 The results are tabulated in Exhibit 7.6 and they show that AMUPPROB and 
MUPPROB are positively related to the households’ length of stay in their current 
dwelling. However, AMUPPROB is found to be insignificant, whereas MUPPROB is 
strongly significant. The results imply that households that are against upgrading do 
not consider the strategy of moving. Yet over time, these households may find that 
their opposition is futile, and learn and subsequently apply the strategy of moving. 
These findings support the hypothesis that households are learning individuals, and 
those who are against the upgrading learn the deviant strategy of moving.  
 
In Test 2, we further test whether the household level of affordability and 
changes in price induces them to learn and apply the strategies of moving. The 
independent variables included are shown as follows: 
AMUPCHDBPRAMUPTUIZx ii ϖκφβ ++= ,  (101) 
where κ and ϖ  are the respective parameters of AMUPTUI and AMUPCHDBPR. The 
first variable, AMUPTUI, captures the change in threshold upgradeability index or the 
affordability of households’ ability to upgrade during the window period. The second 
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variable, AMUPCHDBPR, captures the return of the HDB dwelling during the 
window period. It is noted that an increase in HDB price will also increase TUI, 
because the owner can sell at a higher price, as shown in Equation (67). Thus the 
presence of TUI removed the derived effect of a change in affordability caused by 
change in price and vice versa. Test 2 of Exhibit 7.6 shows that AMUPTUI and 
AMUPCHDBPR are negatively and significantly related to the duration of households’ 
stay. The results support our hypothesis that households learn to appreciate the payoffs 
of moving and apply the strategy of moving as opposed to voting when the payoffs are 
higher.  
 
We further conduct a test with both the probability measures in Equation (100) 
and measures of affordability and gains shown in (101). By doing so, we not only can 
isolate the marginal effect of AMUP on TUI, we can also evaluate the effect if changes 
in gains influence the decision to vote. Exhibit 7.6 shows that the signs for the 
variables for probability to support upgrading, affordability and gains are the same as 
earlier tests. Nevertheless, we notice that AMUPPROB becomes significant. This 
implies that the variables for affordability and gains affect the households’ decision to 
support during the window.  
 
It is noted that the households may downgrade to a cheaper housing, and the 
wealth component is not readily observable. We try to filter the downgrading cases by 
excluding the observations with owners who are more than 50 years old. We also try 
to filter the downgrading phenomenon by excluding observations with owners who 
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live in 4 and 5 room flats. This is because the 3-room flats are low-end housing, and 
owners are unlikely to downgrade further. The results remain consistent. 
 
One possible criticism to the results garnered in Exhibit 7.6 is that households 
only act when the upgrading is announced, and are apathetic to whether their 
dwellings are eligible for the upgrading program. This is unlikely in our context. The 
households in both samples do not belong to the first or demonstration batch for Main 
Upgrading program, and the residents are likely to know the policy. In addition, the 
Upgrading Program is used as part of the election agenda, and is one of the key 
reasons that gave the ruling party the legitimacy of governance of Singapore. The 
residents are being informed consistently of the eligibility of the upgrading program 
by the town council and the ruling party, especially when elections draw near.  Thus, it 
is unlikely that the residents only plan when the authorities announce the upgrading 
program. When AMUP= 1, it increases the immediacy or urgency for the household to 
decide. 
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Chapter 8  Conclusion 
 
We first set out to discover the causes of the turning point of cycles. Many 
studies have attributed the turning point of house price cycle to supply lags. Yet what 
makes the demand to fall such that supply become in excess remains unstudied, 
especially since the effects of down payments will reinforce the price fluctuations. 
Borrowing from the real option theory, we postulate that households have the option 
to defer its move. Building on theory by Stein (1995), we surmise that a positive 
exogenous shock will swing the households to move up their housing career. The 
down payment requirements further reinforce the effects and the number of 
transactions increase. Yet the increase in transactions and price volatility entice 
households to wait for possible increase in price in future. The waiting phenomenon 
further dampens the demand.  Together with possible new supply,   price starts to fall. 
The effects of loss aversion and equity constraints set in and the number of 
transactions and price volatility fall, until some point when it is beneficial to exercise 
the option. 
 
 We first conduct several preliminary tests to check the assumptions of our 
model.  The option component of our model assumes that price follows a Geometric 
Brownian Motion, which is a memoryless process. In other words, we assume that 
households hold rational expectations on house price.  Our duration test shows that 
households’ decision to move depend on the rational expectations of future price and 
this result supports our assumption.  
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 Our second preliminary test aimed to study the importance of equity 
constraints.  Our model draws upon the specifications and assumptions of Stein’s 
model.  In other words, we assume that equity constraints play an important role in 
generating reinforcement effects from price to demand.  In order to test whether the 
assumption is reasonable, we further incorporate the Threshold Upgrader Index (TUI) 
in our duration test.  The TUI encompasses the changes in households’ level of 
affordability to purchase a private apartment resulting from changes in price, income 
and mortgage rates.  We found that an increase in affordability of private housing will 
increase the households’ likelihood to move.  This result supports Stein’s hypothesis. 
 
 Our third preliminary test further check whether loss aversion effects 
overwhelm the effects of equity constraints. If the loss aversion effects render the 
equity constraint effects insignificant, we will need to redefine the model when price 
declines.  Following the example of Genosove and Mayer (2003), we generated the 
loss aversion and equity constraints using a mix of interacting variables between the 
extent of mortgage borrowed and the gain in each year.  The results show that both 
loss aversion effects and equity constraints effects are significant. 
 
 After verifying our assumptions of our model, we further test the real option 
hypotheses.  We first compute the option premium for each household and each year 
of their stay. We further include this option premium in a time-varying duration test.  
The results supported our model. First, the value of the households’ option is 
increasing with the households’ length of stay in their existing accommodations. 
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Second, it is shown that the households’ length of stay is lower if the value of the 
option is low and capital gains are high.   
 
We further extend the above analysis by analyzing how improvement decisions 
are included into the equation. Improvements, as observed by Munro and Littlewood 
(1997), can be carried out before or after the move, so that the household can consume 
its desired amount of housing at the particular stage of life cycle. Following our 
modeling, we found that the households’ decision to delay their move is unlikely to be 
influenced with the added option to improve, provided that the households’ intention 
is to improve and move. Nevertheless, the households may not delay his move even if 
the option premium is positive. This will occur when the market valuation of the 
improvement exceeds the costs. In our tests, we further use the Main Upgrading 
Programme (MUP) as a proxy to households’ improvements. Interestingly, we found 
that the relationship between the value of option to delay moving and the households’ 
length of stay when MUP is announced and that when MUP is completed is different 
under different scenarios. I attribute the inconsistency of the results to the unique 
institution setup of the upgrading programme. More specifically, the collective 
decision making process of upgrading may affect the relationship between value of 
households’ option to delay moving and their length of stay.  As shown in Chapter 7, 
we found that the way people votes changes as they learn their strategies. Hence, such 
changes in strategies will reduce the impact of the value of option to delay moving. 
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We further test the model postulated by Ben Shahar and Sulganik (2003) 
whether households make their votes based on minimizing disutility. In addition, we 
further test whether households do learn new strategies to abstain, or move over time, 
especially if they find the new strategy is more optimal.  In order to test our 
hypothesis, we identify the Singapore housing market because of its unique regulatory 
framework and clear segmentation of the housing sector into private and private. From 
our tests, we find that the households’ option premium to defer payment do influence 
their decision to move; the higher the option premium the greater the likelihood they 
move. In addition, even with upgrading program, the option premium remains 
significant.   
 
In our second part, we further test the assumptions of Ben-Shahur and 
Sulganik’s model (2003). We find that the household do take into consideration of 
disutility in their vote. In addition, using the longitudinal data, we further found that 
most households learn the strategy to move and apply the deviant strategy.  
 
8.1 Limitations 
There are several limitations in our test. First, our sample is not large, despite a 
lot of data about the resident is known. Second, for our test of collective decision, we 
are unable to obtain how the decisions change over time and over different stages of 
economic cycle. Third, we cannot directly observe the characteristics of households 
that move before the vote. Fourth, our assumptions of rental of HDB flats and its 
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growth are based on informal sources and there may be bias. A better database will 
allow us to better test our hypothesis. 
 
8.2 Extensions 
A possible extension of the real option theory portion is to use the least square 
approach (Longstaff and Schwartz, 2001) to value the option premium. The approach 
involves using a least squares analysis to determine the best-fit relationship between 
the value of continuing and the values of relevant variables at each time an early 
decision has to be made.  
 
Alternatively, we can further the collective decision making process by 
empirically testing the assumptions in the using surveys from the private households. 
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Notes: Housing demand typically increases during child-rearing stage of the life cycle towards a ‘peak’ of housing consumption, before diminishing towards a 

























































Notes: In order to match more closely to the continuously adjusting demand equilibrium, households adopt the strategy of moving and improving, as 


















































, debtiinvestmentdin cKrHdPV −+−+=

































































































Exhibit 5.1 Relationship between Private Property Price Index and 
Volatility of Returns of HDB flat 





































Exhibit 5.2 Relationship between Private Property Price Index and 
Volatility of Private Residential Price Index 
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Exhibit 5.3 Resale Applications and Volatility of returns of HDB flat 






























 Source HDB, URA and Author’s Computation 
 
 
Exhibit 5.4: Regression between Volatility of Returns of HDB Housing 
and Resale Price 
Dependent variable RESAPLL 
Independent Variables Coefficients Sig 
Constant -5033.229 .662 
HDBVOL 1979693.2 .003 
HDBVOL2 -19003965 .005 
   
R-Square= 0.594 
Notes: HDBVOL refers to the volatility of returns of HDB flats, HDBVOL2 refers to 















































Exhibit 5.6  Descriptive Statistics 
 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
FLOOR 8.65 5.48 1 25 
R3 .539 .499 0 1 
R4 .335 .472 0 1 
BUYERAGE 38.48 10.98 21 79 
MAL .138 .345 0 1 
IND .488 .216 0 1 
OTHERS .505 .709 0 1 
JOINT .786 .41 0 1 
HHOLD 3.133 1.45 1 7 
INCLEV .770 .522 0 3.93 
PPRICE($) 115423 89735 20000 800000 
SPRICE($) 97261 126100 0 750000 
LOAN ($) 63401 56516.7 1800 328000 
LV (%) 57.3 21.4 22.9 90 
OUTSTAND($) 21525.29 37206.96 0 287346 
PREMIUM (%) 51.3 10.11 -28.9 56 
MUP .318 .466 0 1 
BLDGAGE 24.213 4.909 8.75 33 
SMORTVOL(%) .556 .202 .19 1.55 
HDBVOL 43.498 17.455 0 80.6 
SHDBINT(%) 2.219 1.183 .43 4.51 
CSES .375 .549 -.554 2.289 
CGDP .721 .580 -.321 2.917 
CHDBPR 1.071 1.009 -.2117 3.062 
CHDBMR 2.926 2.409 -.561 9.488 
INTDIFF(%) 4.299 1.297 2.09 9.69 
CAPGAIN .728 1.407 -1 18.4805 




Notes: The data for this study were provided from Housing Development Board (HDB) Branch Office of Singapore. A sample 
of 594 resale mortgages spanning a period from 1982 to 2000 is observed. The buyer characteristics are the age of the buyer 
(BUYERAGE), the dummy variables for  Malay (MAL), Indians (IND) and others (OTHERS). Other buyer characteristics include 
size of household (HHOLD), and the household income level (INCLEV). The household income level is computed by normalizing 
the reported household income with the overall household income adjusted to 1990 prices. The property related variables include 
dummy variables of 3-room (R3) and 4-room (R4), age of unit (BLDGAGE) and dummy variable for Main Upgrading 
Programme (MUP). The loan characteristics are loan- to- value ratio (LV), the outstanding balance (OUTSTAND) and the 
payment- to- income ratio (PAYINC). Other variables include the purchase price (PPRICE), the selling price (SPRICE), the 
premium which is the amount paid above valuation and the date of originations and prepayments.The macroeconomic factors 
include the change in SES index (CSES), change in GDP (CGDP), change in HDB mortgage rate (CHDBMR), change in HDB 
index (CHDBPR), the HDB public rate at point of sale (SHDBINT), the HDB price volatility (HDBVOL), the private mortgage 
volatility rate at point of sale (SPMORTVOL) and the spread between the public and private rates (INTDIFF).  The households’ 
ability to upgrade is represented by the threshold upgradability index (TUI).  The price of dwelling, in GDP and SES may be 
200% higher than that when the household first bought the flat. This is because the price, GDP and SES has increased over the 
past 10 years continuously, and this is especially so for households that  have lived very long in these flats. 
 
5.6a Definition of Variables 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
FLOOR This is a discrete variable that indicate the floor level 
the households stayed in. 
 
R3 This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household stayed in a 3-room apartment or not. 
 
R4 This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household stayed in a 4-room apartment or not. 
 
BUYERAGE This variable indicates the age of the buyer. If the 
property is jointly purchased by two buyers, the age of 
the older buyer would be recorded. 
 
MAL This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household’s ethnic group is Malay or not. For inter-
racial marriages, we will adopt the ethnic group of the 
head of household. 
 
IND This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
household’s ethnic group is Indian or not. For inter-
racial marriages, we will adopt the ethnic group of the 
head of household. 
 
OTHERS This is a dummy variable that indicates 1 if the 
household’s ethnic group is neither Malay nor Indian. 
For inter-racial marriages, we will adopt the ethnic 




JOINT This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
housing is jointly purchased or not. 
 
HHOLD This is a discrete variable that indicates the size of the 
household. 
 
INCLEV This variable captures the relative income level of the 
household with respect to the national household 
income. 
 
PPRICE($) Purchase price of housing 
 
SPRICE($) Selling price of housing. 
 
LOAN ($) Amount of loan taken 
 
LV (%) Loan to value ratio 
 
OUTSTAND($) Amount of Outstanding Loan 
 
PREMIUM (%) Percentage paid above the apartment’s valuation. 
 
MUP This variable is a dummy variable that captures 
whether Main Upgrading Programme is carried out. 
 
BLDGAGE This variable is a discrete variable that indicates the 
age of the apartment 
 
SMORTVOL(%) Mortgage Volatility 
 
HDBVOL Volatility of HDB price 
 
SHDBINT(%) HDB mortgage rate at the point of sale 
 
CSES Change in Singapore Stock Exchange Index over the 
period of stay 
 
CGDP Change in GDP over the period of stay 
 
CHDBPR Change in HDB residential price Index over the period 
of stay 
 
CHDBMR Change in HDB mortgage rate over the period of stay 
 





CAPGAIN Capital gains earned over the period of Stay 
 





Exhibit 5.7: Cutler and Ederer life table estimation of the duration 
Survival Enter Censored At 
Risk 
Exit Survival rate Hazard Rate 
.0- 23.5 594 0 594 6 1.0000 (.000) .004 (.000)
23.5- 47.0 588 54 561 107 .9899 (.004) .0090 (.001)
47.0- 70.5 427 74 390 73 .8011 (.017) .0088 (.001)
70.5- 94.0 280 51 254 47 .6511 (.021) .0087 (.001)
94.0- 117.5 182 28 168 35 .5309 (.023) .0099 (.002)
117.5- 141.0 119 26 106 12 .4209 (.025) .0051 (.001)
141.0- 164.5 81 30 66 12 .3727 (.026) .0085 (.002)
164.5- 188.0 39 30 24 1 .3049 (.027) .0018 (.002)
188.0- 211.5 8 7 4 0 .2922 (.029) .0000 (.000)
211.5- 235.0 1 1 0 0 .2922 (.029) .0000 (.000)
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Exhibit 5.11: Estimated survival function Exhibit 5.12 : 



















Exhibit 5.10 Parametric Duration test on Expectations (Non- Time Varying)  
Dependent Variable: Log(Duration of Stay) 
 
 TEST 1 
(Using Actual 
Returns) 












(Includes TUI and 
excludes returns) 
 Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P 
Constant     2.1870 .0000    2.0481 .0000     2.1744 .0000     1.7614 .0000   2.2821 .0000 
BUYERAGE -   0.3104  .9868 -  0.6361 .7310 -   0.6142 .7516 -   0.6878 .8085 - 0.2772 .8843 
MAL -   0.1007 .1592 -  0.8821 .1249 -   0.7417 .1867 -   0.3511 .2012 - 0.9678 .0701* 
IND -   0.5986 .3275 -  0.6805 .2850 -   0.4573 .4786 -   0.7696 .4228 - 0.7070 .2462 
JOINT -   0.2980 .0000* -  0.2934 .0000* -   0.3079 .0000* -   0.2473 .0070* - 0.2917 .0000* 
HHOLD -   0.1734 .2554 -  0.1422 .3710 -   0.6232 .6853 -   0.9061 .3027 - 0.1456 .3629 
INCLEV -   0.8084 .0430** -  0.6925 .0877** -   0.9227 .0162* -   0.1505 .0027* - 0.8601 .0375* 
PREMIUM -   0.2602 .1388 -  0.2821 .1249 -   0.1592 .3757 -   1.6126 .0001* - 0.2560 .1119 
LV -   0.9465 .3906 -  0.1170 .2992 -   0.1739 .1108 -   0.6424 .0001*   0.1306 .5664 
INTDIFF     0.1953 .0000*    0.1962 .0000*     0.1775 .0000*     0.3287 .0000*   0.1898 .0000* 
SMORTVOL     1.4863 .0000*    1.5923 .0000*     1.5487 .0000*     1.6281 .0000*   1.6548 .0000* 
R3 -   0.1438 .1354 -  0.7517 .2778 -   0.1148 .1871 -   0.3576 .0001* - 0.1197 .0854* 
R4 -   0.3701 .5611 -  0.4021 .9491 -   0.1029 .8733 -   0.1364 .1188 - 0.1143 .8599 
BLDGAGE     0.1430 .0005*    0.1288 .0063*     0.1331 .0010*     0.3485 .0000*   0.1368 .0011* 
SPRICEVOL      0.1239 .0000*    0.1030 .0000*     0.1344 .0000*     0.2902 .0000*   0.1347 .0000* 
CSES -   0.1071 .1456 -  0.7133 .2748 -   0.7894 .1347 - - - 0.8311 .1173 
CGDP     1.0870 .0000*    1.0228 .0000*     1.0473 .0000* - -   1.0462 .0000* 
TUI - - - - - - - - - 0.3584 .0153* 
RELPI      0.5746 .0641** - - - - - - - - 
ACTGAIN  -   0.2417 .0002** - - - - - - - - 
MYOPTE_5 - - -  3.6967 .0001* - - - - - - 
MYOPUB_5 - -    3.0805 .0006* - - - - - - 
RATPTE - - - - -   1.2067 .3123 - - - - 
RATPUB - - - -     0.3414 .0015* - - - - 
EXO_1 - - - - - -    11.1554 .2313 - - 




).'exp()( ixt βλ −=





* Indicates significance at 5 per cent level and ** indicates significance at 10 percent significance level 
The data for this study were provided from a Housing Development Board (HDB) Branch Office of Singapore. From a total of 37,000 units in a constituency, a 
sample of 594 resale mortgages spanning a period from 1982 to 2000 is observed. The buyer characteristics are the age of the buyer (BUYERAGE), the dummy 
variables for  Malay (MAL), Indians (IND). Other buyer characteristics include size of household (HHOLD), and the household income level (INCLEV). The 
household income level is computed by normalizing the reported household income with the overall household income adjusted to 1990 prices. The property 
related variables include dummy variables of 3-room (R3) and 4-room (R4), age of unit (BLDGAGE). The loan characteristics are loan- to- value ratio (LV) and 
the payment- to- income ratio (PAYINC). Other variables include the date of originations (PDATE) and the amount paid over the valuation (PREMIUM). The 
macroeconomic factors include the change in SES index (CSES), change in GDP (CGDP), change in HDB mortgage rate (CHDBMR), change in HDB index 
(CHDBPR), the HDB public rate at point of sale (SHDBINT), the change in private residential price index (CRPI), the private mortgage volatility rate at point of 
sale (SPMORTVOL). RATPTE and RATPUB represent the expected returns of private and public housing using rational expectations methodology. MYOPTE_5 
and MYOPUB_5 represent the expected returns of private and public housing using rational expectations methodology. EXO_1 represent the expected returns of 
private and public housing using exogenous expectations methodology.  
 







 TEST 1 
(Using Actual 
Returns) 













(Includes TUI and 
excludes returns) 
Lambda 0.00897  0.00902  0.00890  0.00752  0.00901  







144.8824  144.8824  144.8824  144.8824  NA  
Log-
Likelihood 
-136.8495  -126.7102  -134.2864  -331.7604  -144.2287  
Sig at 5% 
level of 
significance 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  






Cross Tabulation between Loan-to-Value ratio and Change in Price (Capital 
Gains) 
i) For Households who have moved before June 2000 
  
Loan-To-Value Ratio 
 0-40% 41%-60% >60% Total 
<0% 7 13 13 33
0-20% 6 6 18 30
21%-50% 3 6 26 35
51-70% 5 1 10 16
Capital 
Gains 
>70% 33 75 71 179
Total 54 101 138 293
 
 
ii) For Households who have not moved by June 2000 
   
Loan-To-Value Ratio 
  0-40% 41%-60% >60% Total 
<0% 13 13 53 79
0-20% 3 5 16 24
21%-50% 5 2 18 25




>70% 51 45 40 136
Total 83 73 145 301
 
iii) For the whole sample  
Loan-To-Value Ratio 
 0-40% 41%-60% >60% Total 
<0% 16 19 69 104
0-20% 13 17 46 76
21%-50% 9 6 43 58




>70% 79 120 101 300
Total 137 174 283 594
 

























Source: Author’s computation 


















































































Time-varying Parametric Duration test 
Dependent variable: Log Duration  
  
 Coefficient P 
Constant 4.2559** 0.0000 
BUYERAGE 0.8626** 0.0044 
MAL -0.4406** 0.0000 
IND -0.4709** 0.0003 
JOINT -0.3472** 0.0006 
HHOLD 0.1307** 0.0000 
INCLEV -0.1960** 0.0012 
BLDGAGE -0.3037** 0.0012 
FLOOR 0.4804 0.4286 
R3 -0.1236 0.3179 
R4 -0.7440 0.4654 
MUP 0.1824** 0.0490 
AMUP 0.3605** 0.0000 
LV -0.9645** 0.0000 
INTDIFF 0.1156 0.5604 
SMORTVOL 0.2550 0.1219 
CSES -0.9566 0.8629 
CGDP 2.4260 0.5890 
TUI -0.1745** 0.0009 
   
   
LAMBDA 0.08402  
P 2,04090  
Log Likelihood -914.6188  
   
Notes: *: 10% level of significance, **: 5% level of significance 
R3 and R4 are dummy variables; R3 takes the value of 1 if the current dwelling  is 3 room and R4 takes 
the value of 1 if the dwelling is 4-room flat. BUYERAGE represents the age of the head of household 
and varies over time. MAL takes the value 1if the buyer is malay, else 0. JOINT  takes the value 1 if the 
dwelling is under joint ownership, else 0. HHOLD captures the household size. BLDGAGE 
represents the age of dwelling. INCLEV represents the income level of household over the years, 
SMORTVOL represents the mortgage volatility, TUI refers to the threshold upgradeability index, CSES 
captures the change is Singapore Stock Exchange Index, CGDP represents the change in GDP for each 
year. MUP is a dummy variable, and it takes the value 1 if the unit has undergone upgrading. AMUP is 
a dummy variable, and it takes the value 1 if the unit is eligible for upgrading. 





Exhibit 5.15b Statistical Results: Test For Equity Constraints 
Dependent Variable: Log(Duration of Stay) 
 
Coefficients 






















(.0011)   
  1.6840* 
(.0035) 






-  0.5436 
(.5159) 
JOINT 0.8000    ** 
(.0657) 
  0.8097** 
(.0753) 






-  0.1909 
(.2165) 
INCLEV 0.2333     
(.5709)   
  0.9698 
(.8464) 




   








  1.5991 
(.3043) 




  0.1365** 
(.0599) 
  0.1384* 
(.0455) 






















   
LV 1.2904 
(.1316)       







INTDIFF NA NA - 0.2705 
(0.7611) 
SHDBINT NA    2.295* 
(.0386) 
NA 
PAYINC 0.7038 * 
(.0046)   
   0.1699 
(0.6238) 
  0.2075 
(.5387) 








   
CSES 2.8011*     
(.0031) 




CGDP -18.8748*   





CRPI NA    5.8705* 
(.0005) 
















TUI 0.2350        
(.0005)  
NA NA 




Log likelihood -46.74350* -39.77867* -41.45977* 
 
Predicted 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Actual 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
0 299 2 301 299 2 301 299 2 301 
1 8 285 293 9 284 293 9 284 293 
Total 8 285 594 308 286 594 308 286 594 
 Notes: * Indicates significance at 5 per cent  level and ** indicates 10 per cent level 
The data for this study were provided from Housing Development Board (HDB) Branch Office of Singapore. A sample of 594 
resale mortgages spanning a period from 1982 to 2000 is observed. 3 tests have been carried out. In Model A, The threshold 
upgradability index (TUI) is included. However, the HDB mortgage rate at the point of sale (SHDBINT), change in private 
residential price index over the years of occupation (CRPI), price volatility of HDB housing (HDBVOL) and change in HDB price 
(CHDBPR) are omitted. The buyer characteristics are the age of the buyer (BUYERAGE), the dummy variables for  Malay (MAL), 
Indians (IND) and others (OTHERS). Other buyer characteristics include size of household (HHOLD), and the household income 
level (INCLEV). The property related variables include dummy variables of 3-room (R3) and 4-room (R4), age of unit 
(BLDGAGE) and dummy variable for Main Upgrading Programme (MUP). Some of the property characteristics are omitted in 




ratio (PAYINC). Other variables include the date of originations (PDATE) and the amount paid over the valuation (PREMIUM). 
The macroeconomic factors include the change in SES index (CSES), change in GDP (CGDP). In model B and C, the TUI is 
replaced by the omitted variables. In model B, the change in HDB mortgage rate is used (SHDBINT) and the difference between 
private mortgage rate and public mortgage rate (INTDIFF) is used in model C.  Actual capital gains (CAPGAINS) is included in 
models B and C to test the appropriateness of CHDBPR as a proxy of capital gains ,and is the difference between the selling and 
the purchase price and divided by the latter. The relative price of private property to the price of HDB flats is represented by 
(RELPI). The Log likelihood ratio test shows that at least one variable is significant in all 3 models at 5% level of significance. 
The restricted log-likelihood is -411.6756.  




Exhibit 5.16: Test for loss aversion effects 
Dependent Variable: Log(Duration of Stay) 
 
Variable Coefficient Significance 
Constant   4.442** 0.0000 
R3 - 0.9072* 0.0998 
R4 - 0.2468 0.9630 
BUYERAGE   0.1728 0.2623 
MAL - 0.1194** 0.0031 
JOINT  - 0.2263** 0.0000 
HHOLD   0.5365 0.6700 
PREMIUM   0.1504 0.4045 
BLDGAGE   0.1167** 0.0001 
INCLEV - 0.6862* 0.0505 
CSES - 0.3145** 0.0000 
CGDP   1.3890** 0.0000 
SHDBINT - 0.2366** 0.0000 
LTV   0.1189** 0.0078 
lossDLOSSLTV ××    4.6642** 0.0001 
lossDLOSS ×    3.7417** 0.0000 
GainssDGainsLTV ××  - 0.4683* 0.0583 
GainsDGains ×  - 0.7243** 0.0252 
Lambda   0.00929 
P              4.33661 
Log Likelihood –133.4559 
** Indicates significance at 5 per cent  level and * indicates 10 per cent level 
Notes: LTV, loan-to-value ratio, can take values of 1 and 0, and helps to identify the effect of  initial 
LTV  on mobility independent of equity constraints. lossDLOSSLTV ××  allows us to identify the 
effect of equity constraints and lossDLOSS ×  let us test whether loss aversion does affect mobility of 
households. GainsDGains × let us test the effect of nominal gains, without equity constraints, on 
mobility and GainssDGainsLTV ××  allows us to test the differential effect of  high LTV and 





 Source: Author’s computation 
 
Exhibit 6.1: Base Case Values 
Variable Base Case Value 
Initial price of current dwelling $300,000 
Initial price of desired dwelling $500,000 
Loan to value ratio 0.8 
Loan term, N 15 
N 5 
Length of each time step 1 
Initial mortgage rate 5.5% 
Initial risk free rate 2.5% 
Reversion parameter 0.3312 
Equilibrium interest rate 5.1682% p.a 
Interest rate volatility 2.2257% pa 
  
Rental Yield for desired housing 6% 
Rental yield for current dwelling 3% 
Housing return volatility for desired 
housing (std dev) 
6.09% 
Housing return volatility for current 
dwelling (std dev) 
6.49% 
Correlation between desired housing and 
current dwelling 
0.89 





Exhibit 6.2: Simulation of Option 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Exhibit 6.3: Parametric Model: Test of Volatility  
Dependent Variable: Log Duration 
 Test A 
Excluding CHDBPR and 
SPRICEVO 
Test B 
Excluding CRPI and HDBVOL 
Variable Coefficient  t 
statistic 
p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value 
CONSTANT 2.7992 13.392 .0000 2.8413 15.392 .0000 
MAL -.1427** -2.195 .0282 -.1045* -1.773 .0609 
IND -.8713 -1.272 .2033 -.8114 -.177 .8596 
R3 -.1333* -1.786 .0740 -.1178* -1.843 .0609 
R4 -.1905 -0.026 .9792 -.1045 -.177 .8596 
JOINT -.3608** -7.720 .0000 -.3406** -7.567 .0000 
BUYERAGE -.4361 -0.228 .8193 .1890 .101 .9198 
HHOLD -.6856 -.396 .6921 -.1408 -.888 .3747 
INCLEV -.1131** -2.643 .0082 -.6888** -2.115 .0345 
LV -.5007 -.424 .6714 -.1751 -1.628 .1036 
PREMIUM -.1110 -.628 .5300 -.2621 -1.598 .1101 
SHDBINT -.5597** -1.975 0.0483 .2474 1.261 .2072 
BLDGAGE .2128** 4.726 .0000 .1600** 3.353 .0008 
SMORTVOL 1.729** 12.707 .0000 1.1851** 12.166 .0000 
HDBVOL .7612** 4.318 .0000 - - - 
SPRICEVO - - .- .1381** 7.611 .0000 
CSES -.1232 -1.613 .1067 -.8426 -1.351 .1766 
CGDP 1.2389** 9.605 .0000 1.196 11.103 .0000 
CHDBPR - - - -.9153** -2.308 .0210 
PAYINC -.6005** -1.641 .1007 -.3060 -1.020 .3077 
CRPI -.5853 -1.004 .3125 - - - 
Lambda                       .009040* .00914* 
P                                  3.670813* 
Log likelihood             -195.1843 
.87675* 
-167.5428 
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Notes: * *Indicates significance at 5 per cent level and * indicates significance at 10 per cent 
level 
The data for this study were provided from a Housing Development Board (HDB) 
Branch Office of Singapore. From a total of 37,000 units in a constituency, a sample 
of 594 resale mortgages spanning a period from 1982 to 2000 is observed. The buyer 
characteristics are the age of the buyer (BUYERAGE), the dummy variables for  
Malay (MAL), Indians (IND). Other buyer characteristics include size of household 
(HHOLD), and the household income level (INCLEV). The household income level is 
computed by normalizing the reported household income with the overall household 
income adjusted to 1990 prices. The property related variables include dummy 
variables of 3-room (R3) and 4-room (R4), age of unit (BLDGAGE). The loan 
characteristics are loan- to- value ratio (LV) and the payment- to- income ratio 
(PAYINC). Other variables include the date of originations (PDATE) and the amount 
paid over the valuation (PREMIUM). The macroeconomic factors include the change 
in SES index (CSES), change in GDP (CGDP), change in HDB mortgage rate 
(CHDBMR), change in HDB index (CHDBPR), the HDB public rate at point of sale 
(SHDBINT), the change in private residential price index (CRPI), the private 
mortgage volatility rate at point of sale (SPMORTVOL).  Most importantly HDBVOL 
and SPRICEVO are defined as the price volatilities o f public and private housing.  
The HDBVOL and SPRICEVO are individually tested because the correlation 
between both variables is relatively high, at 0.61. In addition, the change in private 
price index and residential price index over the occupation period are not tested 














Exhibit 6.4: Test on Option 
Time-Varying Parametric Test 
Dependent Variable: Log Duration 
 TEST 1 
(Includes all 
observations) 
TEST 2  
(Excludes observations 




where purchases are made 





where purchases are 




 Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P 
Constant  175.6789 0.0000 159.3337 0.0000 163.8686 .0000 157.1218 0.0000 
R3 -0.1654* 0.0985 -0.2370* 0.0544 -0.2218* .0623 -0.2043* 0.0918 
R4 -0.1378 0.8740 -0.9675 0.3745 -0.9913 0.3519 -0.9766 0.3698 
BUYERAGE  -0.9170** 0.0003 -0.799388** 0.0144 0.7530** 0.0198 0.8228 0.1270 
MAL -0.4064** 0.0000 -0.5016** 0.0000 -0.4810** 0.0000 -0.5335** 0.0000 
JOINT -0.3275** 0.0000 -0.4665** 0.0000 -0.4511** 0.0000 -0.4720** 0.0000 
HHOLD -0.8432** 0.0003 -0.1086** 0.0005 0.1059** 0.0006 0.1084** 0.0006 
BLDGAGE  0.1216 0.8760 0.4760 0.5502 0.1017 0.1707 0.3588 0.6543 
INCLEV -0.1482** 0.0085 -0.1264** 0.0341 -0.1105* 0.0526 -0.1237 0.306 
CSES  -0.4618 0.2471 -0.3382 0.9406 0.9777 0.9825 0.4572 0.9921 
CGDP -10.3875** 0.0042 -9.9712** 0.0162 -9.9898** 0.0145 -11.0900** 0.0074 
MUP 0.2425** 0.0015 0.1269* 0.0998 0.1864** 0.0119 - - 
AMUP 0.2663** 0.0001 0.1966* 0.0950 - - 0.1233 0.1124 
OPTION 0.3983 0.1022 0.4003* 0.0560 - - - - 
INITIAL YEAR -0.8718** 0.0000 -0.7898** 0.0000 -0.8128** 0.0000 -0.7784** 0.0000 
AMUP*OPTION - - - - 0.1587 0.4487 - - 
MUP*OPTION - - - - - - 0.2726** 0.0117 
LAMBDA 0.10723  0.13555  0.13628  0.13556  
P 2.33229  2.79316  2.8168  2.7740  
Log Likelihood -918.1023  -449.0650  -451.6100  -450.2036  
         




Notes: R3 takes the value of 1 if the household currently lives in a 3-room flat, else 0. R4 takes the value of 1 if the household currently lives in a 4-room flat, 
else 0. BUYERAGE represent the buyer’s age. MAL takes the value 1 if the household is Malay. JOINT takes the value 1 if the dwelling is jointly owned. 
HHOLD records the values of the number of members in the household. BLDGAGE refers to the age of the HDB dwelling, INCLEV refers to the income level of 
the household as compared to the average household in Singapore at the subject time, CSES and CGDP refers to the change in stock exchange index and change 
in GDP per capita. AMUP takes the value 1 if the housing is eligible for MUP. MUP takes the value 1 if the housing is confirmed to undergo upgrading. Option 
refers to the option premium derived in (81). INITIAL YEAR takes the value of the year when the current dwelling is purchased. AMUP*OPTION is the 
interactive variable between AMUP and OPTION, whereas MUP*OPTION is the interactive variable between MUP and OPTION. It is noted that we omit MUP 
and OPTION  for the last test and AMUP and OPTION for the third test, because of collinearity problems. 
*-10% significance level 
**- 5% significance level 
 




Exhibit 6.4 (a): Test on interaction between the influence of option and loss 
aversion/ Equity influences 
Dependent Variable :Log Duration 
Test: Time Varying Parametric (Weibull) Duration Model 
  
 Coefficient P 
Constant 321.13 .0000 
R3 -0.4721 .1483 
R4 -0.2982 .6447 
BUYERAGE -0.1443* .0819 
MAL -0.5055* .0992 
JOINT -0.1251** .0390 
HHOLD -0.3892** .0483 
BLDGAGE 0.7964 .1360 
INCLEV -0.3305* .0640 
CSES -0.5988 .1099 
CGDP -18.8276** .0000 
MUP 0.1289** .0191 
AMUP 0.2712* .0551 
INITIAL YEAR -0.1599** .0191 
POPT*LOSS*CHDBPR  9.9509** .0000 
POPT*GAIN*CHDBPR -5.3055 .8002 
POPT*NTUI*CHDBPR  0.3497** .0000 
POPT*PTUI*CTUI -0.1653 .1350 
ZOPT*NTUI*CTUI -0.1300 .4430 
ZOPT*PTUI*CTUI -0.2608** .0135 
ZOPT*LOSS*CHDBPR 4.9589 .3214 
ZOPT*GAIN*CHDBPR -4.9965** .0000 
   
LAMBDA 0.1130  
P 5.02028  
Log Likelihood -290.3845  
   
Notes:  
5% level of significance: ** 
10% level of significance:* 
LOSS is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if CHDBPR is less than 0, and GAIN  is a dummy variable and takes  the value 1 if 
CHDBPR is more than 1.  POPT  is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if the option premium to wait is   more than zero. ZOPT  
is a dummy variable and takes the value  1 if the option premium to wait is zero. NTUI is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if 
the relative TUI over the length of stay drops. PTUI is a dummy variable and takes the value 1 if the relative TUI over the length of 
stay rises. CTUI captures the relative change in TUI over the length of stay. 




Exhibit 7.1 :Reasons Against MUP (420 respondents voted against MUP) 
 
Reason  Frequency Percentage 
High Costs 209 49.7% 
Moving in the future 24 5.7% 
Does not substantially 
increase dwelling’s value 
109 26% 
Have renovated the 
apartment recently 
103 24.5% 
Very Inconvenient  179 42.6% 
Happy with the current 
conditions 
85 20.0% 
Bad Design 26 6.2% 
Unemployed 5 1.2% 
Takes a  long time to finish 
development 
14 3.3% 
Source: Author’s survey 
 
 
Exhibit 7.2 :Reasons for MUP (452 respondents voted for MUP) 
 
Reason  Frequency Percentage 










Improved amenities  119 26.3% 




Source: Author’s survey 
 
Exhibit 7.3: Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
11_20 Takes value 1if the owner is willing to pay/receive 11-20% of 
costs to overturn any unfavorable outcome 
20_30 Takes value1  if the owner is willing to pay/receive 21-30% of 
costs to overturn any unfavorable outcome 
>_30 Takes value 1 if the owner is willing to pay/receive >30% of costs 




AGE Age of Owner 
AREA Takes value 1 if at owner lives in Pandan Garden 
HHOLD Household size 
TIER Takes value 1 if the owner received tertiary education 
INTERMEDIATE Takes value 1 if the owner received intermediate education 
MALAY Takes value 1 if the owner is Malay 
INDIAN Takes value 1 if the owner is INDIAN 
PDATE Date of purchase of flat 
TYPE Type of flat 
RETURN Nominal Return  
SELFEMPL Take value of 1 if the owner is Self-employed 
UNEMPL Take value of 1 if the owner is Unemployed 
PROFF Take value of 1 if the owner is Profession 
GSKILL Take value of 1 if the owner is General-skilled workers 
HHOLDINC Household Income 
MARRIED Take value of 1 if the owner is married 
R4 Take value 1 if owner lives in 4 room 
R5 Take value 1 if owner lives in 5 room 
 
Exhibit 7.4: Descriptive Statistics of Households interviewed 
 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum  
11_20 0.57 0.23 0 1 
20_30 0.27 0.16 0 1 
>_30 0.53 0.22 0 1 
AGE 48.38 10.762 22 87 
HHOLD 3.82 1.234 1 8 
TIER 0.1 0.301 0 1 
INTERMEDIATE 0.633 0.482 0 1 
MALAY 0.163 0.3704 0 1 
INDIAN 0.090 0.28 0 1 
PDATE 1989 8.8827 1968 2004 
RETURN 1.1134 1.008 -0.202 2.05 
SELFEMPL 0.1502 0.3759 0 1 
UNEMPL 0.2465 0.4312 0 1 
PROFF 0.2947 0.4561 0 1 
GSKILL 0.3084 0.4621 0 1 
HHOLDINC 2858 1755 0 8000 
MARRIED 0.899 0.3759 0 1 
R4 0.27 0.4439 0 1 
R5 0.44 0.4971 0 1 






Exhibit 7.5: Test for Disutility and voting decisions 
Probit model: Dependent Variable: For MUP 
 


































Constant 1.800 4.607 1.2673 3.2953 7.3917 6.3882 
R4 -0.2182 -0.2435 -0.2489 -0.1518 -0.2421 -0.2782* 
R5 -0.4399** -0.4583** -0.4738** -0.3341* -0.4028* -0.4519** 
AGE -0.1256** -0.7991 -0.1039* -0.1311** -0.1320** -0.1236** 
AREA -0.8476** -0.8292** -0.7994** -0.8768** -0.9818** -0.9667** 
HHOLD 0.9761** 0.1002** 0.9643** - 0.8787**   0.8467** 
TIER -0.4303** - - -0.4756** 0.5250** -0.4844** 
INTERMEDIATE 0.8092 - - 0.6137 0.9034 0.9700 
MALAY 0.2490 0.7729 0.8293 0.9053 0.5691 0.4248 
INDIAN 0.6253 0.8407 0.8817 0.1091 0.1393 0.1160 
PDATE -0.4399 -0.1956 -0.2394 -0.1028 -0.3129 -0.2632 
RETURN 0.1994 0.4153 0.4866 0.1994 0.13633 0.1838 
SELFEMPL - -0.6016 - - - - 
UNEMPL - -0.1613 - - - - 
PROFF - 0.2180 - - - - 
HHOLDINC - - 0.4937 - - - 
MARRIED - 0.7138 - 0.1045 - - 
11_20 - - - - 0.703** - 
21_30 - - - - -0.393 - 




11_20(HI) - - - - - 0.3803 
21_30(HI) - - - - - 0.7119** 
>_30(HI) - - - - - -0.8189** 
11_20(LOW) - - - - - 1.1186** 
21_30(LOW) - - - - - -0.3805 
>_30(LOW) - - - - - -1.4625** 
Log-likelihood -519.3743 -523.2853 -523.6696 -521.9574 -106.9307 -490.4979 
       
*-10% sig level** 5 significance level 
Notes: We add one additional test to observe whether owners who are married would vote for the project. The result shows that whether households are married 
or not does not influence the households’ decision to vote. 11_20(HI), 21_30(HI), >30(HI) represents the disutility or amount an owner would receive or pay to 
overrule the decision. 11_20(LOW), 21_30(LOW), >30(LOW) represents the disutility or amount a rich owner would receive or pay to overrule the decision. 
TYPE represents the type of housing. 





Exhibit 7.6: Parametric Duration Test 
Dependent Variable: Log (Duration of Stay) 
 TEST1  
(To test whether 
the probability to 
vote for MUP 
changes and affect 
decision to vote) 
TEST2 
















owners more than 




owners living in 4 
and 5 room flats 
 Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P 
Constant 4.6066** .0000 3.1101** .0000 5.3050** .0000 4.073** .0000 5.3050** .0000 
R3 - - 0.8074 .4687 - - - -   
R4 - - -0.8267 .9355 - - - -   
BUYERAGE - - 0.1115** .0003 - - - -   
MAL -0.4504** .0000 -0.4375** .0000 -0.6382** .0000 -0.4914** .0000 -0.6382** .0000 
IND -0.4362** .0007 -0.4354** .0006 -0.9027** .0000 -0.4381** .0038 -0.9027** .0000 
JOINT -0.4544** .0000 -0.4019** .0001 -0.3354** .0119 -0.3816** .0012 -0.3354** .0119 
HHOLD -0.1290** .0000 0.1159** .0000 - - - -   
BLDGAGE -0.1198 .1198 -0.7468 .3901 -0.4321** .0021 -0.1307** .1513 -0.4321** .0021 
INCLEV - - -0.2328** .0009 - - - -   
SHDBINT 4.0979* .6614 -13.1117* .0697 -18.1762* .0928 -13.7662 .1117 -18.1762 .0928 
CSES -0.2208 .6453 -0.6242 .1924 -0.5861 .4454 -0.8471 .1357 -0.5861 .4454 
CGDP 10.1717 .1082 -1.8758 .7142 -9.4624 .2802 -6.3894 .2792 -9.4624 .2802 
AMUP*TUI - - -5.7018** .0330 -5.2132* .0834 -5.4368 .0739 -5.2133 .0834 
AMUP*CHDBPR - - -252.15** .0012 -302.54** .0013 -382.8857 .0001 -302.5440 .0013 
TUI -0.1788** .0005 - - - - - -   
AMUPPROB 0.3541 .1394 - - 0.5416* .0789 0.5482 .0532 0.5416 .0789 
MUPPROB 0.1383** .0277 - - 0.3894* .0858 0.4070 .0011 0.3894 .0852 
HDBVOL -3.4438** .0002 -4.8316** .0000 -4.2674** .0009 -4.7000 .0000 -4.3674 .0009 
LV -1.0351** .0000 -0.7570** .0000 -1.042** .0000 -0.7570 .0000 -1.0429 .0000 
           
           
LAMBDA 0.08074  0.08962  0.08791  0.08981  0.08791  
P 1.96659  1.94104  1.73292  1.76249  1.73292  
Log Likelihood -941.2537  -937.7676  -472.3609  -818.4321  -472.3609  





Notes: AMUP*CHDBPR refers to the change in housing price during the period where MUP is likely to be announced. AMUP*TUI  refers to the upgradability 
index during the subject period. AMUPPROB is the probability that household will vote for MUP after the 18 year benchmark but before the announcement. The 
probability is computed by substituting the significant parameters derived in Exhibit 23 and values of this sample.  MUPPROB is the probability that households 
will vote for MUP when it is announced. As shown in the second test, the relationship of the probability to vote actually becomes significant at the point of MUP. 
This implies that most of the households who were against the upgrading has left by the time MUP has be announced. It is likely that households, who oppose the 
program, learn of the strategy of moving, and the probability of winning. The new knowledge gained over time convince them to leave. 
 






1.1 Option to default and move 
We omitted the households’ right to default because of the institutional setup 
in Singapore- the government tolerance for delinquent payments.  Assuming a 
different setup, we surmise that the households’ decision to default is unlikely to affect 
our model, if most mortgages undertaken are adjustable rate mortgages. Similar to the 
households’ flexibility to move, households also have the option to default their 
mortgage. The finance literature view mortgage default as a put option; borrowers 
have the right to demand that lenders purchase their properties in exchange for the 
elimination of their non-recourse mortgage. The key idea of these option based models 
is that the likelihood of default increases as the market value of equity declines. This 
happens when property values declines or mortgage value increases (Kau et al, 1995). 
Thus, the movements of local property prices, interest rates, along with the related 
vitalities, are the main variables explaining default. 
 
Nevertheless, the competing risks models (Deng, 1997; Hilliard, Kau and 
Slawson, 1998), which postulate that prepayment and default are competing risks. 
Since the mortgage rates are adjusted frequently, the motivation to refinance to take 
advantage of the lower market rates is weak, and the decision to prepay is 
synonymous to the households’ decision to move. Furthermore, given that capital 
gains are critical to the constrained households to move up, we expect the movements 




this case, the risk to default may not be ‘competing’ with the risk to prepay or move, 
assuming that the borrowers can afford the income payments. 
 
Assuming that mortgage payments are affordable, a borrower will default its 
mortgage, the capitalized value of its interest and principal repayments must be more 






































DefV  is the value of defaulting the mortgage, 
VL /  is the loan to value ratio, 
nik
MC ,  is the mortgage constant with interest i, and term n, 
knik
PVAF −,  is the present value annuity factor at interest ki , and term n-k, 
jr  is the discount rate at time j, 
jP  is the price at time j, 
jC is the transaction cost involved in default at time j, 





As shown in (1), the higher the mortgage rate, the less the principal payments, 
and the slower the erosion of the mortgage loan.14 This implies that default risk is 
more likely if mortgage rates are high, because much of the loan has yet to be 
amortised. Alternatively, a higher house price is likely to discourage households from 
defaulting their homes. Borrowing the real option concept, we expect the households 
to delay the option to default if the mortgage volatility  and the housing price volatility 
to be high.  
 
The empirical findings on households’ decision to default have been mixed. 
On the one hand, Clauretie (1987), Zorn and Lea (1989), Canner et. al. (1991), Gabriel 
and Rosenthal (1991) and Kau et. al. (1994) found that house price volatility to be 
negatively and significantly related to the foreclosure rate. On the other hand, 
Schwartz and Torus (1993) found otherwise and Vanderhoff (1989) found the variable 
not significant in explaining foreclosure. Yet, besides the study by Zorn and Lea 
(1989), the rest centered their analysis on fixed rate mortgages. The payment to 
income effect may reduce the importance of house price volatility. Hence, following 
Zorn and Lea (1989), we believe that the higher the house price volatility, the less 
likely the borrowers will default their mortgage. Using the real option framework, 
higher price volatility will induce households to defer their decision to default because 
there is a high chance that the price will increase in the next period.  Our model on 
option to move will not be affected with the added option to default. 
                                                 
14 If we include the income effect, the impact of the decrease in amortization rate because of higher 




1.2  Hedonic Regression 
One of the problems we faced was the lack of price indices for different types 
of HDB flats. Without the price indices, we assume the price volatility for each type of 
public housing is the same, but this may not be true. In addition we cannot determine 
whether the price of each type of housing perfectly correlated. In order to overcome 
the problem, we create the price indices for the three types of housing, 3 room, 4 room 
and 5 room flats by using hedonic regression. Our sample consists of 14, 399 HDB 
transactions, and spanned from Jan 1997 to June 2000. Although the three year period 
is short for our hedonic regression, the price derived from the data helps indicate 
whether our assumption is reasonable and offers us the correlation among the prices 
for different types of HDB housing.  
 
Hedonic equations provide one way to decompose expenditures on housing 
into measurable prices and quantities so that the prices for different dwellings or for 
identical dwellings in different places can be predicted (Green and Malpezzi, 2003). 
The individual characteristics of the dwelling are represented as independent variables 
at the right hand side of the equation, with the price on the left. The regression 
coefficients can be further transferred into estimates of the implicit prices of the 
characteristic. Following past literature, the fundamental regression equation can be 
denoted as follows:  
 







S= structural characteristics, 
N=neighborhood characteristics, 
L= location within market, 
C=contract conditions, 
T= time value is observed. 
 
Although there is no strong theoretical basis for choosing any specific 
functional form for a hedonic regression (Halvorsen and Pollakowski,1981, Rosen, 
1974), most studies use the log-linear form for five reasons (Malpezzi, 2003). First, 
the semi-log model allows for variation in the dollar value of a particular characteristic 
so that price of one component depends in part on the house’s other characteristics. 
Second, the coefficients of a semi-log model have a simple and appealing 
interpretation. Third the semi-log form often mitigates the common heteroskedasticity 
problem. Fourth, the semi-log models are computationally simple and last, it is 
possible to build specification flexibility into the right hand side, using dummy 
variables or splines.  
 
As shown in the review by Malpezzi (2003), the following independent variables 
are usually included: 
 Rooms, in the aggregate, and by type 




 Structure type (single family, multi-family, number of units, number of floors,) 
 Age of unit 
 Structural features 
 Type of cooling systems 
 Structural materials and qualities of finish 
 Neighborhood variables- school, socio-economic characteristics of the 
neighborhood, 
 Distance to the central business district, sub-centres; access to shopping and 
other important amenities 
 Characteristics of the tenant that affect prices: length of tenure, utilities 
 Date of data completion. 
 
In addition to above independent variables, we include dummy variables to capture 
the influence of main upgrading works. As mentioned in the Chapter 3, the upgrading 
is likely to increase the value of the flat, because of the subsidy.  
 
The regression equation is further described in the following equation 
 
∑ ×+= PERIODTYPEXiceLog it  typeperiod,')(Pr βα ,  
where  
'
tX is the vector of housing attributes, 
+α is the vector of regression coefficients of the housing attributes, 




iTYPE  consists of dummy variables representing the different types of housing 




The index is further obtained by the following 
%100498,3,, ×= − QperiodtypeePI periodtype ββ , 
 
where the 3-room is the base case and 4th quarter 1998 is the base quarter. 
 
The results of the regression are further shown in Exhibits A1 and the price 
indices of the different types of housing are plotted in Exhibit A2. The correlation 
between the prices of 3 room and 4 room is 0.58 and the correlation between that of 3 
room and 5 room apartments is 0.5. The movements for the different types of housing 





Dependent Variable : Log Price 
 












































































































R- Square: 0.944 
Adjusted R-Square: 0.943 
Notes: log_age represents the age of the dwelling in its log function and log_area 
represents the floor area of the dwelling in its log function. poll is a dummy variable 
and takes the value one if the dwelling is undergoing polling for MUP. prog is a 
dummy variable and takes the value one if the dwelling is undergoing through the 
improvement process. mup takes the value 1 if the dwelling has undergone MUP. We 
also include 24 dummy variables representing the town which the dwelling is located 
in. The 24 towns are Ang Mo Kio (amk), Bedok( bedok), Bishan (bishan), Bukit 
Batok (bbatok), Bukit Merah (bmerah), Bukit Panjang (bpanjang), Chao Chu Kang 
(cck), Clementi (clementi), Geylang (geylang), Hougang (hougang), Jurong East (je), 
Jurong West (jw), Kallang/Whampoa (kw), Pasir Ris (pasir), Queenstown (qtown), 
Sembawang (sbwang), Seng Kang (sengkang), Serangoon (sr), Toa Payoh (tp), 
Woodlands (wl), Yishun (yishun), Bukit Timah (btimah), and Marine Parade (mp). 
ptehsg takes the value 1 if the dwelling is within 300 metres to a private residential 
estate else 0. expway takes the value 1 if the dwelling is within 300 metres to an 
expressway else 0. mrtstn takes the value 1 if the dwelling is within 300 metres to a 
MRT station else 0.  busint takes the value 1 if the dwelling if the dwelling is within 
300 metres to a bus interchange else 0. primary if the dwelling is within 300 metres to 
a primary school else 0. shopctr takes the value 1 if the dwelling is within 300 metres 
to a shopping center else 0. industry takes the value 1 if the dwelling is if the dwelling 
is within 300 metres to an industrial estate else 0. The remaining variables capture the 
changes in market values. q stands for quarter, and the following number represents 
the quarter the dwelling is sold. The subsequent two digits represent the year the 
dwelling is transacted. rm12 stands for 1-2 room apartments, rm3 stands for 3-room 
apartments, r4 stands for 4-room apartments, r5 stands for 5-room apartments and 
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